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ABSTRACT 
Prominent military figures, both contemporary and historical have, through both personal 
example and their promotion of critical literacy initiatives, emphasised the role of 
professional reading in the development of the professional wisdom that underpins effective 
military leadership. While biographical studies hint at a connection between the 
extracurricular reading habits of notable military figures and the development of their 
professional wisdom, the majority of studies on military leadership development focus either 
through the context of experience or on development through the medium of formal 
educational programmes. Considering the time and resources invested in formal educational 
programmes, and the highly incremental nature of self-development that makes its utility 
difficult to measure, it is understandable but not acceptable that continuous, career-long self-
development through professional reading receives scant attention.  
Using a hermeneutically derived conceptual framework as an analytical tool, this research 
explores the intellectual component of military leadership, as embodied in the idea of the 
warrior-scholar, and the role the phenomena of reading, text, and canon, play in the 
development of the cognitive skills – critical, creative, and strategic thinking – necessary for 
successful leadership in complex institutions and environments.  
The research seeks to contribute original insights into the role that professional reading 
actually plays in the intellectual development of military leaders. The research also seeks to 
determine the extent to which a military canon that embodies professional military wisdom 
exists, and the relationship that this canon might have on the development of military leaders 
in the contemporary environment. 
The research was conducted through an engagement with literatures in multiple disciplines 
and 18 open-ended in-depth research interviews with 24 emerging and established military 
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leaders, and defence academics, in New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Israel and the United States on the role reading plays in their professional 
development. Data have been analysed through literature mapping and the deployment of 
theme discovery and interpretation-centred analysis methods.  
In particular, this thesis has examined the artefact of the professional military reading list as 
used across nations and individual armed services as a component of contemporary 
professional military education for commissioned and non-commissioned officers at tactical, 
operational and strategic leadership levels.  
The research has confirmed the utility of the reading list approach as a means of promoting 
professional reading, particularly to assist officers: 
• prepare for a posting or campaign 
• prepare for formal professional military education courses 
• aid developmental activities towards promotion 
• broaden general knowledge, and 
• cultivate professional military knowledge in breadth and depth. 
The research has found that reading lists are syllabi for the informal mode of professional 
military education, particularly to supplement the study, in breadth and depth, of military 
history, strategy and doctrine, the art of war, and leadership in command. The research has 
also examined the construction and implementation of the reading lists and developed twenty 
principles for the development of reading lists for practical use by militaries globally. 
The research has critically engaged with canon as a concept. While it has not found that the 
canon concept in its ‘pure’ form as understood in literature studies can be usefully applied to 
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military education, a set of core texts have been identified as being highly valued by 
militaries globally for the education of officers. 
Although the research did not seek to prove the link between reading and the development of 
military leaders, such an approach being inconsistent with the methodological lens adopted, 
the research does however indicate that professional reading in breadth and depth is as 
important a component in the development of military wisdom as is training, experience, and 
formal education. 
 
Keywords: Wisdom, military leadership, hermeneutics, self-development, reading, canon, 
professional military education. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCING THE READER-LEADER 
“Everything man is and does is modified by learning and is therefore malleable. But 
once learned, these behaviour patterns, these habitual responses, these ways of 
interacting gradually sink below the surface of the mind and, like the admiral of a 
submerged submarine fleet, control from the depths. The hidden controls are usually 
experienced as though they were innate simply because they are not only ubiquitous 
but habitual as well”.                                                                                                   
Edward T. Hall (1977, p.42) 
 
In this introductory chapter I introduce the inspiration for my topical focus and its policy 
context, and outline my research questions and the thesis approach and structure. I close the 
chapter by highlighting the original contribution the thesis makes to the literature and to 
professional military practice. 
Developing military leaders 
Militaries have historically invested considerable time, energy, and talent in education and 
leader development (Masland and Radway, 1957, Barnett, 1967, Hirai and Summers, 2005). 
Senior leaders have long recognised that growing a quality force of professional, well-trained, 
and highly creative men and women requires a long-term commitment to educational 
excellence (Shelton, 2001). In theory, the role of, and benefits from, a professional military 
education system that is adequately resourced and institutionally championed are many.   
The role of a military education system is: to develop creative, adaptive, and motivated 
leaders who, in turn, stimulate and sustain professional and intellectual development 
throughout the force; provide the service commands with trained personnel who are adept in 
the latest doctrine and warfighting techniques; and create a leadership culture confident in 
anticipating and planning for the future (Abbe and Halpin, 2009, Allen, 2010, Raymond et 
al., 2010). The benefits of professional military education include: the promotion of open and 
informed debate towards the refinement of operational concepts; the promotion of self-
development through learning innovations, professional publications and conferences 
(Shelton, 2001).  
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As Shelton (2001) notes however, sustaining the education and development of military 
leaders has long been a competition between the fiscal and operational constraints of the 
present and the long-term well-being of the force. This thesis seeks to focus on an aspect of 
professional military education: self-development through professional reading. In contrast to 
training and experiential development processes, intellectual development through education 
is more incremental and delayed, and thus harder to quantify (McElhatton, 2010).  
Self-development through professional reading, a more evolutionary, incremental process, is 
even more difficult to quantitatively track and measure, contributing to the paucity of 
research on it within the broader field of military education studies. However, as illustrated 
through the opening quote from Hall (1977), it is this very evolutionary, incremental aspect 
which may contribute to a more deeply embedded form of learning, so gradually gained over 
time that it can seem innate.  
Genesis of this research 
This thesis has its origins in a body of work published as The Strategic Thinking of Major 
General Sir Howard Kippenberger (McElhatton, 2008b). As the title suggests, that work 
sought to establish to what extent the eponymous New Zealand General was a ‘strategic 
thinker’. While it was gratifying to see the case I made for the affirmative being upheld by 
some notable students of strategy (McLean, 2008, Till and Strachan, 2010), the more 
important product of that research has been the key questions it prompted. 
Kippenberger was a classic autodidact.  While he had tactical experience as a young man on 
the Western Front, prior to and throughout WWII he had no formal military education. A 
provincial lawyer and officer in the resource-impoverished New Zealand Territorial Force 
between the wars, his military education was conducted under the tutelage of the great 
authors of military history one-to-one in the privacy of his quiet study in small-town New 
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Zealand. A great leader, he learned his generalship largely through the books he bought or 
borrowed (Harper, 1997, McElhatton, 2008b, McLean, 2008). 
During the research into Kippenberger I began to perceive a certain behaviour of notable 
leaders of the WWII generation. While few were as purely autodidactic as Kippenberger, the 
notable leaders, commanders, innovators and thinkers of the period were predominantly 
voracious, reflective, and critical readers, accomplished and innovative trainers, and, to a 
greater or lesser degree, prolific writers.1 Their mastery of their profession, what I will term 
their ‘practical wisdom’, seemed to have been shaped by a complex interplay between their 
experiences as junior leaders, their cognitive growth through formal and informal personal 
development, and their contributions to organisational learning through training innovation 
and textual enhancement of the body of knowledge (Connell, 1964, Dietrich, 1989, Keegan, 
1991, Barnett, 1995, Perret, 1999, Hamilton, 2001, Shukman, 2002).  
While these leaders were ‘mould-breakers’ – exceptional individuals in unique times – they 
still present relevant cases or benchmarks for organisational learning and development in 
today’s militaries, and potentially for any complex organisation. As Argyris and Schön 
(1996) posited, individual practitioners are centrally important to organisational learning, 
“because it is their thinking and acting that influence the acquisition of capability for 
productive learning at the organisational level” (p.xxii).  
During this earlier research I was introduced to the New Zealand Army’s Professional 
Reading List.2 Further investigation revealed that similar formal lists were widely used across 
nations and individual armed services as a component of contemporary professional military 
                                                 
1
 The figures studied in this period were predominantly those junior officers of WWI who rose to senior 
positions in time to be operational and strategic commanders in WWII for all the major belligerent powers. This 
reading also introduced me to the major Soviet military intellectuals of this period many of whom were 
tragically caught up in Stalin’s purges of the late 1930s.  
2
 The NZ Army list was brought to my attention by former Chief of General Staff, Major General Piers Reid. I 
acknowledge his teaching and book-lending in light of his death in October 2012.   
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education for commissioned and non-commissioned officers at tactical, operational and 
strategic leadership levels. The various lists collected as part of this research from across the 
Anglophone and non-Anglophone world recommend long-acknowledged classics from 
ancient China and Napoleonic Prussia, to recent releases on insurgency, peacekeeping and 
global warming. The lists recommend works from business writers and philosophers, and 
some promote the reading of fiction genres like science-fiction as aids to the development of 
critical and strategic thinking in the military profession.  
So, at the nexus of the consideration of the ‘reader-leaders’ and the reading lists, a research 
question began to form: what is the influence of professional reading on the development of 
the leadership skills necessary for military command?  
Policy context 
Public policy practitioners have framed the contemporary operating environment as one 
moving from a management to a leadership paradigm (Hughes, 2012). The renewed focus on 
‘leadership’ resulting from dramatic organisational and operational change has made 
leadership development a critical strategy for public and private sector organisations 
(Thomas, 2006). Leadership development takes time, with large complex organisations like 
the armed forces recognising that the strategic leaders of the future are ‘grown’ early in their 
careers (Nestler, 2006).  
The education and development of public and private sector professionals is a large and 
diverse multi-billion dollar global industry (Doh and Stumpf, 2007, p.388). Despite the 
significance of this investment it has been estimated that less than 20% of organisations 
investing in leadership development actually evaluate the effectiveness of their leadership 
development programmes (Avolio et al., 2010).  
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Coupled with this, the leadership ‘space’ is increasingly marked by pressures on availability 
and time, resulting in a realisation that alternatives to the development solutions provided by 
traditional and formal education provision must be explored and promoted. Such alternatives 
need to satisfy a need for succinctness, convenience, and limited impact on time ‘on the job’ 
(Walker et al., 2005, p.2).  
An outcome of this research is to develop recommendations towards the professional 
development policies of the military. The importance of leadership development, and the 
sums currently spent on it despite endemic global recession, mean that the evaluation of low-
cost, high-impact alternatives to the prevailing status quo are a professional development 
policy priority. 
Later in this chapter I outline how my approach to literature is grounded in the ethos of 
strategic studies. At this point it is worth evoking one of the midwives of modern strategy 
Bernard Brodie (1973) who noted that, while strategy can accommodate “idle academic 
pursuit[s]”, it is primarily a pragmatic and practical activity, one striving to be ever “policy 
relevant” (pp.452-3).  
Research questions 
The three questions I address in this thesis are:  
1. What is the influence of professional reading-based self-development and non-formal 
education on the development of leadership skills in the military? 
2. Why and how are professional military reading lists developed, and what are their use 
and utility among their audience(s)?  
3. Is there an identifiable canon of key texts the military deem important to critically 
read for the development of leadership and command skills? 
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Thesis approach and structure  
The thesis is structured into four sections. In Chapter Two I outline the methodological 
approach, outline the conceptual framework developed to aid the exploration of my research 
topic, and describe the analytical frameworks and reflexive3 practices I have used to evaluate 
the qualitative and quantitative data. I have chosen this structural approach for two reasons: 
to explain upfront the rationale behind the utilisation of a conceptual framework to structure 
the literature review; to introduce the methodological approach which is itself a conceptual 
component for consideration. 
The literature review is then presented over Chapters Three to Six, each chapter focusing on 
elements of the conceptual framework. The broad focus of each chapter in the literature 
review can be summarised as concerning: practical wisdom and warrior leadership; critical 
literacy and the literary notion of canon; professionalism and the professional development of 
officers; and professional reading by the military. 
I present the research findings in Chapters Seven to Nine. The first of these chapters presents 
findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the professional military reading 
lists. The remaining two chapters in this section present findings from the qualitative analysis 
of the interviews I conducted with military officers and academics over the course of the 
research. 
Finally, in Chapters Ten and Eleven I discuss the findings before offering final conclusions in 
Chapter Twelve.  
This work seeks to contribute to both the broader strategic studies and leadership studies 
literatures. As Baylis and Wirtz (2002) note, the study of the broad field of strategy is an 
                                                 
3
 The terms ‘reflexion’ and ‘reflection’ will both be used in this thesis. Where reflexion is used, this is to denote 
self-analysis, an aspect of the hermeneutic process. Where reflection is used, this is to denote contemplation of a 
theme. 
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interdisciplinary endeavour (p.3). The student of strategy, particularly in its classical, pre-
nuclear form, is a generalist by calling, a grasp of the subject requiring familiarity with the 
humanities and the social and natural sciences (p.3). Acknowledging that strategic studies 
“notoriously lacks a clear discipline”, Strachan (2002) notes that it is a subject of “component 
disciplines” (p.5). Analysing strategic questions requires interdisciplinary lenses (Tsakiris, 
2006, p.173). For Perucci and McManus (2013) the study of leadership has a long 
interdisciplinary history dating back centuries, past Machiavelli, to Plato and before (p.49). 
While this research is not concerned with semiotics, symbols and visual memes are 
subliminally important to the study. The technical difference between an artistic image and 
visual writing is essentially that the former conveys subjective or personal meaning, while the 
latter is an institutionalised means of conveying a message capable of being understood in the 
same way by all those who are using the writing system (Crystal, 1997, p.198). However, 
beyond the elementary or merely functional, deriving meaning from the writings of another, 
particularly one long dead and/or from another culture, can also be an exercise in the 
subjective. As I have written about elsewhere, the understanding of any phenomenon is an 
exercise in engagement with, and interpretation of, the range of its ‘cultural texts’; its 
symbols, traditions, language, biographies, doctrines etc. (McElhatton and Jackson, 2012). 
This thesis will use visual images beyond the need to merely represent data; but also to 
convey meaning. As in Figure One, the Allegory of Prudence from the tomb of Francis II, 
Duke of Brittany can be used to illustrate consciousness of time and place. Prudentia, one of 
the ancient virtues that the Romans derived from the Greek idea of phronesis that will be 
considered in due course, is represented in the tomb as having two faces; one of an old man 
looking backwards to the wisdom of the past, the other of a young woman facing the future. 
She holds a pair of compass dividers, long used in art as a symbol of reason, vision and 
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imagination (Janson, 1970, p.472), and a mirror, the symbol of contemplation and truth. The 
allegory is that of practical wisdom and the forces of change and continuity. 
 
Figure One: The Two Faces of Prudence (Jibi44, 2005) 
The representation of Prudentia symbolises a second way to consider my approach to 
literature, through the prism of canon. Without pre-empting the later discussion on canon, it 
should be pointed out that certain works from the mooted literary canon have woven their 
ideas into the thesis. While this was subconscious initially, my reading of these works has 
been an exercise in reinforcement, the power of the works acknowledged by both their covert 
and overt impact on my thought.  
During the thesis narrative it will be necessary to quote from both primary sources (e.g. 
interviews and source documents) and secondary sources (e.g. key texts). Where an extended 
quotation is taken from a primary source:  
It will be presented indented with no spacing. 
 
Where it is taken from a secondary source: 
It will be presented indented and italicised with no spacing. 
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Original contribution 
This research makes an original contribution to the literature and to professional practice 
through: 
• conducting the first quantitative and qualitative review of professional military 
reading lists across national and service boundaries 
• updating the literature on the influence of professional reading on military leadership 
development through an interdisciplinary literature review and qualitative engagement 
with military leaders and academics 
• the application of the hermeneutic method to a military leadership context 
• the formation, propagation, and validation of principles for the development of 
professional reading lists. 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHOD 
Introduction 
Three primary research methods have been employed for this inquiry: a reflexively-driven 
hermeneutic engagement with discrete literatures relevant to the components of the 
conceptual framework; a documentary analysis of 67 multi-service contemporary military 
reading lists drawn from 19 national contexts; and 18 semi-structured interviews and 
correspondence with 24 emerging and established military leaders, and defence academics. In 
this chapter I outline the methodological approach adopted for the research, the data 
gathering process and the analytical framework used to interpret the data.  
In introducing the methodological stance adopted for the research it is important to highlight 
its role in guiding the ontological and epistemological cast of the research as well as its role 
as a fundamental component of the conceptual framework used to posit and address our 
research question. Thus, I am using hermeneutics to guide my interpretation of my subject 
and I am considering the use of hermeneutics in the intellectual development of military 
leaders.   
Methodological approach 
In her consideration of the relationship between epistemology and methodology, and the 
extent to which the epistemological position we adopt prescribes which research methods we 
use, Willig (2001) highlights the difference between ‘method’ and ‘methodology’. 
Acknowledging that both terms are often used interchangeably, she distinguishes between a 
general approach to studying research topics – i.e. methodology – and the use of a specific 
research technique – i.e. method or what Hart (1998) describes as the ways and means 
employed to gather and analyse our data. Willig (2001) notes the importance of 
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distinguishing between the two terms because methodology is much more directly informed 
by the researcher’s epistemological position than method (p.8).  
The methodological approach the research takes is as much an epistemological stance as it is 
a methodology (Gadamer, 1960/1996, ps.505-6). The hermeneutic process has long focused 
on the pursuit of knowledge through critical engagement with the power and mystery of the 
written word (Abulad, 2007). This research seeks to understand the influence of professional 
reading on military leadership and the hermeneutics of leadership; how meaning is sought 
through the interpretive arts by decision makers.  
An engagement with the history of hermeneutics recalls a not so distant age when the gods 
and heroes of Homer provided parables and lessons for aspiring military leaders (Coker, 
2007). Importantly, through the history of the development of philosophical hermeneutics, an 
opportunity is presented to examine the German intellectual ferment, a by-product of which 
were the great innovations to military organisation, training, and theory of the nineteenth-
century (Gat, 1989) that continue to shape the military culture of our own day (Dupuy, 1977).  
As Crotty (1998, p.91) has noted, hermeneutics is “no mere academic exercise”, but a form of 
inquiry into the application of the meaning in texts. Given the policy context outlined in 
Chapter One, and the conceptual focus on practical wisdom, the applied character of my 
methodological approach serves to further rationalise the choice of methods and the particular 
form in which these have been used (Crotty, 1998, p.7).   
In Chapter Three, I note the nebulous nature of leadership. English (1999) has asserted that 
leadership is a topic that has been “veiled” or “obscured” by the dominant theories or 
metanarratives used to explore it, requiring an interpretive or hermeneutic approach to unveil 
its true essence. Grint (2005) has argued the perspective of leadership as a social 
construction. Arguing for an alternative epistemological and ontological approach to 
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leadership to the dominant empirical approach, Smith and Blase (1991) have advanced the 
hermeneutic perspective, holding that social reality is socially constructed, facts are not 
separate from values, and that the goals of inquiry are the interpretation of meanings and 
intentions (p.6). Pointing out that “the goal of hermeneutics is not prediction and control, but 
rather to realise an interpretative understanding of the meanings people give to their own 
situations and their interactions with others” (p.11), Smith and Blase (1991) cast leadership as 
a dialectical activity, one founded upon the social activities of debate and discussion (p.19). 
This considered, and while acknowledging that other researchers might approach this topic 
from alternative epistemological perspectives, I have chosen a hermeneutic lens to pursue this 
research. 
Modern philosophical hermeneutics – the basis of the modern methodological approach – has 
had a distinguished evolution from Schleiermacher and Dilthey in the nineteenth-century to 
Husserl, Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer and beyond in the twentieth-century (Bleicher, 
1980). Significantly for this study, this German-dominated philosophy grew in parallel to, 
and in largely the same intellectual environment as, the significant nineteenth-century 
contribution to military theory, history and the great reforms of the general staff and 
professional military education system I noted earlier (Gat, 1989, Strachan, 2007).  
Hermeneutics is an inquiry approach focussing on the interpretation of meanings inherent in 
human activity. It is a methodology with ancient roots. Apocryphally, the term hermeneutic is 
rooted in the persona of Hermes, messenger god of the Hellenes, “bearer of knowledge and 
understanding”, herald of the gods’ decisions to man (Crotty, 1998 p.88), the bridge of 
understanding between the sacred word and humanity. For the narrative at hand, Hermes is a 
useful metaphor; the transmitter of advice to strategising Odysseus representing the sage 
guidance ‘classics’ like The Iliad and Odyssey have to offer us.  
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Hermes serves also to represent the gap between endowed leadership and leadership learned. 
Homer relates how the great kingly scepter passed to mighty Agamemnon from the godhead 
Zeus, through Hermes to martial man in the persons of Pelops, “that fine charioteer”, and 
Atreus, the “marshal of fighting men” (Homer, c.800 BCE/1997 2:120-126). Thus while 
leadership is something endowed by the gods, it is done through the medium of knowledge 
and through our ancestor technical tacticians and people-managers. Hermes serves us 
warning through time, however, on the dangers inherent in the task of correctly interpreting 
the words of the great. On accepting his role as herald he tells his father Zeus that he will, 
“never tell lies, though I cannot promise always to tell the whole truth” (Graves, 1960 p.65). 
Many readers of profound but difficult works like Clausewitz’ On War might attest to the 
enigmatic chasm that separates a truth from the whole. 
Finally Hermes, juxtaposed against his brother Apollo, is symbolic of the methodological 
tension between the scientific method and the phenomenological method. Apollo represents 
objective, aloof, scientism. Hermes, on the other hand, is not aloof and removed; he is down 
here among us. He represents duplicity, trickery, interpretation (Harpur, 2002 pp.70-2).  
Following the phenomenologists and the existentialists, Gadamer (1960/1996) saw in modern 
science a tendency to dominate and de-humanise experience. Rather than there being timeless 
universal truths waiting for the scientific method to reveal, for Gadamer (1960/1996) all 
knowledge, all understanding is interpretation, epistemology being therefore hermeneutic 
(ps.505-6). The hermeneutic view is that the attempt to determine knowledge or arrive at 
truth is, in fact, an exercise in interpreting or translating reality and language; and that our 
condition as finite, bounded beings means truth, in its metaphysical sense, is not available to 
us.  
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Gadamer (1960/1996) has written extensively on the evolution of the distinction between the 
social and the natural sciences. For the social sciences, the distinction is found in the German 
term for them, Geisteswissenschaften, where geist is ‘spirit’. When studying the phenomenon 
of reading we are examining something psychological, beyond the merely mechanical. The 
method must also therefore have a humanistic framework complementary to its logical 
framework. My inquiry into this human phenomenon, which itself concerns the study of 
human phenomena, thus necessitates my conclusions to be derived from artistic instinctive 
induction (Gadamer, 1960/1996). 
A tenet of the hermeneutics of Gadamer particularly is that human inquiry is embedded in 
‘horizon’, the limited perspective of an individual’s history, language and tradition. This 
perspective argues that, contrary to the assertion of science, the purely objective approach to 
human affairs is never possible, escape from the basic primal experience, the pre-theoretic 
experience of life as we live it, being beyond our innate ability. The conclusion of this 
perspective is the belief that we never come to know anything without an element of 
presupposition, the particular portion of reality we see always serving to prejudice us. 
Importantly, and constructively, the notion of prejudice doesn’t carry only it’s commonly 
meant pejorative implication, but can be helpful if acknowledged and refined as we correct 
our assumptions or seek new horizon (Gadamer, 1960/1996). 
Using Michrina and Richards’ (1996) schema, to illustrate the dialectical form of the 
hermeneutic inquiry (see Figure Two) on the surface a dialogue can be seen between 
researcher and cultural members or authors of a particular cultural text. In the case of the 
cultural members for this research – the military profession – their text has many volumes, 
editions and translations. The researcher also comes with acknowledged prejudice or bias and 
a particular horizon, though in this case one that is purposefully seeking expansion. The 
researcher engages with text, through the hermeneutic circle, in a cyclical, though 
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evolutionary process. For hermeneutics, a flaw in trying to apply the scientific method rigidly 
to human studies was the distraction of objectivity – humans are rarely objective so a study of 
human phenomena that failed to acknowledge the latent prejudice or bias of either the 
researcher or text would be untruthful (Michrina and Richards, 1996). 
 
Figure Two: The hermeneutic circle applied (after Michrina and Richards, 1996, pp.27-8) 
While the hermeneutic approach to textual analysis is, in the opinion of many theorists, 
consciously or unconsciously the bedrock of all contemporary criticism (Guerin et al., 1992, 
pp.296-7), the approach appears to be relatively uncommon, or at least unacknowledged, in 
studies relating to military leadership. Scholars who have chosen the hermeneutic path to 
study a similar topic to our own have looked, for example, at Robert E. Lee’s leadership at 
Gettysburg (Schlesinger, 2005) and the impact of adversity on leadership development 
(Haller, 2005).  
My own published research has used the hermeneutic method to explore two diverse, though 
related, textual phenomena. The inquiry into The Strategic Thinking of Major General Sir 
Howard Kippenberger (McElhatton, 2008b) used the hermeneutic circle to interpret the 
critical annotations of this already discussed figure. The consideration of Chinese models of 
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leadership (McElhatton and Jackson, 2012) used the hermeneutic method to engage with 
texts from the classical Taoist canon. 
Development and use of a conceptual framework 
Metaphorically, the qualitative focus of my enquiry would be akin to a Russian doll: the heart 
of the enquiry was nested within ever larger and related concepts that would have to be 
‘opened’ one-by one to reach the focus. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) describe theory building as being reliant on a few general 
constructs that subsume a “mountain of particulars” (p.18). These constructs or categories are 
then used to label the “intellectual bins” (p.18) we use to store a range of discrete phenomena. 
Labelling, arranging and defining the interrelationships between these bins leads one to a 
conceptual framework, a “visual or written product”, one that “explains, either graphically or 
in narrative form, the main things to be studied – the key factors, concepts, or variables – and 
the presumed relationships among them” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.18). 
For Maxwell and Loomis (2003) the conceptual framework for a study consists of the theory 
or theories relevant to the phenomenon being studied that inform and influence the research 
(ps.242, 245). Complementary to this, Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) see a conceptual 
framework as the usual basis for reframing the research questions and for “formulating 
hypotheses or making informal tentative predictions about the possible outcome” of a study 
(p.704). 
As Barrow (1977) has argued, the key to the concise conceptualisation of leadership, and its 
related phenomena, is elusive (p.231), thus supporting the use of analytical tools like 
conceptual frameworks to study it. As Elkins and Keller (2003) show, conceptual frameworks 
can help us to understand the relative importance of the environmental and contextual factors 
that impact on leadership (p.601). The decision to use a framework to model the research was 
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made when it became clear that my research topic embraced a range of contingent variables 
and factors. To create a more unified conceptualisation of our topic, a manageable approach 
to the research that could codify the variables would be necessary (Barrow, 1977, p.245). 
The framework developed over time and took shape as oral and paper presentations to peers 
exposed ‘chinks in the armour’, forcing on-going reconceptualisation of the linkages and 
relationships between the individual and emerging components of our research topic. The 
framework is comprised of what I term conceptual and contextual components. These 
components were identified throughout the literature review as having a relationship to the 
broader research topic.  
The first component I had to consider was the notion of professional reading, as exemplified 
by the active engagement with the military reading lists. This nestled within the broader 
concept of professional military education (PME), itself a subset of, and determinant of, 
professionalism. This relationship is shown in Figure Three.  
 
Figure Three: The domain of professionalism 
Now that I had contextualised ‘the act’, i.e. professional reading, I had to factor in its 
relationship to ‘the actor’, i.e. military officers. Referring back to Michrina and Richards’ 
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(1996) idea of cultural members, I had to interpret their cultural text – the tradition, symbols, 
doctrine, ethos etc. that make up their cultural whole.  
A rich vein of literature, complemented by pictorial source material,4 highlighted the 
resonating heritage of the military which I began to conceive in terms of ‘caste’, both in its 
historical ‘class’ sense, and in its meaning related to occupational position in society. In 
contrast, a further body of literature emphasised the professional identity of the modern 
officer corps. The overlap between these two identities of caste and profession was 
encapsulated by the term ‘modern warrior’ which emerged from the literature. 
Parallel to these literatures was a body of literature which debated continuity and change in 
the nature and character of war. The importance of the study of this debate in the 
development of officers’ professional judgement indicated that I would have to factor it into 
my considerations. The relationship between these concepts is shown in Figure Four. 
 
Figure Four: The domain of the modern warrior 
                                                 
4
 Richly illustrated works like Leventhal and Byrne (1973), Garrett (1976), McCormick and Darby Perry (1990) 
and Van Creveld (2000) provided much visual fodder for conceptualising the heritage aspect of the officer 
identity.  
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To this point I had a means by which to conceptualise the act – i.e. professional reading – and 
the actor – i.e. the modern warrior – but there remained the conceptualization of the 
relationship between the two. To do this I had to explore some discrete, but inter-related 
concepts.  
The first of these related to what was being read, (i.e. the books, journals, professional texts 
etc.). A follow on from the research on Kippenberger was the idea that there were military 
classics that formed a body of core texts or ‘canon’ that was important to study if one was to 
master the military arts. Engaging with these texts would not be a passive exercise but one of 
critical engagement. My professional work on literacy developed a conception of ‘critical 
literacy’ that could help explore this engagement which I conceived as being a fundamentally 
hermeneutic process. 
A teleological aspect to the research topic emerged. What was the end or utility of this 
professional reading? While the end point of ‘mastering the military arts’ seemed a 
reasonable utility for the activity of professional reading, it didn’t quite reflect the idea of 
something internalised as suggested by Hall’s (1977) quote at the beginning of this thesis. 
The end-point of ‘wisdom’, at least in its Aristotelian ‘practical’ form, seemed an ideal 
concept to explore, particularly as I felt it sat comfortably with the equally opaque notion of 
leadership, the field of inquiry I had one foot planted in. The relationship between these 
concepts is shown in Figure Five. 
The challenge for the research was then to link these disparate, but related, concepts together 
into a conceptual whole that I could use to explore the topic holistically. Inter-relating the 
three domains that related to act, actor, and teleology of action, I depicted a conceptual 
framework as illustrated in Figure Six. In line with Miles and Huberman (1994), this 
framework provides a construct to enable me to build theory on the “mountain of particulars” 
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(p.18) that comprises the whole of my topical focus. The framework will provide the shape 
for the literature review and the discussion of my research findings. 
 
Figure Five: The domain of leadership  
In addition to this, as Muller (2008) demonstrates, modelling professional knowledge and 
learning using conceptual and contextual continuums reflects both the way our educational 
institutions have changed their orientation and mission, and the way we have changed our 
conception of the utility and function of theoretical or liberal learning and practical or 
vocational learning. This is a key referent because, while the inquiry has some rather abstract 
qualities, its purpose is wholly towards application. 
 
Figure Six: Thesis conceptual framework  
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Reflexive account 
Reflexion and reformulation of understanding are vital components of the interpretive art 
and, as highlighted in Michrina and Richards’ schema, is integral therefore to the 
hermeneutic circling through, and engagement with, the cultural text. To ensure that any truth 
claims or assertions drawn from analysis of our data are able to be properly contextualized 
and perspectivised for both researcher and reader, an acknowledgement of the researcher’s 
particular prejudice and horizon must form the starting point for the reflexion and 
reformulation. 
As Steier (1991, 1995) has noted, the concept of reflexion has its origins in reference, not to 
things, but rather to patterns, particularly to patterns embedded in relationships. Reflexion, 
literally a bending back onto ones-self is, accordingly, a diverse process depending on the 
particular relationship being subjected to reflexion, but includes the application and 
reapplication of the researcher’s experience to the patterns in the relationship being 
researched (1995, p.63). 
With this in mind, this research includes a reflexive account which is built into the thesis 
narrative. Reflexion draws on the researcher’s own intellectual and professional background 
and perspective where it provides context for any analytical approach to the literature or data.  
The non-use of data analysis software 
Before I outline the method and analytical framework it is important to highlight an important 
impact of the methodological approach on my method. As shown, the hermeneutic method 
relies on an interpretative interaction between researcher and the researched – i.e. the ‘data’ – 
to arrive at an eventual understanding (Bernstein, 1983). The data is not the object of the 
inquiry, merely, as Bleicher (1980) shows, the material for the task at hand (p.82), or for 
Bubner (1981) the structural ordering between one theme – in this case professional reading – 
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and the many contributions (p.154) – in this case the elements of my conceptual framework 
and my qualitative data sets. While the literature on the hermeneutic method reveals 
disagreement by the major theorists on a range of issues (Marino, 2011), there is general 
agreement that ‘understanding’ is the basic posture of human life, dialogue as a means toward 
understanding and making the ‘strange’, or unknown, more familiar (Taylor and Mootz, 
2011, p.1). It is a very ‘human’ method. 
This was considered during the data collection period, when I was introduced to, and given 
the opportunity to use data analysis software, particularly NVivo. While engagement with 
this software package confirmed the potency of this tool, it raised questions regarding the 
compatibility of the use of such a tool with the philosophical inclinations of the chosen 
methodological approach.  
After some deliberation, I decided to preserve the epistemological purity of my approach by 
relying on the long-standing analytical methods of the pre-digital age. The reliance on hand-
coding had a number of impacts on the research, the labour-intensity of the method being the 
most obvious. While I leave the discussion regarding the question of the validity and 
reliability of my research findings to the conclusions chapter, a positive impact of my 
approach, the security of my data, should be highlighted.  
The hand-coding approach adopted was a ‘pure’ one: individual pieces of data, (i.e. reading 
lists or interview transcripts), were printed, coded by hand and analysed. This preference for 
the use of hard-copy data proved a boon when, in 2010, my main computer5 was infected 
with a particularly nasty Trojan virus. While much of the soft-copy data was lost, I was able 
to rebuild my data-sets through reference to the hard-copy versions.  
                                                 
5
 The whole of my research has been conducted remotely from my university with no use of that institution’s 
internal servers or network. While this was convenient for me, it also meant that I had to rely on my own system 
of back-ups and electronic security to protect my work. 
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Data collection 
Literature review 
A first task was to determine the extent of prior research on my topic broadly. While I had 
recourse to a body of literature on professional military education generally and studies of 
professional reading like Nye (1986), or studies of individual leaders like Dietrich’s (1989), I 
was unable to determine whether there existed any prior research on the artifact of the 
professional military reading list. 
The scoping of my research topic and subsequent development of the conceptual framework 
meant that a number of key literatures would have to be consulted. The related literatures of 
defence and strategic studies and military history were a significant focus, particularly that 
produced by research outputs from within the broader defence community. I drew from the 
literature of vocational education and education and learning psychology for an 
understanding of informal education and the act of reading respectively. Philosophy, 
literature studies, and leadership bodies of knowledge broadened my understanding of 
wisdom, command and canon. 
Complementary to my research topic, a distinctive approach taken to the literature review 
was a deliberate focus on book-based literature, and ‘riper’ works, particularly those texts 
identified by promoters of the canon as having some timeless message to impart.  
The analysis of the reading lists required a familiarity with the individual works on the lists 
themselves. While years of prior reading, including that done for undergraduate and 
Master’s-level study, provided familiarity with many of the texts, over the course of the 
research it was necessary to develop a broader understanding of the recommended works. 
This was done through a variety of means including: in-depth reading; skim reading sessions 
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physically in specialist libraries and online through tools like Google Books and Amazon’s 
‘read inside’ function; and book reviews in journals and specialist publications. 
Collection of reading lists 
The analysis for this paper is based on 67 multi-service contemporary professional military 
reading lists from nineteen national Anglophone and non-Anglophone contexts (Annex One). 
The lists for this study were predominantly gathered over a four year period, 2007 to late 
2011. The lists were sourced through: direct approaches to individual institutions and 
individual military contacts in New Zealand and abroad; systematic searches of institutional 
websites; and systematic web searches using a variety of phrases related to the artefact. The 
initial phase of the data gathering yielded the greatest numerical results in terms of individual 
lists, though these were overwhelmingly from the Anglophone world, and particularly from 
United States institutions.  
While the direct approaches to individual institutions in the non-Anglophone world resulted 
in only a minimal number of replies, positive or otherwise, it was important to the study that 
a perspective be gained on the diversity or homogeneity of the core and common readings 
international militaries were recommending to their cohorts. It was, therefore, vital to source 
a selection of lists from outside the Anglophone world. It was recognised that the initial 
approaches to non-Anglophone institutions were flawed by my use of the English language in 
communications and the assumption that, in the hyper-active working environment, 
addressees would respond to a ‘cold call’ in a language other than their own. A second web-
based search approach was adopted.  
Recognising that a search using only English language words and phrases would be unlikely 
to yield results from institutions where English was not the primary language, this second 
phase of data gathering was enacted with the specific aim of yielding military reading lists 
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from the non-Anglophone world. To do this, seven distinct search phrases – ‘professional 
military reading list’, ‘army/air force/navy reading programme’, and ‘army/air force/navy 
reading list’ – were translated into thirty-one key international languages using online 
translation programmes and used to systematically conduct further web searches. This 
approach yielded a smaller, but important, set of new national lists, primarily from Europe 
and Latin America. 
 
Figure Seven: Reading lists by region 
As illustrated in Figure Seven, slightly over 75% of the final lists gathered for this analysis 
were still from militaries in the Anglophone world, with over 50% from the United States. 
While the dominance of the sample by Anglophone lists might seem to negate a claim that 
the analysis of these lists will produce findings of a globally representative nature, three 
points should be highlighted that contribute towards a mitigation of the apparent Anglophone 
bias. The first point is that the United States is overwhelmingly the dominant influence on 
military thought and practice globally. With a significant military presence in over 130 
countries (Ferguson, 2004, pp.16-17), and considering that there are 192 member countries in 
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the United Nations  (2011), how the U.S. trains and educates its military leaders 
disproportionately influences how other nations train and educate theirs.  
The second point is that, referencing the indicative ‘military power rankings’ of an 
international defence analysis organisation (GlobalFirepower.com, 2011), the sample 
includes lists from five - U.S., India, UK, France and Germany - out of the ten most 
powerful, and arguably most influential, nations militarily. The military traditions of the three 
European powers mentioned have produced a disproportionately influential canon since at 
least the seventeenth-century (Van Creveld, 2000), much of it still of relevance today. The 
final point is that we should be wary of viewing the U.S. military organisations and 
institutions as being a homogenous or monolithic whole. Murray (1999, p.144) has argued 
that due to historical and operational differences, the five service arms and their sub-branches 
have evolved “extraordinarily different” cultures and worldviews. I argue that these three 
factors go some way to mitigating bias in the sample, a point I believe will be borne out in 
analysis. 
 
Figure Eight: Reading lists by service 
42 
 
As represented in Figure Eight, the sample reading lists have primarily been sourced from 
armies, military academies and joint forces initiatives, the last two displaying a considerable 
land-based focus. While again this points to bias in my sample, this time towards a land-
based view of military leadership, it needs to be acknowledged that, as services with a 
heavily mechanistic, technological and engineering approach to warfare, navies and air forces 
have long had an educational and training focus that reflected this (Murray, 1999, pp.144-5).  
Research interviews 
Ethical approval for the research interviews was approved by Victoria University of 
Wellington’s Pipitea Human Ethics Committee. The approval process involved the 
development of an information sheet and consent form (Annex Three) which would be 
supplied and explained to each interviewee prior to the formal interview. The information 
sheet detailed: 
• the style of interviewing – open-ended questioning  
• interviewee refusal and termination rights 
• data access and security 
• destruction of data – five years after completion of thesis 
• attribution and consent 
• intent of researcher to publish. 
Four categories of interviewee of interest to the research were identified: 
• serving military officers of Captain rank and above 
• retired military officers in academic positions 
• civilian academics working in military or defence related state institutions 
• civilian defence academics. 
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As illustrated in Figure Nine, in total 24 serving and retired officers, civilian defence officials 
and academics, from New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, United States, Canada, 
Israel and the United Kingdom were interviewed (Annex Two). Interviews were conducted 
from 2009 to 2013. The interviews were predominantly conducted face-to-face, but telephone 
and written correspondence interviewing methods have been used and were a prominent 
method used for the final suite of interviews. This was to ensure I had a broad range of data 
to draw from. 
 
Figure Nine: Interviewees by type 
Potential interviewees were identified using three criteria: 
• association or involvement with the development or promotion of military reading 
lists 
• command position 
• relevant position within a defence education or research institute 
• academic or professional publishing on leadership development and/or military 
education. 
15
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Serving military
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Potential interviewees were formally approached in writing. On acceptance, interviewees 
were supplied with the information sheet and a supplementary talking points sheet outlining 
the points I wished to cover with each interviewee. These points included generic topics 
relevant to my research questions and topics tailored to the individual based. Interviewees 
were given confidentiality and anonymity options but all waived these. 
Securing the interviews was the single biggest challenge of the project. A considerable 
amount of time was spent making the formal approaches, and a significant portion of those 
approached declined to take part in the research, mostly with no reason given for the decline. 
Some interviews that had been tentatively secured failed to happen due to a variety of reasons 
including change of working circumstance of the interviewee or time pressures. In one case, a 
series of previously confirmed interviews with officers from the national military academy of 
a country were cancelled in the eleventh hour prior to arrival in that country. This introduced 
an interesting cultural dimension to the research. 
This dimension related to the relative ‘openness’ of military culture generally and by 
individual nation and service. My experience of a certain wariness of engagement with non-
affiliated civilians by the military was confirmed during the research by other doctoral 
researchers from within the military who themselves experienced varying degrees of access 
issues depending on the particular culture being engaged with.  
While the interviews to date are quantitatively more biased towards serving or retired 
officers, the research is heavily influenced by the ideas and writings of a range of civilian 
academics who exert an influence on military thought disproportionate to their actual 
physical experience of war.  
On top of the interviews I conducted towards this research, I have relied heavily on an 
analysis of public domain speeches and lectures by prominent serving or retired international 
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military leaders. The availability of these through various military, academic, and public 
policy websites has made access to the personalities, experiences and ideas of these soldiers 
more accessible and more susceptible to scholarly critique than was previously an option for 
the researcher relying on edited collections and often self-serving and sometimes turgid 
autobiographies. While the knowledge of the fact of a speech being recorded and published 
will make the tongue circumspect, the digital window into once closed peer-to-peer 
presentation environments like the U.S. Army War College or the Royal United Services 
Institute, gives ‘outsider’ researchers a better inclination on the prevailing military mind-set 
than has previously been available. 
Finally, I have engaged in many informal conversations on my research topic with serving 
military from New Zealand and abroad. While the informality of these conversations has 
excluded them from use in my data sets, or as contributing to my findings, it would be 
counter to my methodological approach to deny their influence in shaping, if subconsciously, 
my understanding of this topic. 
Analytical framework 
An analytical framework was developed to examine various aspects of the construction, 
structure and content of the reading lists.  
• coding and analysing texts within lists according to a typology set relating to book 
category or genre, author provenance 
• ranking texts according to their appearance across all the lists, and separately 
according to the frequency of their appearance across the lists from the U.S. and 
elsewhere 
• a topic analysis of the reading lists 
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• the development and utilisation of a constructional analysis matrix to determine how 
the lists have been constructed in relation to: the accessibility of the texts chosen; 
whether the books in each list were narrative and discursive or more theoretically 
oriented; the relative contemporaneousness of the books in each list; and the relative 
breadth or narrowness of the domains of learning covered by each list. 
The analysis of the reading lists, and subsequent findings, is presented in detail in Chapter 
Seven. 
The interviews were analysed using a categorical scheme consisting of two steps as outlined 
by Krippendorff (2004). First the text was transcribed and subjected to first-level thematic 
analysis to determine the relevant themes and ideas. Then the texts were parsed into smaller 
units relevant to the emerging themes and ideas. This process highlighted words, sentences, 
or quasi-sentences that reflected the emergent themes.  
Following this first step, the second step involved coding each unit by assigning a category 
from the coding scheme to each text unit according to a three-level schema. This hand coding 
schema provided a means to drill down to the key thematic messages. Extensive use was 
made of white-boarding techniques to model and re-model the emerging structural themes 
and findings. 
Quotations selected for direct use in the findings Chapters Eight and Nine were chosen both 
to represent the key thematic messages, and for their contribution to the narrative flow. Direct 
quotations were not used from a small number of interviews. This was a stylistic decision, all 
interviews contributing to the overall thematic analysis. 
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Summary 
I have introduced my method chapter at the beginning of the thesis for two reasons: to 
explain upfront the rationale behind the utilisation of a conceptual framework to structure the 
literature review, and to introduce for consideration the methodological approach, 
hermeneutics, which is itself a conceptual component. In introducing the artefact of the 
professional military reading list and my interview locus of serving and retired officers, 
civilian defence officials and academics, I have framed the context of this research: the 
influence of professional reading on military leaders. 
The second section of this thesis, over Chapters Three to Six, considers the literature relevant 
to the main components of the conceptual framework. 
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CHAPTER THREE: PHRONESIS AND THE WARRIOR LEADER 
“Leadership is an intangible”. 
General of the Army, Omar Bradley, (1972, p.2). 
Introduction 
This chapter is the first of four literature review chapters, anchoring the conceptual and 
contextual elements of the framework to my particular research topic. In this chapter I begin 
my examination of the conceptual framework by considering the components ‘wisdom’, ‘the 
modern warrior’, and ‘leadership’.  
I do this by introducing the concept of wisdom and highlighting its practical form, phronesis, 
as expounded by Aristotle. I then consider the concept of the modern warrior with reference 
to the influencing forces of caste and professionalism and continuity and change. I then 
consider the concept of leadership, particularly regarding its distinctive military form. This 
portion of the literature review illustrates the research topic from one perspective. This is the 
modern warrior-leader, a product of both past and present, in pursuit of the skill essential for 
command: the ability to make wise decisions. 
The love of wisdom 
The popular Anglo-Saxon image of the philosopher for the latter part of the twentieth-century 
was of the idealised Oxford Don; an absent-minded and socially indifferent eccentric, 
verbose and abstract (Solomon and Higgins, 1996, p.44), largely cloistered and only 
venturing into the real world to make profound statements about great existential issues  - 
Bertrand Russell in caricature in other words. Like all caricatures, this picture is at once a 
truism punctuated with a large dose of fallacy. A truism because, as Critchley (2001) points 
out, for a large part of the last 100 years, ‘professional philosophers’ in the Anglo-Saxon 
school were content to distance themselves from the largely practical activity that was the 
stuff of philosophy from ancient times – the meaning of life, who should rule, how should we 
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educate, what is love etc. – and concentrate instead on abstract knowledge, on epistemology. 
Philosophy, the mother discipline of the academy, is, in much of its modern ‘professional’ 
form, not widely read, and not popularly considered relevant to ordinary, everyday life (ps.1-
6).  
The caricature is false however because, the output of some philosophers historical and 
modern aside, philosophy in its many guises is, at its heart, an inquiry into the human 
condition, and the very best philosophy since ancient times is marked by its readability and 
relevance to ordinary men and women. We can read Plato, Montaigne, Locke and 
Schopenhauer; Nietzsche and Foucault are loved and loathed because they disturb us; Russell 
won his Nobel Prize for his masterly and accessible public writings, not his mathematical 
reasoning.6 
I have made these points because philosophy lies at the heart of this inquiry. On one level, 
this relates to the focus of the inquiry – the education of the ‘warrior class’ – a concern of 
philosophers since Socrates debated it in The Republic. On another level it is because my 
inquiry seeks to consider the notion of wisdom, the love of which is the Greek Philo Sophia.  
Notwithstanding this etymology, philosophically-informed researchers have only returned to 
the study of wisdom relatively recently. The decline in wisdom studies between the 
Enlightenment and the 1970s has been attributed to two primary factors; the rise of empirical 
science and the parallel development of the theologically and historically grounded discipline 
of Bible studies. While Cowan and Darsoe (2008) describe the marginalisation of wisdom as 
the result of an active struggle between reason-championing science and wisdom “usurping” 
religion (ps.332-3), Trowbridge (2005) sees a much more benign process at work. Until 
gerontology offered a new scientific lens on wisdom in the 1970s, Trowbridge sees the, then-
                                                 
6
 http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1950/russell-lecture.html   
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new science of psychology and its philosophical forebear as passively “ignoring” wisdom 
during the late-nineteenth, and the bulk of the twentieth-century, thus leaving the 
theologically-minded to fill the inquisitory vacuum (ps.1-3). 
This long-standing wariness of the concept demonstrates that, in wisdom, we are faced with 
something nebulous and elusive; something, as in the case of leadership, that defies empirical 
attempts to define it or pin it down (DePree, 1991).  However, the pre-modern philosophers 
did not share this reticence, and long understood that wisdom derived or evolved from 
knowledge or theory gained and applied (Critchley, 2001, pp.1-11); to be wise was to have 
the habits and skills of applying knowledge to develop oneself and others (Baltes, 2004, p.8).  
As Baltes (2004) would have it, understanding the idea of wisdom must be pursued in both a 
scientific and a humanist-intuitive (hermeneutic) manner (p.10). Or, alternatively, as 
Kellerman (2010) notes regarding leadership, through, “an area of intellectual inquiry that is 
interdisciplinary. How can we know [it] without knowing…history, philosophy, psychology, 
politics…literature, art, and so on?” (p.xxv). This essentially humanistic notion expressed by 
Kellerman is important because it brings us back to a time before the creation of disciplinary 
boundaries or barriers, when scholars studied, mused and wrote across the fields of human 
inquiry (Watson, 2006). 
Hanson (2002) notes that, for the classical Greeks, a life of action and one of contemplation 
were not incompatible opposites but necessary facets of a whole ‘lived’ life (p.3). For all 
Greek citizens, philosophically minded or not, military service was a fact of life. Among the 
philosophers and intellectuals of the era, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Demosthenes, Thucydides, 
Xenophon and, importantly, Socrates were all veterans of the horror that was Greek battle 
(Hanson, 2002, p.3). We encounter the warrior philosopher-historians Thucydides and 
Xenophon later in this study, but for the moment, mindful of his early framing of the 
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discussion of the education of warriors just alluded to, I will use Socrates to advance my 
thesis. 
In a recent work, Waterfield (2009) states that “everyone has heard of Socrates”, noting that 
the manner of his death – trial and execution by his fellow Athenians in 399 B.C.E. – and its 
parallels with the martyrdom some four hundred years later of “a Jewish prophet called 
Yehoshua”, have led to the long cultural canonisation of the man (p.xi) of whom the Oracle 
of Delphi thought there was none wiser (Plato, c.399 BCE/1984, p.69). A key point when 
considering Socrates, man and philosophy, is that he wrote nothing down; what we know of 
him, his ideas and his method we derive primarily from his student Plato (Hall, 2010, pp.20-
3). His friend Xenophon and his lampooner, the playwright Aristophanes, are also important 
sources (Waterfield, 2009, pp.xi, 13-5).  
As Solomon and Higgins (1996) note, because he wrote nothing down, to the present, a 
“lively and unresolvable debate” continues about how much of Plato is Socrates, and how 
much of Socrates is Plato (pp.45-6). I address Socrates’ antipathy to writing in the 
conclusion, because his reasoning provides much food for thought for a consideration of the 
future of professional reading; but for now it is suffice to say that Socrates’ generation was 
the last classical society to rely solely on the oral dissemination of knowledge,7 text 
ownership and private study not becoming common until two generations later when Plato’s 
pupil Aristotle built up one of the first known collections of manuscripts for private use 
(Manguel, 1997, pp.22, 59-60). 
                                                 
7
 By the period in question, written culture was firmly established from the Mediterranean, through the Middle 
East and Persia, to the Indian subcontinent and China. The oral cultures of Northern and Eastern Europe only 
began their transformation to a written culture some thousand or so years later, with other established cultures 
like the Polynesians only codifying their culture through writing after their introduction to Europeans in the late 
nineteenth-century (Barber, 1964, Crystal, 1997).  
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Plato and Aristotle together cast a giant shadow over all subsequent intellectual inquiry 
(Russell, 1959, p.56).8 For Solomon and Higgins (1996) the entire Western philosophical 
tradition can be described as “an elaborate extension of the debate” between the pupil, and 
grand-pupil of Socrates (pp.67-8).  And this debate is important, highlighting as it does 
among other things rivalling conceptions of what it means to be wise. These rivalling 
conceptions can be illustrated through Raphael’s 1511 fresco Scuolo di Atene or The School 
of Athens as pictured in Figure Ten. 
 
Figure Ten: The School of Athens (Raphael, 1511a) 
If his biographer, the canonical Vasari (1568/1965), is to be believed, Raphael of Urbino was 
an exceptional human being in all senses of the phrase. His prodigious and abiding talent 
aside, Vasari portrays a man of such fine “qualities of mind…grace, industry…modesty, and 
excellence of character” (pp.284-5) that we have Renaissance wisdom in persona in the 
collective oeuvre that is Raphael and his artistic legacy. A contemporary of the Florentines 
Michelangelo, Leonardo and Machiavelli, Raphael was drawn to Rome by the warrior-Pope 
Julius II and commissioned to create the vast frescos on the Vatican walls that still amaze 
today. The School of Athens depicts ancient Greek philosophy and faces on the opposite wall 
his fresco La Disputa del Sacramento, a depiction of the then-modern theology (Levey, 1968, 
p.112). 
                                                 
8
 Russell’s collaborator Alfred North Whitehead (1929/2010) famously characterised the European 
philosophical tradition as “a series of footnotes to Plato” (p.39).  
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Figure Eleven: Details from The School of Athens (Raphael, 1511b) 
Most (1996) notes that Raphael was the first artist to depict philosophy without the use of 
metaphysical or mythical allegory; in the fresco, philosophy is depicted as a thoroughly 
human activity, the fifty-eight characters philosophising as philosophers do through writing, 
debate, argument, questioning and pondering (p.146).  At the centre of The School of Athens, 
as illustrated in Figure Eleven, are Plato (painted to resemble Leonardo) and Aristotle. 
Deeply in debate, in their left hands they hold the Timaeus and the Nicomachean Ethics 
respectively; with their right hands, Plato points upward to the heavens, and Aristotle’s open 
palm seemingly motioning ground-ward.  
While interpretations of the work’s rich symbolism are many and varied (e.g., Vasari, 
1568/1965, Gutman, 1941, Most, 1996), it is generally accepted that the two hand gestures 
represent the simultaneously contrasting and complementary concerns of philosophy – 
Plato’s metaphysical and abstract speculation, and Aristotle’s empirical, temporally-based 
temperament (Solomon and Higgins, 1996, p.68). This interpretation is reinforced by the 
books each philosopher is carrying. While Plato’s later dialogue the Timaeus (c.360 
BCE/2009) is an extrapolation on the physical and metaphysical nature of the universe, 
Aristotle’s (c.330 BCE/1906) Nicomachean Ethics is concerned with how best to live one’s 
life. Why the differing worldviews of the two philosophers matters for both education and the 
pursuit of wisdom will become apparent. 
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Philo Sophia – literally the love of wisdom – is a compound of two words that don’t quite 
translate directly into modern English. Translation, a literary skill and art which is considered 
later in this work, has at its heart a problem; there are few word-for-word correspondences 
between languages. For Hitchens (2008), “translation is a competition between transparent 
expression and fidelity to the original” (p.144). Because we are not ancient Greeks, this 
tension is the source of much intellectual angst, because the nuances so clear to them are, to 
us, shadows. 
Despite having just pinned the flag of wisdom to the mast sophia, a practical issue with this 
term as was understood by the Greeks must be signalled; one which relates back to Plato’s 
metaphysical and abstract speculation. Sophia as a conception of wisdom can be traced back 
to the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus who conceived of wisdom as a state of grasping the 
logos of things (Allen, 1966, p.10). Only superficially translating as ‘word’, but more akin to 
the balance/disorder concept of the unity of opposites, logos, much like the Chinese concepts 
of Tao and Yin-yang (McElhatton and Jackson, 2012), is a concept at once simple and 
esoteric, practical and metaphysical.  
Allen (1966), noting the cryptic nature of Heraclitus’ writings, describes logos as “the first 
principle of knowledge”, the basis of the structure or pattern of the world. Plato drew an 
essentially metaphysical interpretation from Heraclitus, his wisdom being a quality that 
aspired to the divine, and framed existence in epistemological and ontological abstractions 
(p.10-11). This almost supernatural, or, more correctly, superhuman, conception of wisdom 
presents a problem for the study and understanding of wisdom to this day. 
Hall (2010) highlights some of the issues with our popular conception of wisdom. Recent 
psychological surveys asking subjects to nominate figures who they perceived as being 
especially wise produced a list of figures that were overwhelmingly historical, male, and 
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somewhat otherworldly. The lists were dominated by the likes of Gandhi, Confucius, 
Socrates, Jesus, Solomon, Buddha and the Dalai Lama (pp.11-13). While I have no room to 
critique the model of wisdom embodied (or not) in these figures, and Hall does point out their 
many flaws as actual humans, it can be deduced that, popularly, wisdom is perceived as 
something associated with the spiritual and is beyond the attainment of ‘ordinary’ people 
(especially women). However, the manner in which one frames logos shapes the way we can 
perceive and conceive wisdom.  
Plato’s conception of the ideal republic, that ruled by his philosopher-kings, required a 
rejection of the old Olympian order and the establishment of a whole new cosmology, the 
new religion of philosophy (Solomon and Higgins, 1996, pp.53-4). As Manguel (2007) notes, 
this also involved a dilemma for Plato; an implicit rejection of Homer, the poet he most 
admired, but one who depicted both humanity and the gods as fallible, worthy of our 
temporal empathy (pp.38-42). Striving to conceive the ideal required a suppression of the 
actual. It is paradoxical that Plato’s rejection of the deities resulted in an even more esoteric 
and metaphysical depiction of the cosmological order.  
Nehamas (1999) argues that, because of the interpretive gap between reader and an author so 
temporally far removed, each generation is presented with a dual dilemma/luxury paradox of 
both having to, and being able to, interpret Plato according to the presenting needs, 
circumstances and values requiring explanation or validation (pp.xix-xxv). Thus whether to 
justify elite authoritarian rule in the 1930s (Crossman, 1937, Gigantès, 2002), or help bolster 
the argument for ‘authentic leadership’ in the 1990s (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999), Plato’s, 
particularly later, writings are so fundamentally esoteric that they allow a multitude of often 
conflicting interpretations and can be selectively picked through to justify nearly any course 
of action. This point will be revisited when considering the works of philosopher of war Carl 
von Clausewitz.  
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When considering the symbolism of the School of Athens, I noted the texts illustrated in the 
fresco. While Plato’s (c.360 BCE/2009) Timaeus is, according to its translator Jowett, a work 
“most obscure and repulsive” to the modern reader (p.5), in contrast, the Ethics (c.330 
BCE/1906), in which Aristotle outlines his conception of wisdom, is a wholly accessible and 
relevant work for the modern reader, even in the 1906 Welldon translation that my study has 
relied on by choice. In Book VI of the Ethics, Aristotle lays out his conception of the active 
conditions or dispositions of the human soul, a figurative term representing the primary 
activity or faculty of living things. For Aristotle, a central striving of a good human was to 
attain phronesis, a practical, everyday form of wisdom, and one of the five intellectual virtues 
(Cairns and Sliwa, 2008, p.319). 
Phronesis - practical wisdom 
Aristotle (c.330 BCE/1906) defines phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics as “the capacity of 
deliberating well upon what is good or expedient for oneself, not in a particular, but in a 
general or comprehensive sense” (p.183). For Aristotle, phronesis was neither art nor science, 
but a “rational and practical state of mind in the field of human good and evil” (p.184). 
Phronesis was a quality he observed as highly developed in effective politicians and 
strategists like Pericles (p.184). 
As Noel (1999) notes, the term phronesis has been translated and interpreted with a number 
of different English phrases in the attempt to capture the full meaning of the term. These 
translations have ranged from practical reasoning and practical wisdom to moral discernment 
and insight (p.273). Noel notes that the various translations have tended to emphasise 
different important facets of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis above others, depending on 
the contextual or ethical milieu of the translator.  
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Some translators focus the attention on rationality, others bring out the nature of perception 
and insight, while others highlight the moral and ethical character of the phronimos or one 
with phronesis (Noel, 1999 p.273). Cairns and Sliwa (2008) note that these differing 
emphases have served to present some confusion and contradiction around the concept in the 
growing body of scholarship, both across, and within, disciplines (p.318). One reason for this 
may be confusion on the part of modern scholars of the nature of virtù in relation to the 
practical conduct of those with this practical wisdom.  
As shown by Hall (2010), popular ascriptions can be interpreted as equating wisdom with 
‘virtue’ in its Christian sense of being morally good or righteous. However, in the classical 
model as laid out by Livy and Seneca, rediscovered by Machiavelli, and somewhat hinted at 
by Aristotle, virtù is a quality that is good or admirable, but not necessarily in terms of 
morality (Foster, 1942, ps.275-6, Skinner, 1981, ps.26-37). Virtù, the quality of ‘good’ (i.e. 
able or effective) politicians, generals or strategists, is the protection of interests “in a dark 
world” in which most of one’s protagonists are not “good” in a Christian sense either 
(Skinner, 1982, p.37). It is according to Kaplan (2002) a “morality of results rather than of 
good intentions” (p.53).  
Thus, while much of the contemporary interpretations of phronesis are strong on values, as 
Flyvbjerg (2004) notes, they largely ignore, or are weak on, issues of power. In contrast to 
many contemporaries in management studies, Flyvbjerg attempts to balance values and 
power by seeing phronesis as involving both appreciative judgements in terms of values and 
an “understanding of the practical political realities of any situation as part of an integrated 
judgement in terms of power” (p.284). It is very much concerned with the art of judgement or 
decision-making or, as Rooney et al. (2008) would have it, something less concerned about 
“how much we know and more with how we apprehend and deploy that knowledge” (p.345). 
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In Chapter One the image of the Allegory of Prudence from the tomb of Francis II, Duke of 
Brittany was invoked. Prudence, from the Latin Prudentia, the Roman translation of 
phronesis, is often depicted carrying a book or scroll and a mirror and occasionally is 
depicted with a serpent, an ambiguous symbol of cunning or artifice in Judeo-Christian 
tradition, at foot (Hibbard, 1957, Goodman-Soellner, 1983). As seen in the Allegory, 
Prudence, as anthropomorphised, is often depicted as having two faces; that of an old man 
implying the wisdom of the past and a future-facing young woman.  
In his consideration of the great virtues of the Western philosophical tradition, Comte-
Sponville (2003) notes that while the concept of prudence is one of the four cardinal virtues 
of antiquity and the Middle Ages, it is now overlooked in moral and ethical studies, its central 
characteristics more falling within the domain of psychology and decision theory (p.30). This 
may be in part related to the outmoded or unfashionable nature of the term itself.  
In Mediaeval Scholasticism, the intellectual movement that is the foundation of Western 
academia (Watson, 2006, pp.443-6), prudence, in reference particularly to the ideas of 
Aristotle, was associated with a range of characteristics we might find familiar from much of 
the trait-based descriptions of leadership. From their reading of classical sources, the 
Scholastics included as the characteristics of prudence: a form of open-mindedness that 
enabled the sizing up of presenting situations; and ability to make ‘prudent’ decisions based 
on prior learning and experience; shrewdness or quick-wittedness; discursive reasoning or the 
ability to compare alternative possibilities; foresight and circumspection; and caution or risk 
mitigation (Southern, 1995, Comte-Sponville, 2003, Watson, 2006). 
Interestingly for my study, Comte-Sponville’s (2003, pp.33-5) description of Ciceronian 
prudence, with its emphasis on the patient, attentive and careful handling of complexity, 
paradox and friction is virtually identical to the model of strategic thinking proposed by 
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Luttwak (1987) and to a lesser degree that of Liddell-Hart (1967). Prudence therefore, with 
its enveloping of beginnings and endings, change and time, and the past and the future serves 
as a metaphor for the tactical and strategic arts and the ability to “think dynamically in space 
and time” (McElhatton, 2008b, p.15).  
Crevani et al. (2007) have described an “emergent movement” in leadership studies towards 
viewing leadership in terms of collaboration between two or more persons in contrast to the 
dominant perspective where leadership is something exercised by a single person (p.40). For 
Perucci and McManus (2013) the emerging ‘discipline’ of leadership studies has been 
characterised by a move “beyond the simplistic view of leadership as synonymous with 
leader” (p.50). In his study of Athenian statesman and strategos Pericles, Kagan (1990) 
presents an interesting counterpoint to this move.  
While acknowledging that the ‘Great Man’ or heroic approach to historical or biographical 
analysis “is not fashionable”, Kagan (1990) argues the need to take such an approach, with 
qualifications, to exceptional individuals like Pericles (p.xi). While, on the surface – using 
lens like Pericles the ‘politician’, ‘soldier’, ‘educator’, ‘crisis manager’ and ‘strategist’ – he 
does so, his key subtext is that Periclean leadership is one where the hero-leader is not the 
supreme commander imposing control from above, rather one that seeks to “unleash the 
latent power of thousands of individuals” to join (albeit involuntarily) in a “common effort to 
achieve unprecedented greatness” (p.26). In contrast therefore to the picture presented by 
Cervani et al. (2007), Pericles, or at least Kagan’s Pericles, embraces both the individualistic 
and the collaborative models in one leadership ethos.9 
                                                 
9
 Russell (1959), describing him as “of the stuff that makes a leader” (p.50), paints a much more patrician 
picture of  Pericles, one in keeping with the ‘strongman’ conception of leadership popular during the aftermath 
of WWII. 
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Why this is worth noting here relates to Kagan’s attribution for the philosophical 
underpinning of Pericles political and leadership philosophy; the teachings of Pericles’ friend 
and mentor Anaxagoras, pre-Socratic philosopher and theoriser on Nous or ‘Mind’ (Kagan, 
1990, ps.23-6). Now, while Anaxagoras’ surviving writings are cosmological in focus, the 
intellectual tradition he advanced was the prioritising of the use of reason over myth to 
explain the presenting world (Allen, 1966, Kagan, 1990, Patzia, 2007). His philosophy, 
including his somewhat abstract theory of Nous/Mind, served to liberate his student from the 
common superstitions of his day and develop a rationally based, or prudent, approach to 
political thought and practice (Kagan, 1990, ps.23-6). A contemporary conception of Nous is 
encountered in Chapter Seven. 
As Grint (2007) has shown, phronesis is essentially rooted in action rather than simply 
reflexion and is something intimately bound up with lived experience rather than abstract 
reason (p.236). Grint also noted that phronesis is gained, or in his interpretation gives, 
through leaders leading in “real situations that require decisions where uncertainty, anxiety 
and risk generate the opportunity to learn wisdom” (p.243). This makes it an ideal concept 
within which to consider education for application; that is the education of professionals. 
The modern warrior: caste and profession, continuity and change  
Leaving a fuller examination of professionalism to Chapter Five, I continue to explore the 
conceptual framework by briefly considering caste and profession, change and continuity. 
Green (1980, pp.15) defines caste as “the social character men derive from their profession or 
vocation”. This notion of caste is something independent of the caste members’ individuality, 
and, importantly, of the prevailing social and economic conditions. Thus, while in public 
discourse the tribal or feudal notions of caste, and its related notion class (Noss, 1999, p.87), 
have been abolished by the forces of democracy and market economics, in reality caste still 
remains a powerful, if in ‘the West’, a somewhat subterranean, idea (Green, 1980, p.16).  
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To the outside observer, modern militaries can be seen as varying manifestations of a hybrid 
construct formed by the fusing of caste and professionalism. The degree to which this 
melding has progressed or even begun differs from nation to nation and within and between 
the individual services of each nation. A study of any long-standing military service over a 
long period of time will reveal “striking resemblances and profound differences” (Strawson, 
1989, p.xi). As Coker (2007) has shown, the concepts of warrior and war can only be 
adequately considered through an interdisciplinary lens where the literatures of philosophy, 
psychology, political thought, history, and culture coalesce to aid our examination of a 
multifaceted whole.  
Coker (2007) has examined the warrior concept, from the embodiment of the ideal that is 
Homer’s Achilles, to today’s ‘post-modern’ warrior he frames as struggling with the 
declining resonance of the warrior mythos, society’s scepticism about martial glory, and the 
increasingly technological basis of war. Despite this, Coker argues that the idealised warrior 
ethos and its associated code of honour and morality, is essential to maintaining a 
psychological, humanitarian and political restraint on the conduct of war both by the 
‘legitimate’ forces of the state and by the irregulars of the guerrilla.  
For Coker (2007), ‘warriors’ should be understood through a consideration of their 
instrumental, existential and mythic dimensions. Most modern soldiers only inhabit the 
instrumental dimension; they are public servants in professional service to a state that may 
require them to make the ultimate sacrifice for its interests. The existential dimension – 
sacrifice on behalf of one’s friends in the heat of battle – is where soldier transforms into 
warrior, itself a concept from the mythic dimension, the heroic realm where Achilles is the 
ultimate ideal (p.7). Importantly for our focus on professional reading, Coker (2007) shows 
how “Achilles is invoked time and again in the memoirs of those warriors who reflect on 
their own profession” (p.7).  
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The two worlds of caste and profession are uniquely evident in the military in a form only 
rivaled by the traditional clergy, medicine and, to a lesser extent, the legal profession 
(Freidson, 1984, Downes, 1985). The New Zealand Army illustrates this in the way it depicts 
itself through that most professional artifact, the institutional website. 
Linked to Twitter and Facebook, and featuring sophisticated gaming features to test the skills 
of aspiring soldiers, Army.mil.nz is a professional and sophisticated corporate website. 
Throughout, the language and imagery of tradition blends effortlessly with the contemporary 
profession modes of operation. A corporate public relations piece on a recent deployment is 
accompanied with an image of stripped-to-the-waist warriors performing a traditional Māori 
haka, or war dance.  Images of cutting edge military technologies are posed adjacent to 
images of soldiers doing what they’ve always done – digging, watching, waiting. 
The symbolism of caste is codified in the Army Badge. As illustrated in Figure Twelve, to the 
traditional elements of British martial heraldry – crown, lion and sword – the badge adds a 
taiaha or Māori staff and the legend Ngati Tumatauenga or ‘Tribe of the War God’  
(NZArmy, 2008). The two seeming incongruous worlds of tribalism (caste) and 
professionalism are united in the Army’s professed image of itself.  
Ngati Tumatauenga acknowledges what the Army is - one family of people bound 
together by the ethic of service to our country, military professionalism, common 
values, and mutual respect, mutual trust and camaraderie. As one people we are one 
tribe. Ngati Tumatauenga reflects our oneness and our unity; it has seen us develop 
our own New Zealand military cultural practices and ceremonial guided by Tikanga 
Maori on the one hand and British and European custom on the other (NZArmy, 
2011). 
 
So, the New Zealand example illustrates the conception of the modern warrior as a child of 
caste and professionalism. The tensions within this, as indicated in the framework, are the 
forces of continuity and change.   
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Figure Twelve: NZ Army Coat of Arms (NZArmy, 2002) 
It is commonplace to read in contemporary political and military literature of the increasing 
complexity and unpredictability of post-modern life. For some senior commanders the 
contemporary operational environment “is now more complex and unpredictable, and the 
future operational environment promises to be equally so” (Flowers, 2004). For strategist 
Zbigniew Brzezinski (1993) the vantage of the early 1990s showed a “notable acceleration in 
the velocity” of a contemporary history uncertain in its trajectory resulting in “sharp 
discontinuities that collide with each other, condense our sense of perspective, and confuse 
our historical perceptions” (p.x).  
This thesis of Brzezinski has it that “change” is sweeping across the world in “waves of ever-
accelerating speed and unprecedented impact” (Toffler, 1970, p.18), that we live in an 
environment of historically unprecedented “volatility, uncertainty, complexity and 
ambiguity” (Paparone and Reed, 2008, p.66).  The widespread acceptance of this thesis has 
important ramifications for organisational learning and leadership education, no more so than 
in modern militaries.  
As Murray (2004) has highlighted, the “technological monism” of dominant factions within 
the U.S. defence sector has led them to advocate the abandonment of traditional inductive 
methods of learning from historical experience in favour of predominantly deductive or 
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assumptive methods where one can posit the future without reference to the past (ps.2-3). The 
educational stance of these technophiles is essentially that history, even that of the recent 
past, has been rendered irrelevant, and so, not worthy of space in the professional military 
curriculum.   
This belief in ‘unprecedented change’ is not confined to the political and strategic literature. 
In their attempt to argue that organisational leadership in the twenty-first-century was moving 
from a “Newtonian paradigm” to a paradigm of “chaos”, Tetenbaum and Lawrence (2011) 
greatly weaken the credibility of their argument by claiming that “life moved relatively 
slowly in the 1700s and 1800s, such that there were few major changes to which businesses 
had to adapt” (p.41). The absurdity of the statement is evident through even the most cursory 
consideration of the impact on business during that age of factors like the industrial and 
agrarian revolutions, the rapid growth of cities, and the consolidation of the global economy 
and the emergence of new products and markets, of railways and telegraph, social and 
political revolution, not to mention spectacular advances in the sciences and medicine 
(Watson, 2006).  
In a critique of each generations’ propensity to overstate the relative complexity or turbulence 
of their environment to that of generations past, a critique aimed squarely at the futurist 
writings of Toffler, Ansoff et al from the 1960s, Mintzberg (1994) noted; “environments are 
always changing in some dimensions and always remaining stable in others; rarely do they 
change all at once, let alone continuously” (p.207). This is echoed by Maharey (2013) who 
summed up the mega-selling Toffler output as “wrong or mistimed or self-interested” (p.30). 
That the forward-looking often neglect the past is illustrated when we consider the words of a 
political commentator and leadership theorist writing of “the great changes and variations, 
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beyond human imagining, which we have experienced and experience every day”; that 
Machiavelli (1532/1999, p.79) wrote this of his contemporary environment is instructive.  
By anchoring an ancient concept like wisdom to our modern notions of leadership, I am 
highlighting a question as to whether there is a need for the cultivation of historically minded 
skills and hermeneutic or interpretive perspectives in military leaders. The question regarding 
the nature of the wholly intellectual component of leadership (as opposed to the wholly moral 
or wholly physical components to which it is nonetheless inexorably bound) is whether it is a 
decision-oriented quality. If so, it may conform to Strayer’s idea that “learning is useful in 
meeting new situations, not because it provides a basis for prediction but because a full 
understanding of human behaviour in the past makes it possible to find familiar elements in 
present problems and thus makes it possible to solve them more intelligently” (Strayer quoted 
in, Marwick, 1970, p.18).  
A significant portion of the literature reveals a pervasive infatuation with the notion that 
technological innovation is the prime author of complexity rather than it being one facet in 
the continuously complex struggle and rich tapestry that is the human experiment. Gadamer 
(1960/1996) illustrates the importance of considering continuity and change: “What changes 
forces itself far more on the attention than what remains the same…the perspectives which 
come from the experience of historical change are always in danger of distortion because they 
forget the hidden constants” (pp.xxiii-xxiv).  
As Newton, Colley and Sharpe (2010) note, a key lesson from the writings of Carl von 
Clausewitz is the importance of distinguishing between the enduring nature of war and the 
transitory character of warfare. Elucidating Clausewitz, Gray (2010b) argues that while new 
technologies can, and do, change the character of warfare, the nature of warfare – its social, 
political, and emotional dimensions – remains constant. For many strategic theorists from the 
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Clausewitzian camp, their view of war is predicated on the idea that continuity is central to its 
understanding (Strachan, 2002, p.8).  
One constant that can be easily forgotten when engaging with non-contemporary texts is an 
author’s sense of themselves in ‘the now’; texts composed in our past were all written in 
some other human’s present. While certain conventions of speech, value judgments, and, 
particularly, scientific capacity change, the argument that the human condition remains 
largely constant is one that has dominated the literature on international relations since 
Thucydides (Doyle, 1990).  
Picking a copy of Thucydides’ (c.395 BCE/1972) History of the Peloponnesian War off the 
book shelf, an immediate impression conveyed by the packaging is ‘ancient’, ‘artifact’, 
‘museum piece’. The typeface is old; the cover shows a picture of semi-naked spear and club 
bearing warriors, which a picture credit tells us is a detail from a Greek vase found in the 
Louvre; the cover note begins, “Written four hundred years before the birth of Christ…”. 
However, as Plattias and Koilopoulos (2010), Harloe, Morley et al. (2012), and Nation (2012) 
demonstrate, on engaging with the text itself we are surprised to be spoken to by a modern 
scholar, one every bit as conscious of the difficulties inherent in ascertaining human truths as 
any twenty-first-century strategic thinker. 
Rather than some historical figure speaking from his present/our past, we read in Thucydides 
a living man, rooted in the present, with his eye on the future, fully cognisant of the 
continuities of the human experiment. This quality is not unique to Thucydides. Artillery 
Colonel Oliver Spaulding (1933) wrote of his engagement with the military texts of classical 
Greece and Rome: 
“Their modernity…is surprising; one realizes, almost with a shock, that the ancient 
warrior did not know that he was an ancient warrior. He thought that he was a highly 
modern warrior; and after reading more we are forced to admit that he was” (p.658).  
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The professional literature of the post-Cold War period, until the experience of war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq somewhat queered the pitch, showed an infatuation with the almost 
utopian potential of the technological leaps of our age and the change to come from the 
‘revolution in military affairs’ (Krepinevich, 1994). This led, particularly within the U.S. 
defence establishment, to a hubristic and “fantastical” conception of the character of future 
war (McMaster, 2008, p.19), one where novel technocentric concepts dressed up in the 
“buzzwords” and “ bumper sticker” slogans of change, trumped the lessons and insights of 
history (Owen, 2010).   
Ironically an infatuation with the technological or material side of war is nothing new. In 
lectures to the French Army at the turn of the nineteenth-century, the later Marshal Foch 
(1903/1918) bemoaned the overemphasis in professional military education on teaching 
aimed at the material aspects of war – ground, fortification, armament, organisation and 
administration – over the living aspects of troops in movement and action – human needs, 
passions, weaknesses, self-denials, capacities (pp.3-5). For Foch, the Prussian system of 
historically-grounded military education as shaped by Generals Scharnhorst, Clausewitz and 
Willisen correctly had identified that, to know and understand war, one should not confine 
oneself to “examining the tool which is used in warfare, and taking it to pieces in its 
component material parts, without taking man – who uses it – into account” (Foch, 
1903/1918, p.4). 
As Fuller (2003) demonstrates, an over-emphasis on change over continuity, or on continuity 
over change, creates a fallacious and dangerous thinking in the military profession. The latter 
of these, the inflexible adherence to the familiar and dismissal of technological, tactical or 
social innovation, has well documented historical consequences on land (Dixon, 1979, 
Strawson, 1989), at sea (Palmer, 2005) and in the air (Maier, 2000, Smith, 2000). The former 
of these faults leads to us forgetting that our predecessors were often in a similar position 
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with regard to new and challenging technologies, and faced up to the challenge in much the 
same way as we do ourselves, through trial and error, making (often costly) mistakes, 
improvising, and persevering.10 
So, I have argued that the modern warrior inhabits a space where continuity and change meet 
and merge (Jablonsky, 1994, pp.4-6). This morphing of caste member and professional varies 
to a greater or lesser degree from service-to-service, culture-to-culture and nation-to-nation 
(Dzvonik, 2008). The eternal friction of change and continuity reveal themselves through an 
engagement with the literature of military history (Powers, 2006, Warner, 2006, p.484, 
Harari, 2007, Gilboy and Heginbotham, 2012, ps.xvii-xviii). Having located our modern 
warrior in the intersection of caste and professionalism, the notion of leadership, specifically 
leadership in the military, must next be examined. 
The concept of leadership 
In the concept of leadership, much like that of wisdom, we are faced with something 
nebulous and elusive, something that defies empirical attempts to define it or pin it down 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 1997, Nye, 2008). Ahn et al. (2011) note that, despite 
significant changes in technology and organisational modes and structures, the study of 
leaders and leadership has been a persisting source of interest and inquiry as societies “have 
evolved from tribal communities to the rise of nation-states to modern global, multinational 
enterprises, and multilateral institutions” (p.6). Despite a long interdisciplinary history of 
study dating back millennia (Perruci and McManus, 2013, p.46), and a long commitment in 
education to ‘teach’ the phenomenon, there is still little agreement on the nature, character, 
and function of leadership (Shushok and Moore, 2010, p.71). 
                                                 
10
 Corrigan (2003) provides an engaging interpretation of this regarding the adaptation to new technologies by 
WWI strategists.  
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While one account in the late 1990s reckoned there were at least 130 different definitions of 
leadership in the literature (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 1997), by the mid-2000s, studies 
were counting at least 221 different definitions of leadership, with clear patterns of 
definitional focus trending from the literature of the 1920s to that of our own day (Nye, 
2008). Theories of leadership are no less prolific, with studies again showing the tendency for 
definitions to conform at particular points in time to particular theoretical trends then current.  
As Collinson and Grint (2005) pointed out in the premier edition of the journal Leadership, 
despite the amount of research and expositions on leadership historically and 
contemporaneously, they found “little sense of any established conceptual commonality from 
amongst the writings, let alone a sense of community between academic leadership 
researchers” (p.5). They characterised leadership research as frequently fragmented at best 
and trivial at worst, “too often informed by the rather superficial ideas of management and 
academic consultants keen to peddle the latest, pre-packaged list of essential qualities deemed 
necessary for individual leaders and as the prescribed solution to all leadership dilemmas” 
(p.5).  
However, despite noting that “the intellectual integrity of leadership as a legitimate and 
important field of study has remained open to question”, Collinson and Grint (2005) viewed 
leadership as such a critical element of all forms of organisation, whether formal, informal, 
business, public, civilian, military, historical and contemporary, that it warranted ongoing 
academic attention. This should be innovative, interdisciplinary and internationally focused 
(p.6). The international focus is particularly important because, as McDonald (2011) 
highlights, there has been extensive Western bias in leadership development theory and 
practice, hindering the development of alternate leadership exemplars, and obscuring an 
emerging perception that leadership development is more complicated and difficult than 
current approaches and theories assume (p.643). 
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Citing Ciulla (1998), Ahn et al. (2011) state that the focus of leadership studies is, however, 
not to define leadership, but to explore, “What is good leadership?” They note that the use of 
the word ‘good’ in this inquiry has two connotations - morally good or technically good or 
effective (p.9). This distinction, as has already been noted, is important. 
In essence, leadership studies examine the abilities, qualities and behaviours associated with 
the role of controlling, dominating, directing, inspiring or manipulating a group.11 While most 
of these terms may seem anathema to popular conceptions of transformational (Burns, 1978), 
servant (Greenleaf, 1977) or, say, ethical leadership (Grace, 1999), they are qualities that leap 
out from the pre-academic leadership scholarship that is the great canon of human histories, 
biographies, mythos, and literature. The leadership we encounter in The Iliad or Odyssey, that 
Thucydides presents in The Peloponnesian War, Machiavelli instructs on in The Prince, or 
Shakespeare constructs and deconstructs in Henry V or Julius Caesar, represents the 
perennial moral or ethical debate on the good action, and the consideration of ends, ways and 
means (Kaplan, 2002, Grayling, 2006). As Kellerman (2004) reminds us, until relatively 
recently, leadership was not a moral concept (p.45), ‘bad leadership’ being more associated 
with weakness than moral bearing (p.42).   
Fundamental to a discussion of the phenomenon of leadership is the genetic theory of 
leadership (Page and Miller, 2002, p.16), including the question of whether leaders are born 
or made (Brungardt, 1997, Johnson et al., 1998, McDermott et al., 2011, Yammarino, 2013).  
The pre-modern justification for the exclusive selection of officers from the aristocracy was 
the underlying belief that people from a particular class congenitally possessed the desired 
traits for leadership, in the case of monarch-soldiers, their gifts the product of some ongoing, 
transcendental process of negotiation between them and the metaphysical powers-that-be 
                                                 
11
 Hackett (1983) asserted that, “military leadership has always been…manipulative. What has changed in our 
generation is the material, but only in accident, not in essence…The method of manipulation has tended to 
change” (p.223). 
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(Bendix, 1978). As Grint (2000) has noted, this essentially traits-based approach emphasises 
the selection of leaders rather than their development (p.2). 
While Bendix (1978) shows how the influence of post-Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau 
eventually came to irrevocably challenge the hegemony of the luckily-born few over the 
now-educated many – as Carlyle (1872) put it, “nature could no longer produce great men” 
(p.187) – Carpenter (2005) has argued that the trait theory of leadership endured as a concept 
for examining military leadership until relatively recently. In their study of the models of 
leadership typically emphasised in U.S. Marine Corps leadership training and education, Page 
and Miller (2002) claim trait models as the foundation of Marine Corps ideas on leadership, 
the remaining notable models – behavioural, contingent or situational, normative, 
developmental, transformative, and servant - being more or less congruent with enduring 
Marine Corps thought. 
I look at the concept of professionalism in more depth in due course, but it is worth noting 
here Huntington’s (1957/1981) assertion that one of the key factors in the development of a 
modern, professional military was that aristocratic birth as a requirement for officership was 
abolished. For New Zealand’s military, WWII was a watershed in this regard. Scholars like 
Tonkin-Covell (2003) have highlight the transition in domestic military leadership from a 
land-owning, ‘home-country’-centric, muscular elite, to the ‘home-grown’ variety of 
leadership represented by the post-Kippenberger-era’s emergence of a distinct national 
identity. 
As Dunnigan (2003) points out, nations have historically selected their military leaders on the 
basis of their military traditions, experience and perceived needs (p.302). I have noted that 
the oldest approach is to select candidates from the upper or ruling classes. This approach 
only tends to be consistently effective where there also exists a career service corps of 
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professional Non-Commissioned Officers – think of the Roman Centurion or British 
Sergeant-Major - who know how to run an army (Dunnigan, 2003, p.300). 
The three other approaches to leadership selection are what Dunnigan (2003) terms “trial by 
experience”, “trial by examination”, and “trial by fire”. The first, used notably in Israel, sees 
a single tiered entry point for all soldiers, with potential officers selected from the ranks and 
promoted based on performance at each level of command. Once potential officers are 
identified, they are given a technical and academic military education. In the “trial by 
examination” approach, most rigorously used in the Russian ‘scientific’ approach to 
leadership, promotion is based on candidates excelling in written examinations (ps.297, 300-
1). “Trial by fire” is the system that “naturally” emerges in wartime. As Dunnigan (2003) 
puts it, “in the hazardous atmosphere of combat, only the competent survive” (p.301). 
While the roll of history has revealed the pros and cons of all of these approaches, the huge 
array of variables that impact on the performance of military leadership greatly impede our 
ability to reduce the selection, education and success of leaders to scientifically quantifiable 
terms (Blumenson and Stokesbury, 1975, ps.1-3). As Grint (2000) has posited, leadership is 
simply not accessible to purely scientific approaches (p.4). This is largely because, the 
waning of the popularity of its theory aside (Lorsch, 2010) due to its lack of strong empirical 
support (Yukl, 2011), leadership is dependent on internal and external contingencies. Over 
the personal and professional contingencies a leader has some limited control. Over the 
external ones – time, space and environment – the leader will have even less (Blumenson and 
Stokesbury, 1975, p.2). 
I highlight this because, despite the questionable assumptions about leadership education and 
development that Kellerman (2012) has so provocatively challenged, I believe, as does she, 
that leadership education and development is both possible, and worth pursuing. To better 
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understand the context being studied, the unique aspects of military leadership will now be 
more closely considered. 
The distinctiveness of military leadership 
Despite the willingness of paragons of generalship like Omar Bradley to emphasise the 
commonalities of military and business leadership (1972, p.3), military leadership has some 
important differences from leadership in business or the public sector – this despite the 
literature extolling the management lessons of Alexander, Jengiz Khan, or Horatio Nelson. 
As Command – The Australian Way (Meecham, 2000) would have it: 
“Only military commanders have the authority to commit soldiers, sailors and airmen 
to battle, in circumstances that are likely to endanger their lives. Only military 
commanders have the awesome responsibility for difficult decisions involving lethal 
and organised force, for which they will be held accountable” (p.6).  
 
Wong, Bliese and McGurk (2003) show in their review of the military leadership literature, 
this centrality of the management of violence, combined with the separate legal structure, the 
long and resonant tradition, culture and history of military leadership give it unique and 
distinguishable characteristics from other professions.  
In addition to these overt differences, Ulmer (1998) identifies four other organisational 
factors that emphasise the civil/military divide. First are the virtually unique ‘unlimited 
liability’ employment contracts and the development of ‘organisational goals’ that implicitly 
involve a threat to the life of individual, and teams of, employees. Second, all senior military 
leaders are promoted from within the ranks of the organisation. Third, the exceptions of 
social breakdown aside, countries only have one army, air force, or navy; exiting the 
organization means exiting the profession (pp.8-9).  
Finally, unlike the civilian world where “young people…often wait five to ten years for 
opportunities to head a project team or be responsible for an office of 20-40 people”, most 
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young officers are “exposed to command and staff relationships and resource management 
early on” (Ulmer, 1998, p.9). I come back to this distinction when I examine my findings and 
conclusions; suffice for now to say that it can be inferred that this distinction means that the 
learnings from leadership literature may have more immediate applicability and relevance, 
and be more easily comprehended, critiqued and/or assimilated for entrant officers than for 
neophytes in other professions.  
On top of these distinctions, and crucially for this study, the military profession is unique in 
that its leaders ultimately train for a context that they may never experience and a role they 
rarely get to practice (Montgomery, 1968, p.21). For the defence forces of most post-modern 
nation states, military leadership is usually learned in an “experiential vacuum”, peacetime 
leadership being the norm for most of the post-WWII period, but wartime leadership being 
the gold standard that history judges the military leader by (Dunnigan, 2003, p.295).12 It is 
arguable that, whereas most public and private sector leaders can learn from their mistakes as 
they go and grow accordingly, when a military leader makes a mistake in the context that 
matters most to his or her profession, only other leaders will have the opportunity to learn 
from those mistakes (Blumenson and Stokesbury, 1975, ps.361-374).  
Military leadership can be defined through the concept of command. Shamir (2011) views the 
function of command, and the development of a chain of command, as an evolutionary step 
beyond leadership in civilisation’s progress from tribal warfare to military organisation (p.9). 
Blumenson and Stokesbury (1975) state that command has two basic elements: authority and 
responsibility. The commander exercises authority over subordinates through rank or 
assigned position; the commander is held responsible by superior command for everything 
                                                 
12
 In contrast, General Sir John Hackett (1983) argued that, in spite of the absence of some of the “deeper 
stresses” found in wartime, the management of a major military unit was, “in many respects” more difficult in 
peacetime. This was due both to the financial constraints in peacetime and the need to keep up with the 
administrative and human resource management processes that are largely dispensed with during active service 
(ps.215-6).   
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done under that authority (p.363). Reid (1998) defined command as “the totality of military 
activity; it is about recognizing what needs to be done and acting decisively to do it” (p.112).  
For Pigeau and McCann (2002) command is inherently a creative activity, the structures and 
processes of military doctrine and operational policy requiring change, adaptation, alteration, 
interpretation and, sometimes, even re-invention to suit the evolving needs of the military 
situation. Solving the multitude of unanticipated problems, both large and small, that together 
can impede mission objectives, requires creativity (p.55). 
The correlation between command and phronesis is emphasised by Hankinson (2011) in his 
conception of commander as judge. In this conception, commanders use their experience and 
deep knowledge together to weigh up the conflicting evidence and then to arrive at “right” or 
good decisions – ones that may simply minimise extant risks – and then see these through to 
their conclusion. These decisions are communicated as their command intent, which become 
the guiding light for their subordinates to follow (p.38). 
Defining command as the “creative expression of human will necessary to accomplish a 
mission”, Pigeau and McCann (1995), critical of the cybernetic, ‘human as computer’ 
perspectives of much of the literature on command and control, stress the uniquely human 
qualities and attributes of command.13 Emphasising these human qualities, Dempsey (2012) 
views command through the prism of ‘trust’, both internal and external. Internal trust, 
“integral to the chain of command”, is the bond between senior and subordinate and extends 
vertically and laterally in both directions. External trust is the bond between the military 
profession and the government and people they serve (p.4).   
                                                 
13
 In a rare commentary on his personal experience of war, Sir Michael Howard memorably described one 
commander as “a mobile service station moving among his troops and filling them up with courage”. Quoted in 
Strachan (2002, p.2). 
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Leadership, or rather a deficit of it, is a prime concern of contemporary institutions, armies 
and their sister services not the least of these. Every year the U.S. Army War College’s 
Strategic Studies Institute publishes a Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL). The list is designed to 
give researchers, both military professionals and civilian scholars, “a ready reference” of the 
strategic issues of particular interest to the U.S. defence community at any particular time 
(Lovelace, 2007,p.V) and seeks to form “a critical link in an ongoing research cycle” by 
connecting researchers with potential defence sponsors (Lovelace, 2007, p.V).  
The KSIL seeks to present a list balanced between issues relating to matters of foremost and 
immediate concern, and issues that, while overshadowed, might have the potential to create 
future challenges. Thus, while strategic questions arising from operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have been prominent, theatre questions from a multitude of smaller recent 
operations get prominent billing.  
In the KSIL that I have studied since my research began, leadership has featured prominently. 
While the mooted research questions vary from list to list, a leader education commonality 
can be ascertained. “The future Army…will require…increased cultural sensitivity. How 
should the Army proceed to make this a reality?” (Lovelace, 2007, p.41); How can the Army 
“address the significant moral-ethical challenges it will face in the future?” (Lovelace, 2008, 
p.131), “assess efforts to identify, manage, and sustain the Army’s intellectual…talent” and 
“assess the knowledge, skills, and abilities military leaders require in complex contingences 
and/or stability operations” (Lovelace, 2009, p.9); and “assess the moral and ethical 
implications of civilian casualties with regard to decision-making in contemporary war” 
(Echevarria, 2012, p.10).  
A review of the KSIL over time lends weight to the findings of military sociologists like 
Nuciari (2007) and Caforio (2007) that, while the physical and technical qualities of military 
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leadership are every bit as important as ever, the post-modern operating environment requires 
a professional military education that is as humanistic as it is technocratic.    
For Linn (2009), the source of leadership deficiencies in the U.S. military in the post-
Vietnam era was that the educational culture of the professional military education system 
had evolved into more of a training and indoctrination culture largely producing officers with 
a technocentric “engineering, business management” approach to war. Linn (2009) 
considered that the graduates of this system found most utility in the deductive methods of 
learning, those that downplay the utility of the past as a teacher.  
Carforio (2007) tracks the technocratic training model for officers to the immediate post-
WWII era when the evolution of weapons technologies and scientific discoveries, particularly 
nuclear energy, had led to the conviction that officers had to be prepared principally in the 
mathematical sciences. Heavily influenced by U.S. military hegemony, a science-dominated 
educational model “took root and spread”, complementary to the weaponry, and the tactical 
and strategic deployment models of the Cold War. This left little room for humanistic 
subjects (ps.89-90). As Linn (2009) points out, while the military blocs in the West and East 
were training and preparing for a strategic level confrontation in the Fulda Gap, the strategic 
corridor from East Germany to Frankfurt, the actual wars being fought were of a very 
different character.  
Writing about the period between the end of the Cold War and prior to the invasion of Iraq, 
Morgan (2003) identified five major changes that characterise postmodern militaries. These 
should theoretically influence the education and training of its leaders. These were: the 
structural and cultural overlap of civilian and military spheres; a decreasing sense of 
difference within the military based on branch, rank, or role; moving from war fighting to 
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non-traditional missions; more missions authorised by international bodies; and the 
internationalisation of military forces (p.373).  
Ten years on, Hajjar (2013) sees changes in the postmodern military in terms of cultural 
developments, highlighting: the impact of the “global growth of ambiguity”; the quickening 
acceptance of multiculturalism; information age and new technologies; substantial growth of 
military civilians; an increase in the questioning of authority and ideas; and emergence of a 
“multi-mission military”. Central to, and, paradoxically, unaffected by, these changes is the 
warrior identity (ps.2-3). 
Regardless of the differences expressed by writers from Morgan (2003) to Hajjar (2013), the 
continuities highlight challenges for leadership development in the armed forces. These can 
be summarised using criteria from Caforio (2007), Dauber (2009), Pfaff (2011), Shulman 
(2012) and Outzen (2013) as: 
• Decision-making processes have shifted towards lower levels of the hierarchy 
• Even small units find themselves interacting with units of other nations that often 
exhibit quite different professional ethical codes, value systems and military 
preparedness 
• Inter-cultural awareness is paramount  
• Officers have to deal with different rules of engagement from one operation to 
another 
• Officers have to interact more with civilian officials of international organisations and 
therefore need to develop political nous  
• This interaction includes cooperation with nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), 
whose ideologies and operational methods can be quite different from those of the 
military 
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• A 24/7 ‘mainstream’ media hungry for content, the availability of new, accessible, 
media capture and manipulation devices, and the rise of YouTube and social media, 
means that every officer is a permanently in the business of public relations 
• The consequences of military action at all levels are now political and, potentially, 
globally resonating  
• A high-tempo operational environment is now commonplace, with personal and 
family ramifications for all. 
Essentially, these points all boil down to a need for military leaders to be developed in a 
manner that facilitates the ability to make sufficiently informed decisions. 
Decision-making 
A common thread running through the literature singles out decision making as the keystone 
skill of military leadership (Richardson and Freidin, 1956, Blumenson and Stokesbury, 1975, 
Keegan, 1991, Palmer, 2005). In a practical sense, officers are commissioned to face and 
solve problems that will be in the best interests of their soldiers and their nation. Some of 
these decisions will be routine and the solution apparently obvious; some will be hugely 
complex and seemingly impossible to resolve. But all will require a decision, the choice of a 
course of action, including, as the Chinese military classics show us, that choosing to take ‘no 
action’ is a decision too (McElhatton and Jackson, 2012). 
While the concept of ‘strategic thinking’ is commonly referenced in a range of organisational 
and situational contexts, for the Cold War period, strategic thinking was situated at the apex 
of the government-academic policy interface (Kaplan, 1973). During the course of the Cold 
War and the Damoclean spectre of ‘the bomb’ (Kennedy, 1961), decision making in war, 
particularly at the strategic level, came to be viewed through the theoretical lenses of decision 
theory, game theory, bargaining theory and strategic analysis (Kaplan, 1973).  
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While the literature on decision theory and game theory has been an important part of 
strategy since the dawn of the nuclear age (Dixit and Nalebuff, 2008, ps.ix-xiii), I have not 
drawn on it for this research. The sheer complexity of the body of theory aside, I have also 
chosen to gravitate more to the school of thought that regards decision making in complex 
and crisis situations as less an exact science than, as Herring (1995) describes it, “an inexact 
art of judgement” (p.251). 
Pois and Langer (2004) point out that, while there are psychological factors and 
circumstances that can contribute to, and impact on, decision making in any professional 
context, the remarkable degrees of stress that weigh upon decision making in a military 
context distinguish it somewhat from other professions (p.217).14 While Boin et al (2005) 
appear to suggest that decision making in the tactical or operational arena is much greater 
than that at the political, it should be reasonable to suggest that the psychological pressures 
on military decision-makers are comparable only to, and superseded by, the psychological 
pressures on all-too-human political leaders as documented for example by Margach (1979) 
or Owen (2007, 2008).  
Highlighting the conflicting psychological factors affecting military leaders in war, Pois and 
Langer (2004) note the often simultaneous impacts of decision-making that will result in the 
immediate mass slaughter of humans, friend and foe, the future reputation of the decision-
maker in the one context that has been trained and prepared for, and the overwhelming desire 
to succeed in this most crucial context (pp.216-218). 
Writing in the inter-war period, the then Colonel de Gaulle (1932/1960) stated that, “the 
essential role…which a military commander is called upon to play, is that of assessing the 
                                                 
14
 While it is acknowledged that medical and legal professionals, for example, have to frequently make 
decisions that have significant and thus weighty, consequences, these are usually done on an individual or 
localised level and thus the resonance of their broader social impact is moot. 
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conditions of every special case as it occurs” (p.79). Discussing this in depth, de Gaulle 
emphasised the importance to the commander’s ability to make effective decisions through 
the development of flexible doctrine. De Gaulle warned of the ever-present danger of 
doctrine becoming dogma, and the misery caused through the years through the inflexible 
thinking, the mental paralysis caused by the slide into dogma from improperly drawn 
‘lessons’ from previous wars and conflicts (ps.79-101). 
De Gaulle (1932/1960) attributed the power of the French Revolutionary army to its rejection 
of dogma. Of Napoleon’s style of decision making he wrote: 
“The whole of Napoleon’s method of procedure in the field was firmly based on three 
essentials: to grasp the situation, to adapt himself to it, and to exploit it to his own 
advantage. There is not the faintest hint in any of his plans or orders of generalised 
theory” (p.83). 
 
As Hazareesingh (2004) has shown, the literature on Napoleon is so immense, and the legend 
so daunting, it can be difficult to focus away from the ‘god of war’, and onto the human 
commander. While le petit caporal was an amazing, and thankfully rare, force of nature, his 
command skills were also, as he freely admitted himself, the product of intense study and 
concentration. In contrast to de Gaulle’s hagiography, Napoleon acknowledged that he was a 
great assimilator of other men’s ideas and had no use for “the mind unformed by study” 
(Blumenson and Stokesbury, 1975, p.16). 
Through their research, Wong, Gerras et al (2003) determined that the ability to operate 
effectively at the strategic level of command required a foundation of competence that had 
been laid down in the early stages of the officer’s career and continually built on through 
assignment change and career progression (p.9). A key factor for Wong, Gerras et al (2003) 
in this competency development was lifelong professional reading in breadth and depth. 
While they asserted that this reading should be initially grounded in military history and 
theory, competency would only fully develop with broader, interdisciplinary reading (ps.7 & 
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11). If, as French Army doctrine claims, “command is timeless” (Zeigler, 2011, p.5), it might 
follow from this that studying command only in contemporary settings might risk the 
oversight of important, enduring lessons. 
Summary 
In this chapter I began my examination of the conceptual framework by considering the 
components ‘wisdom’, ‘the modern warrior’, and ‘leadership’. Through the concept of 
practical wisdom, the consideration of the influencing forces on the modern warrior and the 
distinctive nature of military leadership, this portion of the literature review has illustrated the 
research topic from one perspective. This is the modern warrior-leader, a product of both past 
and present, in pursuit of the skill essential for command: the ability to make wise decisions. 
To advance my thesis, I now need to use the conceptual framework to examine the 
intellectual component of this command skill and how it is developed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: READING THE CANON 
“Who reads must choose, since there is literally not enough time to read everything, 
even if one does nothing but read” (Bloom, 1994, p.15). 
 
In this chapter I consider the research topic through a second perspective, that of the 
development of the intellectual component of military leadership through reading. I do this 
through a consideration of the concept of ‘critical literacies’ and the development of these 
intellectual skills through reading, before examining the idea of ‘canon’, the mooted concept 
of core, immutable texts. 
I complete the chapter by linking hermeneutics back to our philosophical introduction to 
phronesis, warrior and the development of leadership intellectually. I do this with reference to 
the ‘philosopher of war’ Carl von Clausewitz, a thinker whose magnum opus has been 
included on lists of ‘great books’ beyond the military realm (Seymour-Smith, 2001). 
Reading and critical literacies 
Ulijn and Salager-Meyer (1998) argue that learning, whether in formal, informal or non-
formal settings,15 largely depends on information derived from texts, and that it is the ability 
to read that governs an individual’s quest for, and acquisition of, knowledge (p.80). Literacy 
pioneer Marie Clay (1979) defined reading as a “message gaining, problem-solving activity, 
which increases in power and flexibility the more it is practiced” (p.6). Clay saw the art and 
act of reading as an extraordinarily complex activity which functions in an irreducible yet 
fundamentally integrated way with the other human-brain sensory-operative processes. For 
Ulijn and Salager-Meyer (1998) reading is “a form of human cognition the ultimate goal of 
which is comprehension” (p.80). 
                                                 
15
 I distinguish these three terms in Chapter Five. 
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Apart from our “chief tutor”, practical experience, Grayling (2001) considers reading, when 
engaged in actively and attentively, a vital means of developing the practical intellect 
associated with wisdom (p.179). Critical for this study is the link between the reading 
function and the predictive function. As “prediction is a method of asking questions and a 
means of eliminating alternatives”, we “read with anticipation…to read with comprehension” 
(Clay, 1979, p.6). This process corresponds with the predictive aspect of command where, 
pending the production of further information, commanders must make anticipatory decisions 
(Ziegler, 2011).  
I have used Clay to provide some context in which to consider reading. Despite its seemingly 
intrinsic place in the phenomenon of being a modern, educated human, defining reading is 
not a simple exercise. Smith (1978) notes that reading, like many other ‘simple’ words in our 
language, has a multiplicity of meaning. What reading means on any particular occasion will 
largely depend on the context in which it occurs (p.102). Rather than a “mere set of skills”, 
reading is a complex phenomenon inextricably inter-related to writing, the broader concept of 
language, and the personal and social conditions that lie beyond being merely ‘literate’ 
(Johnston et al., 2010).  
For this research the term ‘reading’ is an enigma, subsuming ideas like: what it is to be 
literate; the relationship of reading to comprehension and that to the visual and non-visual 
information we process as part of the reading process; and the relationship of language to the 
nature of meaning. This last point has vexed some of the greatest minds of the last century 
(Solomon and Higgins, 1996, pp.283-6, Edmonds and Eidinow, 2001); I explore it no further 
here other than to highlight two points. 
First, as Wolf (2007) demonstrates, language is universal and stretches back to the earliest 
points of human development. All humans, special individual circumstances excepted, 
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acquire and use language. However, writing and reading came much later (interestingly for 
this study, later than the phenomenon of war) and are not universal. Not all humans acquire 
writing and reading and not all cultures developed it.16 Furthermore some cultures developed 
and other cultures co-opted writing and reading (Powell, 2009).  
Secondly, meaning is not something that a reader derives from language, but rather brings to 
language. The difference is critical, implying as it does that reading is not some passive 
activity but one involving “complex intellectual processes that must always be actively 
initiated and directed by the reader” (Smith, 1978, p.9). As Ong (1977) has claimed, reading 
and writing have “restructured consciousness” and created new “interior distances within the 
psyche” (p.17).  
Thus ‘books’ and ‘reading’, are terms that cover “many different levels of reflexion” 
(Gadamer, 1960/1996 p.29). All books are similar in the sense that they share a common 
format, but, as Smith (1978) notes, while reading different books involves employing the 
same initial neural processes and cognitive skills, reading a complex treatise on strategic 
theory say requires the engaging of higher perceptive gears than does an engagement with a 
work of popular escapist fiction (p.103). Adler (1940) came up with a matrix for considering 
the relationship between types of reading, learning and books.  
For Adler, Reading II (A) is related more closely to Books I, and Reading II (B) is related 
more closely to Books II (p.114). Answering Tristram Shandy’s question “Shall we forever 
make new books, as apothecaries make new mixtures, by pouring out of only one vessel into 
another” (Sterne, 1759/1996, p.241), Adler believed that for understanding we should engage 
with original communications (p.114). 
 
                                                 
16
 A related point to this illustrated by Janks (2010) is that many languages do not have a word for ‘literacy’ or 
‘illiteracy’ (p.1). 
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 Types of Reading  Types of Learning 
I For amusement I By discovery: without teachers 
II For knowledge II By instruction: through aid of 
teachers 
 
A. For information 
 
A. By live teachers: lectures, 
listening 
 
B. For understanding 
 
B. By dead teachers: books, 
reading 
 Types of Books   
I Digests and repetitions of other 
books 
  
II Original communications   
Table One: Adler’s reading matrix 
These original communications are problematic. For Adler (1940), these texts are a source of 
‘truth’, but one that requires hard work, interpretation, time and prior knowledge to elicit. 
This would seem to imply the existence of a fixed or proper meaning within a text and clear 
authorial intent towards it. However, as Mailloux (1995) argues, interpretation – an act 
directed simultaneously toward a text and for an audience (p.121) – is always an argument at 
“particular moments in specific places to certain audiences” (p.135). And then there is the 
problem of intention.  
Considering the historical literary and legal discourse, Patterson (1995) demonstrates the 
challenge posed by the attempt to conceptualise authorial intent. For Valdés (1998), while 
literature is acknowledged for its capacity to make sense of certain aspects of human 
experience, ‘meaning’ is a problematic construction, part of the more general problem of 
language as a collectively generated, but individually realised, mode (p.4). I leave this avenue 
of inquiry to the literature on semantics and semiotics. 
Reading involves much more than the picking up of visual information – e.g. the letters or 
pictographs on a page – by the eyes, and the subsequent processing of this data by the brain. 
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Reading relies on the presence of nonvisual information – e.g. prior ability in reading, 
familiarity with the language presented, and familiarity with the subject matter – already in 
the brain prior to the reading experience (Smith, 1978, p.13). Generally, but particularly so 
when the reading experience has some contextual purpose, prior reading creates foundational 
content, thematic threads, and the derived experiences we term knowledge, and  leaves what 
Birkerts (2010) terms the ‘residues’ and ‘resonances’ (p.40) of authorial intent.  
What is occurring is assimilative learning – that is learning by addition,  growth through the 
gradual build-up of knowledge and experience (Illeris, 2009). Wolf and Barzillai (2009) note 
that reading propels comprehension through an array of sophisticated processes that include 
inferential and deductive reasoning, analogical skills, critical analysis, reflection, and insight 
(p.33). While Wolf and Barzillai (2009) refer to these processes as ‘deep reading’, I refer to 
them as the components of critical literacy discussed presently.  
To be human is to be the product of biological, neurophysiological, cultural, linguistic, social 
and historical developments (Wenger, 2009, p.216). However, at the heart of the human 
condition lies learning. That we all learn is self-evident. However the details of learning – the 
how, when, what and why of this phenomena – are, despite millennia of inquiry, still a matter 
for research and debate (Moore, 2012). The learning landscape is a grand vista with many 
paths for exploration.  
For this study, reading needs to be considered for both its influence on the individual and on 
the organisation, in this case militaries. Bibliotherapy, the therapeutic use of books to solve 
personal problems, is practiced widely by psychiatrists and psychologists (Jackson, 2001). 
Despite this popularity, there is little definitive research on the psychological impact of 
reading on individuals (Adams and Pitre, 2000, Levitt et al., 2009).  
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Koch (1994) has shown how reading impacts on the political interests and activities of 
students, while Campbell and Smith (2003) have examined the actual impacts of self-help 
books on stimulating personal change. Research like that by Jackson (2001) and Mains and 
Scogin (2003) has shown the impact of reading on mental discipline and emotional 
adjustment and the therapeutic value of targeted reading on some disorders. Taken as a 
whole, this particular body of literature suggests that engagement with text has a short-term 
impact on cognitive make-up. The long-term impact of reading on humanity has been 
considered in another body of literature. 
The part writing and reading has played in the development of human society has been 
explored in recent years through the different approaches of Manguel (1997), Man (2002), 
Wolf (2007), and Dehaene (2009). We learn from these collective works that the 
development of reading and writing coincides with the rise of settled technological cultures 
and the development of the trappings of culture that go beyond the foundational human 
accessories of clothing, jewellery, idolatry, and basic weaponry. Human development to this 
point in time seems to have been dependant on a socially, culturally, technologically and 
economically innovative elite who, through the mastery of reading and writing, took 
conceptual intelligence to new ideas of idea generation and application. Writing and reading, 
and human advancement go hand in hand.  
As Chandler (1974) notes, settled civilisation and the move from purely tribal to more 
organised, formal, professionalised violence (war) are contemporaneous (p.21), the earliest 
records of civilisation showing that thoughtful humans have long struggled to bring some 
theoretical order to, and derive applicable lessons from, the “great bloody confusion of war” 
(Dupuy, 1992, p.9). This is the context to which I am applying the conceptual framework.  
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Critical literacy 
In the consideration of canon, I highlight the ideas of the educational perennialists. An 
educational movement allied, if not subsidiary, to the perennialists was the notion of 
essentialism. Prominently propounded by Bagley (1934, 1938), the essentialist call for a 
‘renewed’ focus on reading, writing, and arithmetic (Moss and Lee, 2010), remains a 
powerful education policy debate today, as  illustrated by the intense debate surrounding the 
introduction of National Standards in New Zealand primary schools in the late 2000s by the 
National Party-led government (Trevett, 2011, Hawke and Simpson, 2011). 
This debate is usually framed using conceptual approaches to literacy. Before I outline the 
conception of critical literacy I ground this study in, I must distinguish this from three other 
approaches to literacy: the functional; that from Critical Literacy Theory (CLT); and the 
related theories that engage with the idea of leadership literacies. As Jank (2010) has shown 
in her study of literacy and power, these competing approaches, centred on theoretical 
arguments about whether literacy is a cognitive skill or a social practice,17 have contributed to 
an unproductive academic discourse widely termed the “literacy wars” (p.xiii). This 
rancorous debate mirrors the debate on canon. 
Thompson and Gadd (2006) define functional literacy as the ability to understand, respond to, 
and use those forms of language that are required by societies and valued by individuals and 
communities. This functional perspective appears to frame literacy as a social good, 
something of benefit to all. On closer examination however the definition reveals the source 
of the social tension between the functional and the CLT perspective. 
In Thompson and Gadd’s (2006) definition, there is an implicit hierarchy of importance in the 
sequence of “required by societies” and “valued by individuals and communities”, and a 
                                                 
17
 Jank (2010) herself considers literacy to be both cognitive skill and social practice.  
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distinct separation of ‘society’ from ‘individuals and communities’. While not implying any 
sinister motive on the part of the authors, the definition has been framed disingenuously. 
Interpreting the definition, ‘society’ is a euphemism for financial markets, employer elites 
and professional politics, and ‘individuals and communities’ a meaningless conflation of the 
differing socio-cultural and economic groupings that make up nations in the West. Functional 
literacy could here be more honestly framed using a term like ‘useful to employers’.    
Literacy as an ideological issue or construct, and one linked to prevailing power structures, is 
the CLT perspective (Pahl and Rowsell, 2011, p.130). For critical literacy theorists then a 
functionally literate individual is therefore one who can function for the dominant paradigm. 
In contrast, for CLT, to be critically literate is to be able to read texts in an active, reflexive 
manner in order to better understand power, inequality, and injustice in human relationships 
(Coffey, 2008); a function in resistance to the dominant paradigm. 
For Luke (2012) the classical questions of critical literacy ask, “What is “truth”? How is it 
presented and represented, by whom, and in whose interests? Who should have access to 
which images and words, texts, and discourses? For what purposes?” (p.4). In CLT, critical 
literacy aims to empower the marginalised and, crucially, as Pahl and Rowsell (2011) note, 
aims for the “interrogation” of canonical texts (p.131), canon viewed as the elite preserve its 
critics claim for it.  
First expounded by Friere (1970/2007) in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, a work written using 
Marxian class analysis, the critical literacy of CLT is positioned within a critical socio-
political context, the functionally literate oppressed transcending their marginalisation 
through a critically literate interrogation and demystification of the texts of the powerful 
(Lee, 2011). 
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Responding to Grint’s (2005) conception of leadership as a social construction (p.1473), and 
building on social complexity theories like Complexity Leadership Theory (Uhl-Bien et al., 
2007, Uhl-Bien and Marion, 2011), Dynamic Complexity Theory (Chia, 1998), and Complex 
Adaptive Leadership (Obolensky, 2010), Davis (2012) developed a Leadership Literacies 
Framework to create an alternative cognitive frame through which to engage, think about, 
and consider the place of leadership. Key to the framework is “the power of language and its 
role as a signifier of underlying mindsets and cognitive frames that influence leadership” 
(p.73). Davis aligns with Fairhurst’s (2009) view that critical theorists and discursive scholars 
understand that “language does not mirror reality, but constitutes it” (p. 1608). 
In contrast to the three approaches to literacy outlined above, I approach the issue from a 
different perspective. While functional literacy has, for a variety of reasons benign or self-
serving, long been of interest to our context, the armed services (Lloyd, 1950, Persyn and 
Polson, 2012), its attainment by the rank and file is a concern for, not of, officers, and 
therefore outside the interest of this inquiry. While there is some conceptual fellowship 
between the critical literacy of CLT and that from my conception, a key, and for proponents 
of CLT probably, crucial, point separates us: critical literacy for me is a class- and value-
neutral concept.  
While Lee (2011) has argued that critical literacy and critical thinking are radically different 
constructs (p.97), a claim that is undoubtedly correct from a CLT perspective, as I outline in 
the introduction, I bring a strategic studies and leadership perspective to bear on the notion of 
literacy. While Davis’ (2012) Leadership Literacy construct is attractive, it views literacy 
through a CLT lens and holds a foundational viewpoint derived from Hames (2007), that is 
repugnant to the thesis I am advancing. This is that twenty-first-century conditions are likely 
to call for “different ways of thinking about, and enacting, leadership than those that may 
have served in the past” (p.73).  
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From these perspectives, critical literacy, over and above those sophisticated processes that 
propel comprehension (Wolf and Barzillai, 2009), is a catch-all term I use to encompass the 
higher order of literacies that go hand-in-hand with higher order thinking. Higher order 
thinking skills have been much considered since the committee led by Bloom (1956) first 
published the eponymous Learning Taxonomy. Since that influential work other theorists like 
Ennis (1962, 1991, 1993) on critical thinking, Biggs and Collis (1982) and their Structure of 
Observed Learning Outcome (SOLO) Taxonomy, and Ackoff (1989), who codified the 
venerable ‘knowledge pyramid’ from a knowledge management perspective (Rowley, 2007, 
p.165), have used a variety of models to explain the hierarchy of learning. 
The Knowledge Pyramid, or DIKW Model as illustrated by Rowley (2007, p.164) and in 
Figure Thirteen, is of interest to this inquiry, representing wisdom as it does at the pinnacle 
of a hierarchy of functional relationships between qualitative information typologies. Despite 
its popularity among information and data management theorists, as Rowley (2007) notes, the 
DIKW Model is widely believed to have its origins in T.S. Eliot’s 1934 poem The Rock 
where he asks: 
Where is the wisdom that we have lost in knowledge? 
Where is the knowledge that we have lost in information? (p.166) 
 
 
                    
Figure Thirteen: The knowledge pyramid 
Wisdom
Knowledge
Information
Data
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By this representation, to be wise is a state of substantive essence or cognisance beyond being 
merely knowledgeable. Across the range of traditionally considered literacies – write, read, 
listen, speak – adults at the highest levels of proficiency have a broad range of skills and 
abilities including: a vocabulary that includes many general academic words and specialised 
words; using strategies to analyse ideas and information and to reflect critically on surface 
meanings and underlying meanings; evaluating the validity (truth) of information in relation 
to the writer’s purpose and/or the reader’s purpose; and integrating prior knowledge with new 
information within and across several different texts to deepen understanding (TEC, 2009). 
What these traditional conceptions of higher literacies lack however is a correlate to action, 
an implicit recognition that while one might attain the attributes of the literate, this is of little 
practical utility if one also hasn’t attained the symbiotic cognitive, moral and physical 
attributes necessary to function in the human environment (Jank, 2010). For this research, 
critical literacies encompass a breadth of open-ended concepts now readily familiar from the 
growing leadership development literature within strategic studies.    
These inter-related critical literacies include: the early modern concept of Coup D’Oeil or 
strategic insight (Duggan, 2005); the creative thinking skills that allow the manipulation of 
ends, ways and means in the abstract (Kelly and Brennan, 2009); the skills of critical analysis 
that challenge the creative process and allow for the implementation of change (Echevarria, 
2006); the contextual thinking skills that help reveal the forces, situations and processes that 
intersect to shape particular environments (Mancini and Roberto, 2009); and the arts of 
strategic thinking, the disciplined cognitive processes (Yarger, 2006, p.2) that allow one to 
“think dynamically in time and place” (McElhatton, 2008b, pp.14-18).18  
                                                 
18
 I previously unpacked this definition as “the ability to observe and conceive material and metaphysical 
objects in motion simultaneously through time and space…the ability to make abstract deductions about the 
likely behaviour of objects and forces as they relate to self over time in a manner more prescient than the human 
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So far I have used the conceptual framework to connect our actor, the military leader, with 
our action, professional reading, and its teleology, the attainment of wisdom. The route 
towards apex of the knowledge pyramid and the attainment of wisdom indicates that critical 
literacies distinguish reading in its most basic form – the simple processing of information – 
from its more complex form – the interpretation of knowledge. This brings us to the sources 
of knowledge as seen in Adler’s reading matrix; the key books he dubbed ‘dead teachers’. 
Canon 
When Thucydides (c.395 BCE/1972) illuminates our understanding of hoplite tactics through 
his description of, say, the battle of Delium (pp.321-5) he has added to our academic 
knowledge, something ‘nice to know’. However when, in the Melian Dialogue (pp.400-8), he 
presents a troubling and perplexing case study on might and right, the comparative flaws of 
regimes, and the brutal logic of war, he gives us something “permanently life-enhancing” 
(Cartledge, 1986, p.11); we are confronted with a ‘need to know’ about the enduring 
character of power relations. If the idea is entertained that some books have some intrinsic 
and timeless power, some fundamental and enduring message to impart, we begin to 
approach the idea of canon.  
Putting its theological origin and associated ‘negative’ principles aside until later in this 
section, we have in the ‘positive’ notion of canon a belief that “books not only define lives, 
civilisations, and collective identities, they also have the power to shape events and nudge the 
course of history” (Basbanes, 2006 p.13). Canon reaches across disciplines embracing works 
old and of more recent vintage from science, literature, political science, philosophy, and 
strategy.  
                                                                                                                                                        
average. It is contemplative but is in time rather than in hindsight. [Its] mark is that it works when it is most 
needed, it is singularly adaptive”.  
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Canon has been particularly embraced by leadership studies (Grint, 1997, Humphreys and 
Einstein, 2003, Wren et al., 2004, Abbott, 2010, Fraiberg, 2010, Kellerman, 2010, Shushok 
and Moore, 2010, Wilson, 2013), the interdisciplinary sources of canon providing a “new 
means of addressing the ineffable, aesthetic aspects of human activity” (Moreland et al., 
2010, p.69). This is an acknowledgment that mastering an understanding of what the Latin 
poet Prudentius (C.392 CE/2002) called the psychomacia – the struggle within the ‘soul’ or 
human condition – is key to being able to operate effectively socially, organisationally, and 
inter-personally. 
The idea of canon is not limited to works that directly touched the multitude. As I have 
previously noted on the Chinese military classics (McElhatton and Jackson, 2012), there are 
works “though only read by a few in their time…were read all the same by an important few, 
and thus altered the way humanity views the world” (Basbanes, 2006 p.13). This original 
sense of canon is that it indicated that a work was worthy of academic study (Johnson, 2005, 
p.201). 
Downs (1983) asserts that certain books have exerted a profound influence on history, 
culture, civilisation and scientific thought throughout recorded time. This idea hides within it 
something more fundamental and profound; that writing, and the codices or ‘books’ that 
developed from it, is one of the handful of basic tools essential for large numbers of people to 
live together, a building block of civilisation (Watson, 2006, p.100).  
For Hutchins (1952), the history of ideas as transmitted through the written word is “the great 
conversation” of humankind. Hutchins is an important figure in the consideration of canon 
being, along with his colleague at the University of Chicago, Mortimer Adler, both a founder 
of the ‘great books’ movement, and an influential member of the school of educational 
philosophy that underpinned the idea of great books and canon, educational perennialism. 
98 
 
Educational perennialism 
Curtis and Boultwood (1963) highlighted the paradox of the great theories of education. 
While they were products of a particular age and environment and shaped by the individual 
personalities and attitudes of their respective proponents, they all formulated certain universal 
and immutable ideas (p.vii). Despite the perception that educational debate is seemingly 
prone to fads and fashions and the tyranny of the acronym, it is possible to clearly discern in 
the long history of educational theory, common themes, albeit with sharp differences in 
process emphasises, among the ‘great educators’ (Rusk and Scotland, 1979, pp.1-6).  
Osborn (1959) argued that while methods and fashions in education change, at the heart of 
education sits the library, what he termed the “conservator of learning” (p.179). While the 
library as a social construct is much more than the sum of its parts, those parts – books, 
journals and other repositories and transmitters of knowledge – have, through one of the 
single most remarkable inventions in history – writing and reading – altered the intellectual 
evolution of our species (Wolf, 2007, p.3).  
Even though, through the impact of digital technologies, reading and the book are undergoing 
change that has a potentially significant impact on future human evolution (Birkerts, 1994, 
Young, 2007, Wolf and Barzillai, 2009), to this point in history it is hard to disagree with 
Carlyle’s claim that, “all that mankind has done, thought, gained or been…is lying as in 
magic preservation in the pages of books. They are the chosen possession of man” (Hoggart, 
1998, p.67). This idea of a core common and essential body of knowledge sits at the heart of 
perennialist philosophy. 
The perennialist argument is that the knowledge of our forebears, especially the ancients, has 
as much applicability to the problems of life today as it did in the past, and that a study of the 
great books of science, philosophy, the humanities and literature will provide a general 
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education of enduring utility (Apps, 1973, pp.21-2).  This portion of the perennialist 
argument mirrors the dominant theoretical perspective in strategic studies, that of classical 
realism (Baylis and Wirtz, 2002, pp.6-7). The realist perspective on the provenance of 
knowledge is summed up by Morgenthau (1978) in a passage worth quoting in full. 
“Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since 
the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavoured to discover these 
laws. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old age a 
defect. The fact that a theory of politics, if there is such a theory, has never been 
heard of before tends to create a presumption against, rather than in favour, of its 
soundness. Conversely, the fact that a theory of politics was developed hundreds or 
even thousands of years ago…does not create a presumption that it must be outmoded 
and obsolete” (p.4). 
 
That the perennialist view of knowledge, while concerning itself with the broader human 
condition, is in concurrence is illustrated through Adler’s (1940) statement, “there is not 
progress in everything. The fundamental human problems remain the same in all ages…The 
great books are…the primary teachers of mankind…[they] deal with the persistently 
unsolved problems of human life” (pp.333-5).  
Having established a claim that aspects of perennialist educational theory are complementary 
to the realist weltanschauung, I consider the innately perennialist educational ideas of the 
realist school of strategic thinkers as exemplified by Colin S. Gray (1999, 2009, 2010a), in 
the discussion on ‘professional reading’ in Chapter Six. However I cannot proceed without 
raising a caveat regarding my depiction of perennialism. 
I highlight the word ‘aspects’ in regard to my overview of perennialism because, as well as 
ideas on the common body of knowledge and the importance of intellectual discipline, the 
movement also embraced what would now be considered neo-conservative conceptions of 
faith, principle and morality (Rusk and Scotland, 1979, p.231), and, as was demonstrated 
during the Bush II years, neo-conservatism has an inherently idealist worldview 
(Mearsheimer, 2005).  
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The problem of canon  
The perennialist argument aside, canon is a most problematic notion conceptually and 
practically, something that can be sensed when considering the professional military reading 
lists. Both Hutchins and his colleague Mortimer Adler, the great evangelist of the post-war 
era ‘great books’ movement, essentially believed that there were 100 or so key texts, a life-
time’s study of which would be sufficient for a first class liberal education (Adler and Wolff, 
1959). This project to compile a list of the essential great works of all time is, as Umberto 
Eco tells us, an attempt to “create culture” and to make “infinity comprehensible” (Beyer and 
Gorris, 2009). This ascribed ‘agenda’ of the canonisers has prompted one of the most intense 
and controversial debates in literary criticism of the twentieth-century (Guillory, 1995, 
p.234).  
Some critics have seen conscious reinforcement at work in the notion of canon and ‘great 
books’. For them canon inculcates “a conservative ideology of classism and sexism, that 
justifies privilege for the few”, and consists predominantly “of highbrow books that defy 
popular appeal and are read by the privileged few” (Casement, 1995, p.203). This prompted 
attempts, briefly successful, at canon reform to replace or counterpoint the “dead white 
males” with the “lost voices” of colour, poverty or femininity (Guerin et al., 1992, p.299).  
While the debate was largely driven and flavoured by the intellectual remonstration relating 
to class, race and gender that was at the heart of the ‘culture wars’ of the period (Bloom, 
1987, Annette, 1994, Jardine, 1994), as Guillory (1995) demonstrates, we can, if not 
reconcile, then at least lay these issues to one side and still face objectively framed challenges 
to canon and canonisation. 
Guillory (1995) argues that many of the hostile perceptions of the notion of canon derive 
from the framing principles of the term during its theological origins in the fourth-century 
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C.E. (p.233). Originally a Greek term for an instrument of measurement, by the early 
centuries of the first millennium CE kanon had evolved to mean ‘rule’ or ‘law’, a context in 
which the term is still commonly used today. Applied to the Greco-Hebraic texts of the early 
Christian corpus, canonisation began to denote a negative process to separate or exclude texts 
and authors deemed heretical from the emergent dogmatic orthodoxy of the Church. The 
biblical canon became closed forever, the on-going works of philosophers subject to scrutiny 
for heresy (Guillory, 1995). 
Thus critics have become convinced that any exercise to ‘canonise’ works of literature must 
operate according to the ‘negative’ exclusive principles used to formulate the biblical canon 
(Guillory, 1995, p.233). This is contestable. An act of singling out ‘key works’ is arguably a 
positive endeavour, one seeking to make a simple, but difficult appraisal – in the limited time 
we have available in our busy lives, what is worth reading, or, more accurately, as Bloom 
(1994) would have it, what is worth re-reading (p.29).  
To make something comprehensible – to ‘frame’ it – we often resort to devices of narrative 
like time, sequence, and continuity (Carter, 1993). As literary critic Sainte-Beuve (1910) 
pointed out in his essay What is a Classic?, the compilation of the non-theological canon was 
much easier up to the Renaissance because the term ‘classic’ was restricted purely to the 
works of the ancients of Greece and Rome – the concept was bounded. However, once works 
began to appear in the vernacular and the great revolution in printing and reading gathered 
pace, by the late seventeenth-century canon became a fluid and expanding exercise. So rather 
than a fixed set of classic texts, canon required ever-ongoing enlargement to fulfil its role as 
“the home of all noble human beings, of all who have permanently increased the sum of the 
mind’s delights and possessions” (Sainte-Beuve, 1910 p.135). By the second decade of the 
twenty-first-century the home has become incomprehensively crowded and the mind is more 
befuddled than delighted. 
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While I leave the contested beginnings of canon to the culture warriors, the ends of canon are 
in my scope. This becomes the question of what and why to leave out, and who gets to 
decide? For Bloom (1994) canon today is characterised by ‘key’ texts “struggling with one 
another for survival” and the reader’s attention (p.19). The vastness of the exercise in making 
the great ideas of humankind comprehensible and digestible means that, at some point, 
something has to give.  
Highlighting its identity constructing function, Ricoeur (1977) stated that through canon-
forming “a community recognises what is consistent with its own existence, what founds it” 
(p.35). Prior research on both Indonesian and Chinese strategic cultures (McElhatton, 2008a, 
McElhatton and Jackson, 2012) is complemented by Newmyer’s (2010) account of how 
Deng Xiaoping encouraged senior Peoples Liberation Army strategists to study the ancient 
Chinese military classics as he launched them on the course of modernisation and Deng’s 
comparison of the contemporary security environment to the world of the Warring States 
period when the classics were written.  
The reference to, and perceived relevance of, these ancient military treatises represents the 
endurance of certain fundamental philosophical and political views that are reflected in the 
tradition and continue to mould regime behavior around the strategic environment (Newmyer, 
2010, p.491). With this in mind, I return to the notion of a ‘military canon’ in Chapter Six. I 
conclude this chapter and my consideration of the leadership portion of the conceptual 
framework by examining the place of hermeneutics in this inquiry. 
The ‘Philosopher of War’ 
‘Philosopher of war’ Carl von Clausewitz is one of the most enduring, if controversial, 
military thinkers of modern times (Keegan, 1993, Bassford, 1994, Van Creveld, 2000, 
Strachan, 2007). In Clausewitz’ On War (1832/1976) we have a “treasure of the human 
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spirit” (Van Creveld, 2000, p.118), one symbolic of the symbiotic relationship between my 
methodology and subject.  
On War is an inherently interdisciplinary work, drawing from military history, political 
science, philosophy, and the sciences, human and natural (Strachan, 2007). As Aron 
(1976/1983), Hartmann (2001, 2002) and Niebisch (2011) have argued, Clausewitz develops 
the prototype of the German concept of humanities (the Geisteswissenschaften encountered in 
Chapter Two) that, nearly 100 years later, found scientific reputation with Wilhelm Dilthey’s 
works about hermeneutics. The common disassociation of Clausewitz with the broader 
corpus of eighteen and nineteenth-century Enlightenment, Classicism and Romanticism 
literature is the reading of these texts in isolation from the military turmoil of the period and 
context in which their intellectual gestation took place (Krimmer and Simpson, 2011). 
Through its repudiation of the ‘scientific strategy’ apparently suggested by Buelow and 
Jomini, and through the promulgation of the primacy in war of non-empirical concepts like 
‘hatred’ and ‘chance’ (Ropp, 1962 pp.151-160), we find in On War an epistemological 
embrace of the hermeneutic. As Hartmann (2001) argues, when Clausewitz uses the word 
philosophy, he is arguing for the creation of a new model of science that is more proper to the 
nature of war than the natural or positivist sciences as they were then understood. As 
Strachan (2011) notes, this ‘new science’ of war is a habit of mind where the commander is 
conditioned to embrace chance, chaos and the unexpected as aides, rather than impediments, 
to decision making (ps.1294-5). 
On another level, On War represents the unfinished struggle of a professional soldier to attain 
the broadening of intellectual perspective termed ‘horizon’ (Howard, 2002); it is a work that 
embodies the application of the dialectical methods of the hermeneutic circle to the study of 
complex phenomena (Handel, 2001). Hartmann (2001) argues that Clausewitz offers 
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hermeneutics as intellectual tools to assess war and develop strategies, not only in the 
classrooms of war academies but also in exercises and real war. Niebisch (2011) argues that 
in his inquiry into the use of intelligence by commanders, Clausewitz developed a 
hermeneutics based not on the identification of “truthful messages”, but on the identification 
of incorrect ones (p.66). 
Clausewitz argues for an approach to strategy making that accord with the methods of 
hermeneutics and dialectics. This requires the strategist to adopt a holistic intellectual 
approach that must have already finished its reflection upon the final action (e.g. peace) 
before the first step (e.g. war) is made (Hartmann, 2001, p.37).  
A key student of Clausewitz, French soldier and philosopher Raymond Aron (1967),19 drew 
from the Prussian that the study of war is ultimately about praxeology, the theory of practical 
activity and human conduct. This meant that every student of war had to deal with the 
problem of how theory translates into reality (Handel, 2001, p.52). For Clausewitz the 
attributes of a good soldier include “a sensitive and discriminating judgment…a skilled 
intelligence to scent out the truth”, and the importance of memory, imagination, an inquiring 
mind and a knowledge set that is “comprehensive rather than specialised” (Clausewitz, 
1832/1976). Clausewitz’s conception of the attributes of the commander is best understood 
through his use of the term ‘geist’ (Strachan, 2007), the ‘spirit’ of human enquiry or wisdom. 
In this approach, military leadership is most effectively studied through attempting to discern 
the ontological, epistemological, and teleological views of great commanders (Connelly, 
2002, p.1).  
                                                 
19
 Aron’s doctoral thesis in the 1930s on the ‘philosophy of history’ drew both from Aristotle’s teleology and 
Dilthey’s hermeneutics (Ahonen, 1994) thus providing an intellectual thread between phronesis, hermeneutics, 
and the study of war by military leaders. 
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Lying at the heart of On War, an aspect not generally appreciated, is Clausewitz’ preeminent 
enthusiasm for Bildung – the German concept of ‘self-cultivation’ – and the perfectibility of 
the individual, a key concern of the German Enlightenment (Paret, 1985, p.46).20 He held 
strongly to a belief in the enduring importance of independence of thought, analytical skills, 
and critical self-reliance in commanders, something only a broadly based military education 
could foster. As Otte (2002) shows, the “refining of certain military leadership skills” and the 
“cultivation of mature judgement” through education were “crucial components of the 
Clausewitzian theory of war”, with On War itself intended to serve as a sophisticated 
educational tool (ps. 28-9). 
So, in my invocation of Clausewitz, I bring together three strands of the conceptual 
framework presented to this point. First, beginning with the Aristotelian phronesis and 
travelling to our time via the praxeology of Clausewitz and his students, a long intellectual 
thread is revealed that conceives of wisdom as something leaders can attain and that is 
focussed on practical ends. Secondly, to grapple with the complexity of a phenomenon like 
war, the method of strategic thinking is hermeneutic or interpretive. Finally in this 
conception, this wisdom is pursued through the critical reading in breadth and depth of key 
texts that represent the best thought on the military arts and sciences.  
However, we are now faced with the horns of a dilemma. This comes from the inherent 
difficulty of many canonical works like On War. Handel (2001) typifies the view that 
Clausewitz’ methodology is both the strength and weakness of his work, observing that 
professional military readers and scholars seldom have taken the time to cultivate a deep 
understanding of the text, preferring instead to either raid it for quotes that conveniently 
                                                 
20
 As Strachan (2012) points out, while contemporary thought often frames the modern-era German enthusiasm 
for both learning and militarism as a contradiction or disjunct, in fact the Prussian reformers of 1795-1813 
would have been delighted that by 1914 a united Germany was “the world’s model for higher education 
and one of its preeminent military powers” (p.149). This point is highlighted by many of the authors in Krimmer 
and Simpson (2011). 
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confirm preconceived ideas21 or approaching it second-hand through its many interpreters 
(ps.24-5).  
This difficulty is exemplified by Clausewitz, but not confined to him and his work. While 
authors like Handel (2001) praise Sun Tzu for his more explicit, accessible approach (p.25), 
practitioners like Montgomery (1968) note that The Art of War is written in a manner that is 
“terse, sometimes obscure, [and] sometimes deceptively simple” (p.380). The dangers of this 
deceptive simplicity are illustrated by Phua’s (2007) analysis of the misuse, and 
misunderstanding of Sun Tzu thought in sections of the U.S. military. 
So, on the one hand is the ideal that there are essential texts that are fonts of professional 
wisdom for the developing officer. On the other hand, the complexity and challenge that 
many of these texts present the average mind, particularly to the developing and 
inexperienced mind of a junior officer, make them, in reality, daunting and difficult to 
approach. This should be borne in mind when the findings are presented and considered. 
 
                                                 
21
 Principle architect of the WWII invasions of Poland and France, Blumentritt observed that to give On War to 
the military was like “allowing a child to play with a razor blade”, (Handel, 2001, p.25). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: EDUCATING MILITARY LEADERSHIP 
“By the very nature of things, skill in the profession of arms has to be learned mostly 
in theory by studying the science of war – since the  opportunity of practice in the art 
does not come often to the general. For this reason the great captains have always 
been serious students of military history…T.E. Lawrence rightly said that we of the 
twentieth-century have two thousand years of experience behind us, and, if we still 
must fight, we have no excuse for not fighting well. My reading over the years has 
convinced me that nobody in this twentieth-century can become a great commander, a 
supreme practitioner of the art of war, unless he has first studied and pondered its 
science” (Montgomery, 1968 p.21). 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine the research topic from a third perspective, that of professionalism. 
In the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Two, professionalism nestles within it the 
more discrete concepts of professional military education, and within that, professional 
reading. In this chapter, I move to a more contextualised approach than so far adopted by 
introducing professionalism in the military with particular reference to some of the key works 
from the civil-military relations literature of the 1960s and 1970s that defined the topic. I then 
briefly look at professional military education as a subset of professionalism, considering it 
from an androgogical, or adult learning perspective. 
Professionalism and the military 
Whether or not, as I have discussed earlier, our modern world is any more volatile or protean 
now than at any other pivotal time in our history, the idea of change is embedded in modern 
conceptions of life (Rogerson, 2011). The idea of change is particularly prevalent in the 
workplace where changes in patterns of employment tenure, civil mobility, and evolutions in 
technology, markets, and organisations have led to changes in the way human development is 
conceptualised (Colardyn and Bjornavold, 2004).   
The concept of ‘learning’ is complex, the research literature revealing a diversity of 
theoretical perspectives, and significant epistemological and theoretical differences between 
the disciplinary and cultural traditions within which each concept is constructed (Saljo, 
108 
 
2009). Unsurprisingly due to its centrality to the human condition, individual learning is one 
of the most philosophically considered topics, many historical concepts and theories still 
informing contemporary teaching practice (Bigge and Shermis, 2003). Organisational 
learning however is inherently intersubjective, complicated by the interaction of multiple 
internal and external forces and the perceptions, memories, perspectives, and practices of the 
organisation, and its competitors’ personnel (Fear, 2003, p.163). 
Mumford, et al (2000) have pointed out three fundamental contradictions in organisational 
life. The first is that, organisations must balance the tendency toward stability, brought about 
by prior investments, interdependencies among systems, and people’s habits, with a need for 
change to cope with shifting environmental conditions. Secondly, although they might work 
together to bring about organisational goals, the individual units or divisions that comprise 
organisations may not agree on goals or strategies for coping with change. Finally, 
organisations must not only cope with objective performance demands, they must also 
recognise the individual needs of the people who comprise the organisations (Mumford et al., 
2000, p.13). 
Argyris and Schön (1996, pp.11-13) considered how organisational inquiry, that is the 
interplay of thinking and action to solve problems, leads to organisational knowledge, that is 
the ever-evolving body of knowledge that guides organisational practice. Asking how 
knowledge becomes organisational, they outlined how organisations function as ‘holding 
environments for knowledge’. When an organisation is functioning in this way knowledge is 
held in, and accessed from three sources: the minds of individual members; the policies, 
records, histories, and other texts an organisation develops and accumulates; and in the 
“physical objects that members use as references and guideposts as they go about their 
business” (Argyris and Schön, 1996, p.12). 
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Much of the literature on organisational learning focusses on modern corporations, that is 
organisations with, relative to human history, a short history. As the first large-scale 
organisations in history militaries provide a “rich source” of information on organisational 
learning (Fear, 2003, p.165). For organisations with this more substantial developmental 
base, the questions on how knowledge becomes organisational can be considered from a 
more historically grounded perspective. 
As noted, the professional development of its leaders has been an enduring concern of 
militaries since the early modern era. Kingseed (1999) has stated that, “after warfighting 
itself, the most demanding challenge confronting the military profession…is the preparation 
and training of young men and women for combat” (p.1054). Recruitment and retention of 
the right people for the modern strategic environment is a major concern of modern 
militaries. Wardynski, Lyle et al (2009) predicted that without substantive changes the “U.S. 
Army’s Officer Corps will be unequal to future demands” (p.v).  
Wardynski et al. (2009) have interpreted this situation as being caused by a complex 
combination of factors, one of them an inability in the all-volunteer age to adequately 
compete with the private sector for the most talented potential future leaders. Whereas, in 
previous eras, the military was able to rely on the “lateral entry of specialised talent via 
conscription” (p.2), that option is all but closed in the current political environment in most 
Western nations.  
Senior officers from the highest echelons of the U.S. and British militaries have cited “the 
erosion in leader development” (Dempsey, 2010, p.6) and “intellectual decay” (Newton et al., 
2010, p.45) as a concern at the highest levels of militaries across the world. Unlike most large 
organisations militaries cannot buy talent to fill short-falls at its mid and upper-level ranks. 
The unique nature of the military profession means that once an armed service accesses a 
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cohort of officers, it must “live with them throughout a 30-year career span (Wardynski et al., 
2010).  
While it is evolving to embrace broader academic approaches, the study of leadership in the 
armed services is still primarily a study of military history and the biographies of great 
military leaders (Pape, 2009). As Keegan (1976) has noted, the study of ‘generals and 
generalship’, when done well, can yield remarkable psychological insights into human 
character (p.27). More often though, rather than being modes of inquiry and frameworks for 
thinking about problems (Cohen, 2005, p.575), these studies, seduced by a romanticised view 
of soldiers and soldiering (Desch, 2006, p.573), have a tendency to succumb to sycophancy, 
hero-worship and author/subject identity projection, all impediments to their use as tools for 
the development of the critical faculties. 
Evetts (2003) characterises professions as the “structural, occupational and institutional 
arrangements” for managing work associated with risk. In her categorisation, professionals 
are “extensively engaged in dealing with risk, with risk assessment and, through the use of 
expert knowledge, enabling customers and clients to deal with uncertainty” (p.397). 
Schwartz and Sharpe (2010) have argued that wisdom is “embedded” in the practices of 
many professions, military officers included (p.271). This wisdom, or as Kiszely (2007) 
would have it, the exercise of “good judgement” (p.15), is most manifest when, in the 
absence of specific orders or clear guiding protocol, the military leader is required to make 
decisions in “unpredictable and quickly changing situations” (Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010, 
p.159). Schugurensky (2006) notes the Aristotelian idea that participation in deliberation and 
decision making has a highly pedagogical potential (p.169). 
The concept of ‘professionalism’ has had a chequered history of use and contrasting, even 
contradictory, interpretations in the literature (Evetts, 2003, p.399). Moskos et al (2000a) 
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show that the concept of professionalism defines the evolution of officership from the 
‘modern’ to the ‘late-modern’ and the ‘post-modern’ eras.22 Moskos (2000) identifies a 
dominant type of military professional in each of these periods. The modern era is typified by 
the “combat leader” as predominant role model; the late-modern period by the 
“manager/technician”. In contrast, the dominant role model for officership in the post-modern 
period posited by Moskos is the “soldier-statesman/soldier-scholar” type (ps.14-16). Plus ça 
change. 
In contrast to Moskos (2000), Janowitz (1960) previously identified in armies typologies of 
the ‘Intellectual Officer’ and the ‘Military Intellectual’. For Janowitz the first was one who 
brought an intellectual dimension to their job, but where this intellectualism was held in 
check by the needs of the profession. In contrast the military intellectual was one whose 
attachments and identifications were primarily with intellectuals and intellectual activities. 
Janowitz thought the second were fundamentally unsuitable for higher command. I consider 
the typologies of Moskos and Janowitz in more detail in Chapter Eight. 
Moskos (2000) and Nielsen (2012) acknowledge the influence of Morris Janowitz on the 
study of professionalism in the military. Citing the prescience of Janowitz, Pinch (2000) 
endorses his view that the dominant military professional model is produced by “the 
confluence of socialisation and the type of problem to be solved at any one time” (p.161). 
Paradoxically, this influence of change on the dominant model has contributed to the 
strengthening or continuity of a distinctive military identity (Janowitz, 1971, ps.44-46). 
                                                 
22
 Moskos et al (2000a) delineate these three eras as: Modern from the introduction of the levee en masse citizen 
army during the 1793 French Revolution; Late Modern as a period roughly contemporaneous with the Cold 
War; and the Post-Modern dating from the end of the Cold War. The authors acknowledge that these three 
delineations are contestable, noting that the Modern era militarily is commonly ascribed to the post-Treaty of 
Westphalia period from 1648 when the modern nation-state and, by extension, modern armies, were established. 
Given the rapid development of military theory in the seventeenth-century, I adopt the earlier delineation for the 
Modern era (ps.1-2). 
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Janowitz (1971) saw the development of the military profession as a continuous struggle to 
be rational and scientific in the context of military requirements, describing the history of the 
modern military establishment as a struggle between heroic leaders who embodied 
traditionalism and glory, and military managers who were concerned with the scientific and 
rational conduct of war. For Janowitz, the essence of this struggle and its perennial nature 
was that, while soldiers need to be scientific and rational, they also need to be brave (p.45). 
Janowitz (1971) described this struggle as a tension between “militarism” – the vast array of 
customs, interests, prestige, actions and thought associated with armies and war – and the 
“military way” or the evolving professionalisation of the military. Janowitz considered 
militarism – what I have characterised as ‘caste’ – as an impediment to military purposes 
(ps.44-46). 
Jordan (1971) noted that while the origins and timing of the transformation of military 
officership from a trade to a profession are obscure, it was clear that by the latter part of the 
nineteenth-century it was well advanced in both Europe and America (p.213). The 
Napoleonic campaigns saw rapid promotion (to NCOs) for many private soldiers and so 
increased responsibility and need for them to take on the administrative duties normally 
devolved to officers (Lloyd, 1950, p.7).  
Janowitz (1976/1991) described this change in relation to an interrelated set of structural 
changes within society and the military. While technological necessity and the growth in size 
of the military required that middle-class officers be introduced to fill the cadres of artillery, 
engineering and logistical specialists, changes to the social powerbase through political 
reform, seen most dramatically in Revolutionary France, imposed bureaucratic structures and 
controls upon an institution that had been the traditional preserve of the feudal-based landed 
aristocracy (ps.230-1). As Abrahamsson (1972) put it, “the historical process of 
professionalisation of the military involves its transformation from an ascriptively recruited, 
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usually temporarily employed and – in relation to contemporary standards – low or 
uneducated corps of officers to an achievement-recruited, permanently hired, and well-trained 
group of experts” (ps.151-2).  
There were then four or five key factors influencing the professionalising of the military: the 
emergence of nation states; the creation of mass armies; the accumulation of industrial and 
technological resources through standardised automation and machine production; and new 
organisational forms and managerial innovations e.g. the division principle, central staffs, and 
total warfare organisations to integrate military and civilian defence (Abrahamsson, 1972, 
ps.151-2). Professional military education developed as a functional corollary to these 
changes (Kennedy and Neilson, 2002). 
Janowitz (1971) listed the essential elements of a professional group as (a) a system of 
training, (b) a body of expert knowledge and skill practices, (c) group cohesion and 
solidarity, (d) a body of ethics and sense of responsibility and, (e) mechanisms of self-
regulation (p.14). Jordan (1971) justified the application of the term profession to the military 
because it is bureaucratised, with a hierarchy of offices and a legally defined structure, and it 
is marked by its members commitment to, potentially, unlimited service, extending to the risk 
of life itself. Jordan noted that these characteristics have an important impact on military 
education (p.211). 
These categorisations of the military profession largely conform to a normative view of the 
concept. From a normative perspective, “professional identity is associated with a sense of 
common experiences, understandings and expertise, shared ways of perceiving problems and 
their possible solutions” (Evetts, 2003, p.400). This common identity is produced and 
transmitted through occupational and professional socialisation by means of members’ shared 
and common educational backgrounds, professional training and vocational experiences, and 
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by membership of professional bodies and associations which encourage practitioners to 
develop and maintain a shared culture of work. A result of this professional socialisation is 
that similarities in work practices and procedures, common ways of perceiving problems and 
their possible solutions and shared ways of perceiving and interacting with client groups 
develop and become entrenched (Evetts, 2003, ps.400). 
Evetts (2003) contrasts the perspective on professionalism as a normative value with the 
critical perspective of the 1970s and 1980s that viewed professionalism as an ‘ideology’ to 
maintain powerful, privileged, self-interested monopolies (p.401). I will not examine this 
perspective in detail here other than to note Abrahamsson’s (1972) comment, particularly 
regarding the U.S. military, that “organisation and expertise are major factors underlying both 
[its] normative influence and its political power” (p.152). 
I highlighted Grint’s (2005) view of leadership as a social construction and how this aligned 
with the hermeneutic approach to leadership inquiry. This corresponds with Janowitz’ view 
of social groupings like the military where social relations and context were always 
overlapping and inter-relating resulting in dynamic social organisations which never became 
more than partially integrated (Shields and Soeters, 2013, p.9).  
As shown, specialist expertise is a key element of professionalism. Writing from a late-
modern perspective, Jordan (1971) noted that military expertise had expanded to include a 
broader skill set than was traditionally required. These skills included: helping to define the 
nature of the nation’s security tasks, especially their politico-military dimension; applying 
scientific and technological knowledge to military matters; and training, supplying, deploying 
and – if necessary – employing the fighting capabilities of military units in changing politico-
military and technological environments (p.212). Jordan considered that only the third of 
these roles was traditional.  
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Partially validating this view, Abrahamsson (1972) points out that while military leaders have 
acted throughout history as advisors to kings and princes on matters of war and strategy, it 
has been predominantly from the twentieth-century that the officer corps as a whole – at least 
in the major world powers – has been professionally trained and educated to make political 
appraisals (p.155). 
In one of a series of speeches that symbolically mark the beginning of the Cold War (Gaddis, 
2005. ps.94-5), and therefore the transition to Moskos’ (2000) late-modern era, Winston 
Churchill addressed the U.S. Army General Staff in April 1946. There he stated that the small 
pre-war U.S. Army’s ability to raise, move and utilise its very large forces in WWII was 
down to, “professional attainment, based upon prolonged study and collective study at 
colleges, rank by rank, age by age – those are the…needs of the commands of the future 
armies and the secret of future victories” (Jordan, 1971, p.214). With this in mind I hone in 
further on my research focus by considering professional military education, particularly with 
regard to the formal, informal and non-formal modes of education that relate to professional 
reading. 
Developing officers 
Military education programmes encompass almost every adult education component from 
basic skills training through graduate-level higher education (Persyn and Polson, 2012, p.5). 
Militaries are both major consumers of, and contributors to, adult education theory and 
practice. They integrate adult learning principles and theory to increase organisational 
effectiveness and address their learners’ educational needs, and influence adult education by 
assisting the civilian practitioners expand avenues through which to improve adult education 
practice (Persyn and Polson, 2012, p.6).  
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For the military, adult education is a process that stimulates individual growth, maturity, and 
learning in order to achieve organisational goals. The importance given to adult education is 
grounded in the belief that human capital is the most valuable military asset compared to 
technological capital, financial capital, and built capital, none of which reach their full 
potential without the full potential of human capital as embodied in the enlisted and officer 
cadres being fulfilled (Zacharakis and Werff, 2012, p.90). Despite the prevalence of the 
technological monism in some sections of the military noted in Chapter Three, the rapid 
historical development of weapons, transport, and communications technology has led to a 
new, or at least renewed, appreciation of human factors, including the benefits to militaries 
from the long-term education of their personnel (Lovell, 2010, p.31).  
King (2010) asserts that many of the terms and concepts used in military education are 
commonly misused and misunderstood, with little consensus on the meaning of even the most 
common terms (p.25). This ‘what’ of education – what education is – is further complicated 
by debate over the second ‘what’ of education – what education does, or perhaps more 
correctly, what we want education to do. This second question has been an adult education 
dilemma since Aristotle first described the problems educators faced in Ancient Greece 
(Apps, 1973, p.1). These two ‘whats’ of education are complemented by a further point of 
debate, the situationalist question, or the ‘where’ of education (Schugurensky, 2006). The 
‘whats’ and ‘where’ of adult education will be briefly considered, before narrowing in on 
professional reading in the military. 
The ‘whats’ and ‘where’ of education 
During my consideration of critical literacies, I referred to the taxonomies of learning as 
expounded by Bloom (1956), Ennis (1962, 1991, 1993), Biggs and Collis (1982), and Ackoff 
(1989). In this section I refer to taxonomies of education. While the perspectives of Anderson 
et al. (2005) or Beetham and Sharpe (2013) would suggest this is merely a semantic 
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distinction, I consider that there is an important difference to be considered. While the 
taxonomies of Bloom and his successors considered the ‘how’ of learning, the taxonomies of 
education considered here are focused on the “whats’ and ‘where’ of learning. The locus of 
learning is an important factor in professional reading.  
Bearing in mind Schugurensky’s (2006) caveat that taxonomies, due to their rigidity, are 
generally incapable of capturing the complexities of learning processes (p.164), to further 
consider leadership development it will have to be done from a taxonomic perspective. 
Rogers (2004) has argued that the benefit of educational taxonomies and typologies is that 
they provide tools for analysis and planning to educators, learners and organisations in 
helping them provide, encourage, or delineate responsibility for, a broader spectrum of 
educational opportunities than might traditionally have been acknowledged (p.261). 
The taxonomic debate referred to by King (2010) can be illustrated by an examination of the 
simple educational model, often referred to as the ‘professional development framework’ 
(Edwards et al., 2006, Bentley et al., 2008) which sets out four developmental elements: 
training, experience, education and self-development (Rhode, 2012). The benefits of the 
model are twofold. First, as illustrated in Figure Fourteen, it lends itself to the application of 
evaluative continua to aid the holistic consideration of organisational learning packages 
(McElhatton, 2010). Second, its very simplicity makes it a powerful model to consider and 
categorise learning. 
Acknowledging that many exceptions could be raised that prove the rule, the professional 
development framework allows for an evaluative consideration of individual developmental 
programs and activities in terms of their likely production of results in specified timeframes, 
within financial parameters and against organisational metrics. As Lovell (2010) points out, 
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instrumental approaches are an important, though not necessarily effective, element of 
education planning and procurement in the military (p.30). 
 
Figure Fourteen: The professional development framework (McElhatton, 2010) 
 
Broadly speaking, training and experience, as they are articulated in the framework, are the 
foundations of military professional development because their effects are immediately 
apparent (Masland and Radway, 1957). In contrast to the training and experiential 
development processes – e.g. practice training, performance management, goal setting, 
coaching, reward and discipline – intellectual development through education is more 
incremental and delayed, and thus slower to determine results from and harder to quantify 
(Guskey, 1994). Of all the elements, self-development, in the simple sense that the 
framework defines it, is the most underutilised and understudied as it depends, by definition, 
on large degrees of autonomy and, because it evolves incrementally, it is even more difficult 
to track and measure its effect or benefits (Madigan, 1998). 
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While the professional development framework presents a neat typology of knowledge and 
skills development, it is extremely problematic. First, as shown by Shugurensky (2006), this 
neatness of definition neither captures the complexity of the learning process nor does it 
adequately reflect the ‘whats’ and ‘where’ of education. Secondly, professional reading, 
particularly when driven by a reading list, does not neatly fit into the schema. I address this 
second point presently. 
The framework differentiates clearly between the terms education and training. This would 
imply a significant difference in their modus, desired result and short and long-term benefit to 
the recipient. McCausland (2008) holds that, “while training is more concerned with teaching 
what to think and what the answers ought to be, education is all about teaching how to think 
and what the questions ought to be” (p.x). Somewhat complementary, Kiszely (2007) has it 
that training is “preparing people, individually or collectively, for given tasks in given 
circumstances”, while education is about developing “mental powers and understanding” 
(p.14). This equation of education with higher-order cognitive skills is emphasised by the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff who assert that education generally “conveys general bodies of 
knowledge and develops habits of mind applicable to a broad spectrum of endeavours” 
(Gortney, 2011, p.129) and military education particularly “conveys the broad body of 
knowledge and develops the habits of mind essential to the military professional’s expertise 
in the art and science of war” (Gortney, 2011, p.132).  
In these examples, the differentiation seems clear. However the typologies are not as clearly 
definable as these attempts to define them might suggest. First there is the equation of 
education with higher-order cognitive skills. This is challenged by research into the 
interrelationship of creative thinking and intuition in command, where the ability to make 
decisions quickly and under pressure is dependent on the prior internalisation of skills, 
knowledge and behaviours through training (Ilyichev, 2009). Furthermore, as Strachan 
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(2006) shows, training is “an enabling process, a form of empowerment, which creates self-
confidence”, and is thus largely psychological or cognitive in form (p.216). 
The equation is further undermined by a growing awareness since the end of the Cold War 
that increasing operational and technological demands on personnel means that training for 
any purpose will only be effective if the trainee is first adequately educated (Kime and 
Anderson, 1997, p. 3).  
As Kiszely (2007) acknowledges, education also needs to be considered contextually or 
teleologically, i.e. in terms of its intended purpose. For the military, education is not pursued 
for its own sake, but for the purpose of developing the “capacity for good judgement” in their 
professional career, and thus has a training dimension (p.15). This is an illustration of the 
perspective that differentiates between ‘academic’ education and ‘vocational’ or professional 
education (Kime and Anderson, 1997), a distinction with its own historic and instrumental 
problems (Hodge, 2013). This prevailing imperative to break learning into neat typologies 
may have a cultural dimension. A consideration of the more nuanced Gallic approach is 
instructive. 
For Bonnet (2011) the characteristics of officer education are “continuity, consistency, [and] 
permanent adjustment”,  where the aim is to preserve “the essence of what constitutes the 
competence of a military commander” while still adjusting “constantly” to meet the needs of 
current engagements and tactical, operational and strategic reality (p.11). Beyond, what is 
termed in France, ‘military and athletic physical education and training’, or ‘basic training’, 
professional military education has been described by Bonnet (2011) as having three primary 
components: tactical training, academic education, and military culture (p.12). In Bonnet’s 
(2011) typology, tactical training is “the heart of an officer’s role” (p.11), and is self-
explanatory. ‘Academic education’, a broadly focused pursuit, is concerned with giving 
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commanders, all the intellectual tools they need “to understand the contemporary world” 
(p.12).  
What is termed ‘military culture’23 here is, for the French Army at least, an abstract 
educational concept marking the nexus between academic education and tactical training 
which aims to enable officers to embed their actions in thought (Bonnet, 2011, p.12). The 
term can be interpreted as the intellectual essence of command, or as Murray (1999) 
represents it, “the ethos and professional attributes, both in terms of experience and 
intellectual study, that contribute to a common core understanding of the nature of war” 
within military organisations (p.134).24  
Thus, rather than being characterised in terms of distinct typologies, Masland and Radway 
(1957) suggested the professional development framework might be better understood 
through the addition of another continuum or spectrum which has ‘pure training’ – e.g. 
breaking down and cleaning a rifle – at one end, and something they labeled ‘pure education’ 
– that involving the highest levels of abstraction – at the other (p.51). 
So, as seen in this section through some brief examples, the neat typologies commonly used 
in military education are problematic. I point this out because of the earlier stated need to 
understand what is meant by the term ‘professional reading’ I have sought to investigate. The 
self-development strand of the framework would appear the ideal locale for a consideration 
of the concept. However this strand carries strong connotations of autonomy and self-
direction in the learner in accordance with androgogical theory (Hayden, 2007, p.224). A 
reading list as an organisational artifact, and one that may be imbued with greater or lesser 
degrees of direction, would sit uneasily there. The problem is also posed of how to categorise 
                                                 
23
 “Culture Militaire” is also the name of the French Army professional reading programme. I examine this in 
more detail in Chapter Seven. 
24
 This is in marked contrast to the somewhat negative conception of ‘military culture’ as typified by Dunivin 
(1997) or Soeters et al (2006) which focus on the study of masculinity, discipline, professional ethos, ceremony 
and etiquette, and service or unit subculture . 
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the professional reading done as part of, say, a post-graduate paper. This recalls King’s 
(2010) earlier point about the problems caused by ill-defined educational terms.  
Livingstone’s (2006) primary agency/knowledge structure framework is a taxonomic model 
through which professional military education can be considered in more detail. As in Figure 
Fifteen, the model cross-categorises the basic forms of learning from the perspective of both 
the primary agent – i.e. the learner or teacher – and the knowledge structure of the learning 
experience – i.e. whether it occurs in an institutional or in a situational setting (p.204). 
  Primary Agency 
  Learner(s) Teacher(s) 
 Institutional Nonformal education Formal schooling 
  Further education Elder’s teaching 
Knowledge Structure Situational Self-directed learning Informal education 
  Collective informal 
learning 
Informal training 
Figure Fifteen: Livingstone’s learning framework25 
 
Livingstone’s taxonomy draws from both Critical Literacy Theory and related educational 
discourses that dominated the 1970s (Rogers, 2004, ps.2-3) and the current government 
policy-driven Lifelong Learning debate that particularly promotes non-formal and informal 
education as key means to enable economic competitiveness, employability, individual 
fulfilment and self-development (Colardyn and Bjornavold, 2004, p.69).  
While definitions of the terms formal, non-formal, and informal in Livingstone’s (2006) 
taxonomy are widely contested (Colley et al., 2002, Rogers, 2004, Golding et al., 2008), 
                                                 
25
 Livingstone’s original matrix uses the term ‘pre-established’ for the upper half quadrants. I substitute the term 
‘institutional’ for clarity. 
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theorists presenting often wildly conflicting representations of each term in terms of agency, 
or knowledge structure, the model still allows us to develop a more comprehensive and useful 
understanding of the nuances of learning. 
Drawing from Rogers’ (2004), Schugurensky’s (2006, p.164) and Livingstone’s (2006) 
definitions, formal education, or ‘schooling’ as Livingstone terms it, can be understood as 
that which is highly de-contextualised, not adapted to individual participants, and is an 
institutionalised, ‘top-down’ system, from pre-school to graduate studies, where a state or 
institutionally prescribed curriculum is delivered. The system is dependent on certified 
teachers and results in the award of grades or qualifications that provide pathways to the next 
level or to employment. Formal education has a large element of compulsion, overtly through 
law at primary and secondary levels, and covertly through societal expectations and labour 
market pressures at post-secondary. 
Non-formal education is that which is partially de-contextualised and partly contextualised 
and consists of learning embedded in planned activities that are not explicitly designated as 
learning, but which contain an important learning element (Rogers, 2004, p.261). Non-formal 
education refers to all organised educational programmes that take place outside of the formal 
system, are usually short-term and voluntary, and are based on curriculums with varying 
degrees of flexibility or rigidity. Non-formal education is usually, but not always, dependent 
on teachers or instructors. Non-formal education does not normally demand prerequisites in 
terms of previous schooling or qualifications (Schugurensky, 2006, ps.164-5).  
Informal education is generally agreed to be that which is highly contextualised, 
individualised, and small-scale; it is highly participatory (Rogers, 2004, p.261). Informal 
learning is defined as learning resulting from daily life activities related to work, family, or 
leisure. It is sometimes referred to as experiential learning. Typically, it does not lead to 
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certification. While these aspects are not widely contested, the differing views on informal 
education relate to the degree of sensitivity of the learner to the acquisition of skills or 
knowledge and the presence of an instructor (Livingstone, 2006, p.206). 
While informal learning is often categorised as non-intentional, incidental or random (Green 
et al., 2004, Golding et al., 2008), Livingstone (2006) disagrees, arguing the need for some 
degree of intentionality or consciousness of learning of value occurring for the term to have 
any real meaning and differentiation from the business of everyday life (p.206).  
Schugurensky (2006) emphasises the non-dependence of the typology on institutional design 
or organised teaching and its non-curricular character. Crucially for the ‘where’ of education, 
Schugurensky is careful to emphasise that the concept is not situationally dependent; informal 
learning can occur in informal, formal and non-formal settings. Thus, informal learning is 
that which is not organised as a pedagogical activity by an educational institution and can 
occur both outside and within educational institutions (ps.165-6). 
I began this section by considering a commonly used taxonomic perspective on education 
broadly writ. The professional development model could be described as sacrificing precision 
for simplicity, something that perhaps makes it a ‘sticky’ educational model (Heath and 
Heath, 2007). In contrast, the taxonomy of lifelong learning sacrifices simplicity for precision 
and the accommodation of nuance. It also employs terminology that is not endemic to our 
professional context and therefore provides a useful theoretical counterpoint to consider 
during my qualitative analysis. 
The inherent problem with educational typologies is that they present the many shades of 
grey in simple black and white terms. Most educational programmes are not either formal, 
informal or non-formal, but exhibit various degrees of formality, informality, or non-
formality depending on the particular characteristic of each programme that is being 
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examined (Rogers, 2004, p.125). Schugurensky (2006) argues that education should not be 
understood exclusively as a schooling process, but also as an experientially-based learning 
process that takes place in daily life (p.169), and by extension, in the course of one’s 
professional duties.  
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CHAPTER SIX: PROFESSIONAL READING AND THE MILITARY 
“All military laws and military theories which are in the nature of principles are the 
experience of past wars summed up by people in former days or in our own times. We 
should seriously study these lessons, paid for in blood, which are a heritage of past 
wars. That is one point. But there is another. We should put these conclusions to the 
test of our own experience, assimilating what is useful, rejecting what is useless, and 
adding what is specifically our own. The latter is very important, for otherwise we 
cannot direct a war. Reading is learning, but applying is also learning and the more 
important kind of learning at that”. Mao Zedong (1936) 
Introduction 
The final perspective through which to consider my research topic is that of professional 
military reading, the final component of the conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 
Two. I consider professional reading as an intellectual tradition in the military, through an 
introduction to the artefact of the professional military reading list and a consideration of 
professional reading in historical context.  
Historical military figures from Napoleon, through George S. Patton and Sir Howard 
Kippenberger, to contemporary figures like former U.S. Marine Corps commandants 
Generals Hagee (2005) and Gray (Puryear, 2009) or former New Zealand Chief of Defence 
Force Lieutenant General Jerry Mateparae (Amner, 2006) stress the vital part professional 
reading plays in the development of command skills. Since the development of professional 
military education in Europe during the nineteenth-century, the reading by officers of key 
texts on military history, tactics, strategy etc. has been a central pillar of the war college 
programme.  
Professional military education developed as a corollary to the emergence of a professional 
officer corps. In his study of the German officer-corps, Demeter (1965) put forward four 
principal drivers for the development of professional military education systems in Europe 
from the mid-seventeenth-century onwards. These were: a natural outcome of the division 
and specialisation of labour through social and economic evolution and development; 
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technological development in artillery and military engineering that required a standardized 
training in mathematics and the natural sciences; pressure from the traditional martial class, 
the landed gentry, to provide a free education for their progeny to compensate for that class’s 
economic decline; and the rapid growth of an educationally benchmarked professionalism 
across society propelled by an ascendant, meritocratically-inclined and educationally hungry, 
middle-class (ps.66-72). By the 1960s the armed forces had become the world’s largest 
educators (Jordan, 1970, p.214). 
While recommended reading lists have long been part of officer induction manuals (Moss, 
1917, Anon., 1942), Metz (2011) has suggested that the modern artefact of the professional 
military reading list begins with U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Earl Wheeler’s provision 
of a reading list in 1963 (p.1). Like many of his generation of military leaders, a preeminent 
part of Wheeler’s military education was based around the study of historical operations 
(Collins, 1978, p.ix). However, by the Cold War era, the rapid broadening of the scope of the 
formal curriculum to accommodate new operational and technological topics saw the 
reduction in time devoted to the in-depth study of, particularly, military history, and thus the 
need for informal means to supplement the formal instruction (Collins, 1978, ps.ix-x). 
Globally, professional military reading lists are the most prominent resource used to guide 
leader self-development in the military services (Lemay, 2010). Many defence forces and/or 
their individual component services and units publish professional reading programmes and 
lists replete with recommendations for all stages of a soldier’s career. These various lists 
recommend long-acknowledged classics from ancient China and Napoleonic Prussia, to 
recent releases on insurgency, peacekeeping and global warming. The lists recommend works 
from business writers and philosophers, and some promote the reading of fiction genres like 
sci-fi as aids to the development of critical and strategic thinking in the military professional.  
129 
 
Lieutenant General Mataparae’s rationale for a reading list was that, “through reading we can 
fill an experiential vacuum… encourage our minds to be flexible…heighten our 
understanding of our profession and the circumstances we might face into the future” 
(Amner, 2006 p.3). The Canadian Forces (CF) rationale for developing their reading 
programme, A Guide to Reading on Professionalism and Leadership (Horn, 2006), was their 
feeling that the ‘self-directed strand’ of the ‘professional development framework’ was being 
neglected and that the promotion of a reading programme would be one way of further 
developing leadership skills supplementary and complementary to existing professional 
military education programmes.  
The Australian Army sees their reading programme as a key tool for the long-term 
development of professional mastery by its soldiers through their development of intellectual 
tools to help understand and appreciate “war in all its manifestations and dimensions” 
(Hopkins, 2007a, p.1). For a former Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, the benefits of 
their reading programme are both intellectual and fiscal. “In an era of constrained resources, 
our professional reading programme is designed to provide Marines with an intellectual 
framework to study warfare and enhance their thinking and decision making skills” (Krulak, 
1996a, p.12).  
Carpenter (2004) has written about the communication aspect of command and the 
importance of words in the armoury of a commander, which he describes as “a fundamental 
factor for martial persuasion” (p.199). Carpenter (2004) particularly singles out General 
Macarthur’s well-developed communication skills for consideration, the articulateness of this 
‘warrior-scholar’ and his adroit use of his extensive vocabulary in written communiques and 
his memoirs (p.199) having been developed through his extensive and life-long professional 
reading.  
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Ulijn and Salager-Meyer (1998) argue that reading is one of the keys to both academic and 
professional success (p.80), Hopkins (2007b) claiming that reading is the core of military 
professionalism. Referencing research on leadership development for school principals, 
Blackwell (2003) has shown how reading and discussing the successes, failures, actions, 
limits and constraints on characters from classic literature can be used in leadership ‘renewal’ 
programmes (p.463).  
Remarking on dramatic changes in U.S. Army thinking since the commencement of post-war 
stabilisation operations in Iraq, Brooks (2010) highlighted the innovations of a cohort of 
officers below or barely into generals’ rank who he said were leading ‘‘with two minds’’ – 
one “steeped in Army culture”, the other in some additional, often academic, culture (p.27).  
Brooks (2010) described how these autodidacts, or “dual-consciousness people” as he dubbed 
them, could be practitioners one month and then academic observers of themselves the next 
and were neither blinkered by the traditional Army mind-set nor so removed from it that their 
ideas were never tested by reality, as a pure academic theoretician’s might be (p.27).  
Brooks (2010) highlighted the culture of learned debate, critical discourse and creative 
applied thinking that had developed in the U.S. Army in response to the early operational and 
strategic failures in Iraq as documented by Ricks (2006). This change was led by an emerging 
generation of iconoclastic “warrior-scholars” like Petraeus and H.R. McMaster who balanced 
operational and combat roles with academic publishing, the promotion of quality debate in 
professional journals, and the promotion of professional reading through tailored and 
intellectually provocative reading lists (Ricks, 2006, p.420). With this in mind, I make a brief 
historical survey of professional reading in the military. 
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The Ancient World 
For Bobbitt (2002), war is a product as well as a shaper of culture, a creative act of 
civilisation (p.xxxi). While this may sit uncomfortably with our modern conception of war as 
a wholly destructive enterprise, it is worth reflecting that one marker of the transition from 
animal hominid to civilised human is the transition from mere fighting – the animal 
dimension – to war-making – the sole preserve of humanity (Bobbitt, 2002, p.xxxi). Macksey 
(1973) describes warfare as the “ultimate expression of man’s interminable struggle for food 
and space in addition to his yearning for security, power and self-justification” (p.i). 
Pioneering researcher on aggression in animals, Lorenz (1966) found it a “curious paradox” 
that the unique faculties of verbal speech and conceptual thought that enabled humans to 
evolve from the foraging condition of the animal – the condition of inter-species fighting – 
are the same faculties that encouraged and enabled the development of systematic intra-
species fighting i.e. warfare (p.230). 
Humans have been writing, and therefore reading, about war for as long as humans have been 
writing and reading. The earliest forms of these martial writings were poetic or prose 
narratives. The prose accounts, like those inscribed on the monuments of the great and dread 
empires of Egypt, Babylon, Maurya and Assyria, commemorate campaigns and battles and 
the feats of ‘great men’ and served to record and glorify events, historical or otherwise, and 
transmit to the people the laws of kings (Van Creveld, 2000). The poems, originally orally 
composed and transmitted, but eventually preserved through writing, while also 
commemorating the founding deeds of a people also served the secondary purpose of 
educating young warriors on the morals, values and conventions of their people and to inspire 
them to heroic deeds worthy of über-hero Achilles, wily Odysseus (Finley, 1955) or 
superhuman Gilgamesh.   
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While many works on the art of war (e.g., Jones, 1989) choose to begin with the Greeks of 
the early-mid first millennium BCE, organised military activity is much older, the first 
pictorial evidence being from the Standard of Ur dating from circa-3500 BCE (Macksey, 
1973, p.3), the same period the development of the first picto-ideographic writing systems is 
seen (Martin, 1994, p.1). It is not for another two millennia that the first attempts to codify 
military thought are seen. The writing of Sun Tzu’s Art of War circa-600 BCE bookends a 
thousand years of military organisation that ends with the writing of Vegetius’ hugely 
influential in its day De Re Militari (Macksey, 1973, pp.14-28). Therefore, while military 
organisation, and the systemised approach to training that is implicit in this notion, stretches 
five and a half thousand years in posterity, military education, a notion I assert to be 
dependent on the presence of both reflexive and critical thought and the existence of a 
codified body of knowledge that can be disseminated, discussed and built upon, is only a 
phenomenon which can be traced from the mid-first millennium BCE. 
Ancient China 
A powerful form of martial writing developed in China during the Warring States period of c. 
400-200 BCE. This form, written by experienced professional generals of the period, sought 
to preserve and impart to their martial successors the methods and stratagems they had 
efficaciously employed in the field. The most honoured of these texts was The Art of War by 
the general known to us as Sun Tzu. Honoured it was, but unique in its day it was not.  
“The military wisdom of Sun Tzu would be valued and preserved not because he was 
the first great military mind of China but because the Chinese already boasted a rich 
military and intellectual tradition with sophistication enough to appreciate the genius 
of The Art of War” (Lynn 2003). 
 
The power inherent in this and others in the ancient Chinese military canon is evident in how 
they were ‘published’. Unlike the poems or prose of Greece and the near East which were 
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‘public documents’ for wide social consumption, the musings of the Chinese generals, 
revealing as they did the victory secrets of the state, were held in state archives for elect 
consumption, only being made available to a wider Chinese audience at the end of the first 
millennium CE when they began to be widely studied for the annual imperial military 
examinations (Van Creveld, 2000).  Once in the archives access to these texts was restricted 
to a small handful of elite scholars, military commanders, high officials and the emperor 
himself. Some works like T’ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings were even more restricted, 
encouraging as they did military teachings that advocated and instructed on, revolution.  
Sawyer (2004) relates how Chang Liang, the general who played a major role in establishing 
the Han Dynasty, felt that his engagement with the sole copy of Three Strategies of Huang 
Shih-kung had played such an important role in his success that it was too dangerous a work 
to leave for others, and so had it buried with him on his death. Such a dangerous text could 
not be long restrained by the dead hand of General Chang and quickly resurfaced with the 
help of some bibliophilic tomb raiders. The rulers of the Ch’in Dynasty, who Chang had 
helped defeat, also felt strongly about the instructive and combustive power of these military 
texts, and exempted them from their notorious book burnings (Sawyer, 2004).  
Prior to unification under the Ch’in dynasty in 221 BCE, China was a land politically 
fractured, subject to horrific, epic warfare and social discord, yet bearing fruit to an 
enduringly rich philosophical, artistic and linguistic whole-culture that, unlike say the Celtic 
or Anglo-Saxon corpus in the British Isles, still forms the intellectual basis of modern 
Chinese life. This rich and ancient cultural tradition, its “nearly timeless written language” 
and “disparate intellectual threads”, serves as a counterpoint to the tortured political heritage 
of continuous conflict and measureless human suffering (Sawyer, 2004, p.ix). This was the 
era of the flowering and codification of Chinese culture known as the ‘hundred schools of 
thought’.  
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Two great institutions have held the Chinese state together for nearly four millennia – the 
writing system and the warrior-scholar ruling elite. An ancient system which, unlike its early 
contemporary Sumerian, still exists in daily use, Chinese writing has been described as “a gift 
from the past to the present”, one in which whole histories of thought are hidden in single 
characters (Wolf, 2007, p.48). As early as 1850 BCE written reports are found recording the 
direction of great public works by this elite (Fairbank, 1988, p.3). Chinese language is written 
using ideograms, literally the visual representation of an idea. Chinese ideograms, through 
millennia of evolution from their rudimentary origins, have a particularly multidimensional, 
ambiguous quality and, notably for ideograms representing complex ideas, lend themselves to 
multiple interpretations (R.L. Wing, 1988). 
Like all feudal or caste-based societies, classical China was socially stratified. A class quite 
unique to classical China, though a form of it is seen in classical Greece, were the Shih, the 
warrior-scholars of the lower aristocracy, keepers of professional knowledge, oracular 
procedure, calligraphy, ritual and use of arms, tactics and stratagem. These broadly and 
deeply educated, though somewhat materially impoverished, men led a precarious existence 
wandering China in search of employment and intellectual succour in the numerous courts of 
the period (Eichhorn, 1969, p.71). They were adventurers in the minds and affairs of man. 
Crucially for our study Shi, a related term, is the “inherent power or dynamic of a situation or 
moment in time”, the art of music, letters, lovemaking, the martial arts, and the contemplative 
process itself (Minford, 2003). 
At the nexus of the cultural refinement and political horror of the period developed a 
“contemplative literature” (Sawyer, 2004) that sought to fathom the chaotic order of the 
world. The way of thinking that permeated all these texts came from “the observation and 
contemplation of the forces at work in the environment, from the attunement of the 
microcosmic self to the energies of the macrocosm” (Minford, 2003, p.xxv). Rulers and 
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scholars studied and contemplated these books as they struggled with the complex problems 
of their day. The classical Chinese canon as produced by the Shih, including the great works 
of military thought, lend themselves particularly well as contemplative aids to reflect on the 
human constant. More than 2,300 of these works have survived the ravages of time (Pheng et 
al., 1995) with only a handful known outside China. 
While they are very much products of their time and context, they were written in an 
ecumenical and immutable fashion, designed to provide advice to anyone at any time. It is the 
freshness of the language and the eternal relevance of the message that has given works like 
the I Ching, the Tao Te Ching, Chuang-Tzu and Sun-Tzu Bing Fa an enduring status in ‘the 
West’ since they were first introduced there from the eighteenth-century CE onwards. The 
compatibility of their teachings to modern business practices has been extensively 
commented on (see e.g., Low, 2001, Tung, 1994). The ubiquity of these texts, particularly of 
the writings of Sun Tzu, is constantly reinforced by their inclusion in contemporary military 
reading lists. 
Classical Greece 
Ferrill (1985) recounts how a changing tactical environment, combined with that curious 
proclivity for inquiry that stood the Greeks out from their classical contemporaries, led to the 
development of a true military science in the years during and after the Peloponnesian War 
(431-404 BCE). In the Athenian firmament particularly, the idea developed that their more 
complex ‘modern’ campaigning required a more intellectually based generalship, one where a 
sophisticated appreciation of tactics, logistics and people management skills mattered as 
much as the honour-based leadership of the heroic era (ps.162-6).    
Ferrill (1985) has also described the phenomenon of the ‘professor of tactics’ in Greek 
society, tutors  (with some military experience one would assume) who were available to 
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educate young candidates for generalship on the tactical theories of the day. The very 
existence of these ‘professors’, and the willingness of the well-off to pay for their services, 
demonstrates that Greek society increasingly saw war as an intellectual activity (Ferrill, 1985, 
pp.162-6). Unfortunately little is known about the quality or doctrinal foundation of these 
proto military academics other than the rather partisan and disparaging references made to 
them by Xenophon in Constitution of the Spartans and Recollections of Socrates (Ferrill, 
1985, pp.165-6). What is known is that the Greeks favoured historical, as opposed to a more 
scientifically grounded, analytical approach to military instruction (Ferrill, 1985, p.164).  
Xenophon’s contempt for ‘classroom warfare’ begins the debate, zero-sum for its more 
extreme adherents over the ages, between the educationally and the experientially inclined 
models of professional development that has raged until the modern day, as illustrated by the 
impassioned debate on officer development conducted within the Canadian Forces at the turn 
of the millennium (Horn, 2001, Beare, 2001). From the Peloponnesian War to the fall of the 
Western Empire some 800 years later, saw the beginnings of what has been described as a 
military canon, book-ended by the writings of Thucydides, Xenophon and Aeneas Tacticus in 
the fourth-century BCE and those of Vegetius in the fourth-century CE (Ferrill, 1985, p.164). 
While Homer’s heroic Iliad was still the principal inspiration of Alexander (Renault, 1975, 
p.28), the more temporal works of Xenophon were used for practical guidance by figures like 
Cicero and Scipio (Ferrill, 1985, p.164). 
The Middle Ages and Renaissance 
While Van Creveld (2000) is generally dismissive of the quality of military works produced 
during the Late Middle Ages, he does acknowledge the return to literacy in the period by the 
European aristocracy, particularly in their rediscovery of the military classics of Rome and 
Byzantium (ps.55-65). That the ideal of the “cultivated warrior” was cherished by the elite 
can been seen in cultural artefacts of the period like the sepulchre of Martin Vázquez de 
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Acuña in the cathedral of Sigüenza, Guadalajara, Spain, adorned with a statue of the warrior, 
killed in battle in 1486, clad in armour, but thoughtfully reading a book (Mackay, 2000, 
p.114). 
 
Figure Sixteen: The tomb of Martin Vázquez de Acuña (Malaga, 2013) 
 
Prior to the professionalisation of the military and the development of a coherent professional 
military education from the Enlightenment period on, an archetype can be discerned, the 
polymaths dubbed by later eras as ‘Renaissance Man’. The educated classes of the 
Renaissance and for another few centuries beyond tended to be broadly read and “widely 
acquainted with military and diplomatic affairs, if not directly from experience, then from 
extensive reading in ancient and modern works on statecraft” (Eden, 1991).  
Two archetypes of the period are Montaigne and Montecuccoli. A moralist and philosopher 
of life (Solomon and Higgins, 1996, pp.178-180), Michel de Montaigne was the notable 
‘reader’ of the French Renaissance whose Essays (1580/1958) still touch the imagination of 
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popular audiences today.26 While often ignored by historians of philosophy (Solomon and 
Higgins, 1996, p.179), a scan of the military reference books at hand show that he is always 
ignored by historians of war. Understandably so, for most reference biographies of 
Montaigne choose only to highlight his scholarship, political diplomacy, and idiosyncratic 
worldview. However Montaigne, like his father, was a soldier of some minor distinction 
(Pop, 2001, Fleming, 2009) and his writings are replete with musings on war (Rapoport, 
1964, Bonadeo, 1985, Hale, 1998, O'Neill, 2001).  
Raimondo, Count Montecuccoli, shared with Turenne and Condé the first place among 
European soldiers of the seventeenth-century. His Memorie della guerra profoundly 
influenced the art of war for the next century (Keegan and Wheatcroft, 1996, ps.201-2). 
Among Montecuccoli’s other achievements, Barker (1975) highlights his great literary 
output, describing him as a “studious warrior”, the epitome of the science of generalship who 
sought to “correlate the wisdom of the printed word with the experience of battle” (p.2). A 
reader with catholic tastes, Barker (1975) found in his analysis of Montecuccoli’s writings a 
broad range of reference points from Medieval and Renaissance texts, ancient Greece and 
Rome, contemporary scientific works, fellow military theorists,27 historians and political-
jurists from the period (p.55). 
Under the influence of Machiavelli, the intellectual and literary roots of military thought in 
the period, and the increase in interest in the science and philosophy of war, lay firmly in the 
rediscovery or ‘rebirth’ of classical literature (Newark, 1988, ps.181-3). The military science 
in the period was evolving through the study of a combination of Greek and Roman classics28 
                                                 
26
 For example the book and TV adaptation of De Botton (2000). 
27
 Montecuccoli’s military theory contemporaries include long-forgotten thinkers like Georg Basta, Adam 
Freitag, Buonaiuto Lorina, Hendrik Hondius, Johann Neumair, Francois de Noue, Henri de Rohan, Diego Ufano 
and Johann Wallhausen (Barker, 1975, ps.57-8).  
28
 Barker (1975) lists these Greco-Roman influences as Aeneas Tacticus, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, 
Caesar, Rufus Curtius, Aelian Tacticus, Frontinus, Justinus (Trogus Pompeius), Onosander, Plutarch, Polybius, 
Publius Aemilianus Cornelius Scipio, Sallust and Vegetius (p.57). 
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and the new scientific literature and the exchange of ideas that came about through its 
dissemination (Barker, 1975, ps.55-8). From this time onward, after the foundation of 
military science as a discipline for serious study, military leaders strove with increasing 
fervour to understand their metier by means of a cognitive process – the applied and directed 
study of the writings of the great martial thinkers and practitioners. This marks the 
beginnings of professional military reading in the sense understood today. 
The Enlightenment 
The seventeenth-century, arguably the beginning of the ‘modern’ professional age, was a 
ferment of military innovation, from technological advancements in fortifications and 
weaponry, tactics and training (Montgomery, 1968, Jones, 1989). The proto-nations and their 
elites of the period adapted to this original ‘revolution in military affairs’ in different ways 
and at different speeds, depending on their particular socio-cultural, economic and strategic 
context (Lynn, 2003).  
Whereas the Dutch Republic, in perpetual conflict with the Hapsburg Empire, could produce 
new styles of command and standards of military professionalism to rise to the challenges of 
the age, the socially stratified English Kingdom still clung to the old hierarchies of status 
rather than merit to produce its military leadership, and as a consequence was slower to adapt 
to the new realities. The innovations of Maurice of Nassau, stadtholder and captain-general of 
the Dutch Republic, and his contemporaries created a new paradigm where the military 
officer, aristocrat or commoner, “was now expected to be well read and educated, as well as 
skilled in the arts of war and command” (Manning, 2007 p.675). 
The actualities of battle in the gunpowder age were a world away from the romantic ideal 
portrayed in art and literature. Commenting on a depiction of the eighteenth-century battle of 
Fontenoy by court painter Pierre Lenfant, John A. Lynn sardonically notes an image of 
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“control and glory”, where “parts of the field are obscured by smoke, but none by blood. No 
wounded writhe upon the ground; no gaps break the linear perfection of the infantry” (Lynn, 
2003 p.114). The reality was very different, with human and inhuman noise, smoke, fire, 
movement, and sheer confusion contributing to an assault on the senses that made figuring 
out what was actually going on across the battlefield impossible for all, commanding general 
included.  
Therefore, and in contradiction to much later thought, “experience in battle was thought to be 
insufficient because one person could observe only part of the action, and it was therefore 
necessary to read histories of warfare to supplement this incomplete knowledge and 
experience”. Learning, through engagement with military treatises, memoirs, the classics of 
the ancients, as well as contemporary works on mathematics and engineering came to be seen 
as “the nourishment of military virtue” (Manning, 2007 p.675).  
In his consideration of how the ‘great captains’ of history learned the art of strategic decision 
making, Brodie (1973) isolated one possible important factor – professional reading. 
“Meaningful parallels were usually not to be found in the leader’s own experience, though he 
may have found them in a creative reading of history – the kind of reading that enables one 
without effort and perhaps only half consciously, or even unconsciously, to recall some past 
instance that bears in some significant way on a present problem” (p.435). The historical 
context Brodie (1973) attaches this remark to - the mid-seventeenth to mid-eighteenth 
centuries – is important to this study, for the age of Marlborough, Eugene, De Saxe, 
Frederick et al was, to Brodie’s eyes, marked by a paucity of current works of value on the 
higher military arts (pp.435-6).   
Brodie’s low opinion of the military works of the Enlightenment is shared by writers like Van 
Creveld (2000) who, while admitting it to be a curious thing that the age of the Great 
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Captains could produce military theory of so little value, goes on to portray the theorists of 
the period as being so fixated on the ideas and works of the ancients that, despite their 
revolutionary action in the field, they could contribute little that was fundamentally new on 
the page (p.73). A curious thing indeed; but only if, like Brodie and Van Creveld, one 
focusses one’s lens narrowly on the ‘pure’ military writing of the period, i.e. that focussing 
exclusively on tactical or operational concerns. 
Lawrence (2009), building on the earlier research of Beckett (1991), Anglo (2000) and Fissel 
(2001), has provided a compelling challenge to this perspective, arguing that a sophisticated 
culture of military inquiry and instruction had developed among the aristocracy and landed 
gentry of pre-Civil War England. For those who had not benefitted experientially from the 
campaigns of Elizabeth I in Ireland, the Thirty Years War or the wars of the Dutch against the 
Spanish Empire, a range of up-to-date specialist tactical treatises from the continent were 
available in translation to provide answers to the practical problems of command. 
The Enlightenment has been seen as marking the transition from the age of the self-taught 
‘gentleman’ soldier, to the age of professionalism (Childs, 2000) marked by the emergence in 
the 1770s of the military academy and staff college, and, concurrently with this transition, an 
increase in the number of specialist military treatises, written by military specialists, for 
specialist military audiences (Van Creveld, 2000, p.93). Thus in this view, one result of 
increasing professionalisation is an increase in both the quantity and quality of military 
theory. An alternative interpretation is possible. This is that the increasing 
professionalisation, coupled with a varying quality and breadth of instruction at the PME 
institutions, and the increased circumscription as to the purpose of professional military 
education by the military authorities, led to a narrowing of the focus of military thought to the 
purely ‘scientific’ aspects of the martial endeavour.  
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The age of industry 
The increasing professionalisation of the military in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries is shadowed by its increasing ‘industrialisation’. The preeminent military thinker of 
the mid-eighteenth-century was the technological ‘early adopter’ and training innovator 
Maurice de Saxe (Macksey, 1973, p.87) who, through his practical innovations and his 
influential work, Reveries upon the Art of War (De Saxe, 1732/1985), was to have a great 
influence on two of the ‘Great Captains’ of the coming century, Frederick the Great of 
Prussia and Napoleon Bonaparte. While largely ignored by his immediate contemporaries, his 
promotion of the idea of “intelligent leadership” to produce high morale and a reasoned 
response from subordinates resonated with his intellectual heirs (Macksey, 1973, p.87). 
Frederick’s contribution to professional reading was notable. Much like his ancient Chinese 
counterparts, his Military Instructions for the Generals (Frederick, 1747/1985), which 
outlined his philosophy of war and tactical and operational doctrine, was published in 1747 
under standing orders in a limited edition of fifty copies. It remained secret until a copy was 
captured in 1760 and subsequently published (Macksey, 1973, p.94). Frederick’s system was 
drawn upon by the Count of Guibert for his 1772 Essai Général de Tactique which, in its 
advocacy for a popular citizen’s army, was to profoundly influence the leadership of the 
French Revolutionary, and Imperial, Armies (Jones, 1989, 316-7) and the American 
Revolutionary Army under Washington (Spaulding, 1924). 
Napoleon casts a giant shadow over the period, the study of military history and leadership, 
and the activity of professional military reading. This famous maxim is self-explanatory: 
“read over and over again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, 
Eugene and Frederick…this is the only way to become a great general and to master the 
secrets of the art of war” (Napoleon, 1827/1985). Napoleon’s reading of the classics, history 
and political theory, geography, travelogues, poetry, drama, and literature is well catalogued 
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by his many biographers. Durant and Durant (1975) document the influence of Plutarch’s 
Lives on the young Napoleon, while Cronin (1994) notes the influence of Plato, Machiavelli, 
and Montaigne on his political thought, the reading research he conducted prior to campaigns 
and the portable library that travelled with him throughout his years of conquest.  
In Chapter One, I explain how this research was prompted by earlier research into the reading 
habits of Major-General Kippenberger (McElhatton, 2008b). Cronin (1994) shows that, like 
Kippenberger and Patton, Napoleon was a habitual note-taker and annotator of texts and had 
great powers of memorisation and recall, all developed through years of concentrated self-
directed study. His military ideas, codified into his Maxims (Napoleon, 1827/1985), were the 
battle-field companion of soldiers like Stonewall Jackson in the ‘total’ wars of the late 
nineteenth-century (Phillips, 1985, p.405).  
If Napoleon casts his shadow over military history, then the contemporaries Antoine Jomini 
and Clausewitz cast their shadow over military theory. Himself a military writer of some 
renown,  nineteenth-century Russian General Mikhail Dragomirov quipped that “it is well 
known that military history, when superficially studied, will furnish arguments in support of 
any theory or opinion” (Luvaas, 1965, p.91). He could easily have been referring to the works 
of Jomini and Clausewitz, the latter particularly, like his philosophical ancestor Sun Tzu, 
frequently misinterpreted or cherry-picked for justifying bon mots. I refer to a less-
appreciated aspect of Clausewitz’ impact on professional reading in due course.  
Antoine-Henri Jomini was a Swiss military theorist who served under, and sought to interpret 
Napoleon. Very much a product of the Enlightenment who promoted a geometrical and 
scientific approach to war, Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War published in 1838 became the 
premier military-educational text of the mid-nineteenth-century and greatly influenced U.S. 
Civil War generals. A twentieth-century editor of Jomini’s work, Marine Corps General J. D. 
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Hittle (Jomini, 1958/1987) popularized the idea that ,“many a Civil War general went into 
battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War in the other” 
(p.396).  
In his 1958 edition of Jomini’s Art of War, Hittle highlights “the strange paradox of military 
history” whereby in the mid-nineteenth nentury Jomini’s name was “synonymous with 
military wisdom”, while the works of Clausewitz were virtually unknown to all but a “small 
group of leading military thinkers”, whereas, by the mid-twentieth-century, “the military 
world that today burns gun-powder at the altar of Clausewitzian doctrine has all but forgotten 
Jomini” (p.395). Over half a century later, a cursory scan of military journals articles and 
monographs shows that this is truer than ever. 
While this may be due to the discrediting of the formalistic and schematic ‘scientific’ 
approach to war that Jomini championed, as Waldman (2012) has shown, there is much in 
Jomini that complements the Clausewitzian conception of war (p.348). Rather, it may be that 
Jomini is simply the victim of fashion, neglected because he is neglected, rather than because 
he should be. This has some bearing on our consideration of ‘canon’. 
Between 1743 and 1908 also saw the foundation of modern British professional military 
education with the founding of the Royal Military Academy and the Royal Military College 
(Lloyd, 1950, p.8). This period was characterised by an ongoing battle between reformers and 
reactionaries for control over the administration of the British Army and the education of its 
officers, a masochistic struggle ultimately “tragic” (Skelly, 1971) for the soldiers and the 
officers who led them into the wars in the Crimea and South Africa. 
When reform over the commissioning of officers finally came, albeit slowly, to the British 
army in the nineteenth-century, birth and wealth became no longer sufficient in themselves to 
secure a commission, and competitive examination, and the preparation for it, became 
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mandatory. While the reformers held sway, powerful reactionaries in the British military 
establishment fought against the meritocratic reforms in a manner that would long perpetuate 
the anti-intellectual image of the British officer class. 
“Earl Grey was impelled to warn that too much learning weakened the mind and said 
that brain disease was decimating the military cadets of France. Sidney Herbert said 
he would hate to see an army of bookworms; he preferred the ‘fine fellow,’ so long as 
he knew his duties. General Sir William Codrington warned of the danger of getting a 
man whose mind is a complex dictionary instead of a man whose mind is created for 
energy  and action” (Turner, 1956, ps.197-8). 
 
Despite the prevalence of this educational Luddism29, and the peculiar effect the regimental 
system has on British professional military education to this day, active autonomous reading 
by ambitious and able young British officers flourished. An 1850s guide, The Pattern 
Military Officer, recommended that officers engage deeply with key contemporary texts like 
Yate’s Elementary Treatises in Tactics and Strategy, Napier’s History of the War in the 
Peninsula, Wellington’s Dispatches, Maurice de Saxe’s Reveries, and Napoleon’s Maxims, as 
well as classical evergreens like Caesar’s Commentaries, Plutarch’s Lives and the Histories 
of Livy, Polybius and Xenophon (Turner, 1956, p.198), many of which were being collected 
and read by Kippenberger et al over seventy years later (Dietrich, 1989, McElhatton, 2008b).  
After its success in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, the German Army became the global 
centre of military innovation and German thinking on tactics, organisation, and doctrine 
embedded itself into other nations’ armies and academies (Luvaas, 1965, p.71). Much of this 
innovation, and its dissemination abroad, was facilitated by establishment of professional 
journals that gave soldiers everywhere a forum to publish technical and theoretical articles. 
The period was also notable for the “ferment of discussion” created by technological change. 
This professional discussion was assisted by the establishment of new military academies 
giving a new direction to doctrinal innovation, the expansion of the historical sections of 
                                                 
29
 Lloyd (1950) mischievously quotes a senior officer of the Napoleonic period who described a proposed 
regimental library as, “an unnecessary and objectionable institution” (p.8). 
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General Staffs and thus the solidifying of military history as a sub-discipline in its own right, 
and a period of intense revision of tactical manuals (Kennedy & Nielson, 2002). 
An example of the enduring nature of some works of military literature, and how their 
lessons, influenced by changes in the international strategic and tactical environment, can be 
forgotten and then rediscovered by subsequent generations, can be seen in the work of 
Colonel C.E. Callwell. One of the few military works of any originality to come out of the 
British military in the late-nineteenth-century (Luvaas, 1965, p.81), Gray (1999) argues that 
Callwell’s 1896 Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, is, along with the writings of 
Mao and T.E. Lawrence, a “first rank” and profound source for understanding the principles 
of irregular warfare (p.283). On publication, the work became the “textbook for imperial 
soldiers” (Gray, 1999, p.275), was quickly translated and published in France, then Britain’s 
leading colonial rival (Luvaas, 1965, p.81), and was a much sought-after text by I.R.A. 
officers during Ireland’s 1919-21 War of Independence (Clode, 2010). 
Noting “the book's enduring relevance as a study of how the weak may often thwart the 
strong in [irregular] warfare” on its republication in the mid-1990s, Cohen (1996) found that, 
some dated tactical injunctions aside, the work was a thoughtful examination of “the 
perennial frustrations of colonial powers in dealing with their amorphous opponents” (p.143).  
Theoretical content aside, Clode (2010) highlights that the very structure of the book – its use 
of keynotes, extensive cross-indexing and glossaries – show that Callwell had created a work 
that was to be both studied and used as a practical handbook in the field. 
The era of ideological warfare 
Earlier in this section I noted that I would refer to a less-appreciated aspect of Clausewitz’ 
impact on ‘professional’ reading. As will become apparent, the ‘professionals’ referred to 
will not completely conform with the model presented to this point.  
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The intellectual brilliance of On War can be best appreciated in contrast with the 
contemporaneous output of other military theorists, Jomini excepted. For example, 
MacDougall’s (1858) Theory of War, while providing interesting historical insights into the 
operational concerns of its time, is purely an intellectual curiosity, with little or no 
contemporary relevance. While the continuing relevance of Clausewitz to the post-modern 
profession of arms is a topic of much debate (Meilinger, 2007, Gardner, 2009, Andersen, 
2012, Waldman, 2012), his continuing political relevance through his influence on guerrilla, 
insurgency, and terrorism theory is hard to dispute.  
To this point I have been primarily focussed on members of legitimate armed forces i.e. the 
mandated forces of a state (Taylor, 1988, ps.62-3). While professional officers are the subject 
of this inquiry, my ability to hone in on the focus of our inquiry, professional reading, has 
been somewhat hampered by the complex set of interrelating activities emerging officers 
engage in to develop as leaders.  
Whichever education taxonomy it is considered through, isolating professional reading as a 
distinct factor in leadership development could be considered an exercise in making tangible 
the intangible. However, stepping back and remembering the primary or elemental function 
of a military leader - i.e. the exercise of authority over forces in the accomplishment of a 
mission (Snyder, 1993, p.11) – then I may be justified in expanding, with  regard to the 
impact of professional reading, the literature regarding our subject group to include irregular, 
or non-professionally developed martial theorists and leaders, i.e. those who have developed 
and proven their military prowess without recourse to a formalised professional military 
education framework or programme.  
Before I go further, a qualifying statement is required. In examining ‘non-professionals’, I am 
considering individuals who are or were, predominantly, or at some formative time in their 
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career, engaging in guerrilla, insurgency, or other politically inspired activities that can be 
labelled terroristic. Ethically, politically, historically, and emotionally, this is tricky ground. 
For one, the discourse surrounding the activities of non-professional or non-state actors is 
subjective, emotionally-charged, and infused with ideological or cultural bias (Steele, 1986) 
regardless of whether the topic is considered from a religious (Stern, 2003), ethnic (Harff and 
Gurr, 2004), philosophical (Elshtain, 2003), ideological (Bloom, 2007), or international law 
(Dershowitz, 2003) perspective. These considerations are not the purview of my research. 
Bale (2012) has highlighted the dearth of research on the ways and means individuals and 
organisations who could variously be termed30 irregular, clandestine, covert, illegitimate, 
terroristic etc., actually “acquire, analyse, share, and apply knowledge” (p.18). While this 
might be true regarding today’s activists, a clear insight is available into the dissemination of 
knowledge among the anarchists and revolutionary and guerrilla communists of the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries. 
White (2003) describes the international phenomenon of international terrorism as 
“historically connected” (p.112). Plotting a line from the Russian theorists on revolution of 
the late-nineteenth/early twentieth-centuries, through their Irish student Michael Collins, and 
on to the irregulars of the Middle East, White (2003) places the intellectual pivot of modern 
terrorism with its “primary architects” Carlos Marighella and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, and its 
theoreticians Franz Fanon and Regis Debray (White, 2003, ps.112 & 131).  
While this plotline comfortably (to our sensibilities) places the evolution of terrorist thought 
on the ideological fringes, it hides an uncomfortable reality; that is that much contemporary 
military thought shares an intellectual heritage with much of the radical thought that is of 
                                                 
30
 While Bale’s study is based on contemporary conflict and published in an emotionally and politically nuanced 
intellectual environment (e.g. subjects are all categorically labelled ‘terrorists’), his study focus, theoretical 
perspective and findings provide a useful lens through which to examine the acquisition of professional 
knowledge and expertise, by non-members of the profession, through non-prescribed or non-conventional 
means. 
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such concern to military thinkers today. As Taylor (1988) shows, it is possible to draw a 
plotline from Clausewitz to Lenin and Mao through to Che and Fanon on one hand (ps.61-7) 
and, by extension, to the Islamists and Salafis on the other.  
As Macksey (1973) and Strachan (2007) show, Clausewitz’ On War (1832/1976) developed 
within the same intellectual milieu that gave birth to the theoretical basis of revolutionary 
communism. In his analysis of ‘What is War?’ Clausewitz made two important assertions. 
The first was that “war…is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our 
will” (p.75). The second was that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means” 
(p.87). These ideas greatly influenced Engels and Marx, and subsequently Lenin and Mao 
(Taylor, 1988, p.62) leading them to develop the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare that 
is influential to this day (Christenson et al., 1975). 
Trotsky’s lifelong intellectual development through reading highlights how development of 
theoretical military capability can develop outside of a conventional military organisation 
(Wolfe, 1966, ps.202-3). In early 1917, to prepare for the armed revolt in Russia that he knew 
was imminent, Lenin, “history’s most influential student of Clausewitz” (Kaiser, 2009, 
p.668), threw himself into a study of military tactics, particularly On War and General 
Cluseret’s On Street Fighting (Pearson, 1975, p.33), which he had translated into Russian 
back in 1905 (Wolfe, 1966, ps.326-7). Paul Gustave Cluseret was both a theorist and 
practitioner of urban guerrilla warfare, his experience in the Paris Commune helping him 
produce some of “the most insightful writing on the conduct of strategy and operations in 
industrial cities” (Evans, 2009, p.518).  
Irish social revolutionary James Connolly was greatly influenced by Cluseret’s writings, 
penning his own influential treatise On Street Fighting (Connolly, 1915/1978) in the year 
before he led the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin. Principle Republican strategist during the 
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Irish War of Independence 1919-21, Michael Collins’ tactical education was primarily 
through his study of the writings of Russian anarchists (White, 2003, ps.69-70, & 85). 
An early British theorist-practitioner was Tom Wintringham. Drawn to communism through 
idealistic convictions rather than through working-class roots like Connolly, the university-
educated Wintringham developed his military theory in response to his experiences in WWI 
and his belief that warfare was changing in favour of guerrilla tactics undertaken by a 
citizen’s army fighting in a “just cause”. He raised, and led, the International Brigade that 
fought for the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War and, in response to the threat of Nazi 
invasion after Dunkirk, founded and trained the Local Defence Volunteers, which was to 
become the basis of the Home Guard (Bloom, 2007, p.232-3). 
His books included a primer on the historical development of guerrilla warfare, Weapons and 
Tactics (1943/1973), the handbook Guerrilla Warfare (Levy, 1941), credited to his friend 
‘Yank’ Levy, but generally agreed to have been written by Wintringham, and a variety of 
articles published in the magazine Picture Post. His communist background meant that he 
was held in great suspicion by British authorities during WWII and he had little influence on 
the training of British forces after 1940. However, as Bloom (2007) notes, his writings were 
read with great interest in Palestine, and translated into Hebrew, his ideas on the formation of 
secret cells put into deadly effect by Haganah and Irgun in their insurgency for the creation of 
Israel (p.233). 
The foremost theoretician-practitioner of guerrilla warfare is Mao Tse-tung (Christenson et 
al, 1975, p.146). His thoughts on professional reading are quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter. Mao’s thought developed in the political hothouse of late-Imperial China where 
students, intellectuals and leftists were simultaneously embracing and reacting to Western 
theory in response to a century of constant economic, social and regime upheaval 
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(Christenson et al, 1975, ps.148-9). Mao’s theory of guerrilla warfare developed from the 
Chinese communists’ need to grow military strength and mass support from a position of 
weakness. For Mao, guerrilla warfare was as much an intellectual and psychological 
enterprise as it was tactical. 
Osanka (1971) describes the intellectual dimension of guerrilla warfare and its dependence on 
propaganda, psychological warfare, and a cadre of trained and ideologically literate, or 
indoctrinated, fighters, leaders and organisers. Kellen (1971) notes that, like guerrilla warfare, 
psychological warfare is an “ancient art” and is the adjunct of all application of force. This 
intellectual dimension of warfare uses the employment of forms of deterrence, coercion, 
compellance to forestall the use of actual force; psychological warfare is emotional, verbal, 
uses trickery, subversion and deception, blandishments and inducements, is primarily 
psychologically based and therefore to a large degree an intellectual exercise (p.417-8). 
The advent of the nuclear age changed the pattern of international relations and altered the 
threat of general war, creating the conditions for more ‘limited’ forms of war. These limited 
wars were no longer ‘traditional’ and often saw the employment of nonprofessional or 
irregular forces (Janowitz, 1971, ps.14-5). From an English-speaking perspective, the 
defining ‘limited’ and guerrilla war of the Cold War era is the second Viet Nam war, one that 
was long, misunderstood, and bitterly debated (Grey and Doyle, 1992).  
In describing the development of the theory and practice that guided the Viet Nam 
Communist Party’s conduct of both the conventional and guerrilla portions of the war 
against, first France, and then the American-supported South Vietnamese regime, Kolko 
(2001) highlights the intellectual development of the central cadre of highly educated 
individuals who led the movement and directed its military strategy. Committed Marxists, 
152 
 
their years in jail31 had given them time to refine their strategic thinking through individual 
study and group discussion (ps.44-5). The Party’s leaders, including Vo Nguyen Giap, a 
French-trained history professor (Fall, 1961, p.34), were not merely military and political 
administrators but also intellectuals “with an exceptionally nuanced curiosity” about a variety 
of topics, including military strategy, which they read and wrote about tirelessly (Kolko, 
2001, ps.48-9). 
Intellectualism was a common driver in twentieth-century guerrilla and revolutionary forces. 
In Cuba, Fidel Castro32 a lawyer, and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara a medical doctor, are prime 
examples. Petras (1998) claims that Guevara was a revolutionary theorist even when he was 
engaged in armed combat. In the words of Guevara’s associate and fellow guerrilla war 
theorist Régis Debray (1975), Guevara was “both a man who analysed and wrote and a man 
of action and adventure” (p.142).  
McLaren (1999) has claimed for a strong pedagogical foundation to Guevara’s revolutionary 
praxis, situating Guevara within a redemptive model of educational leadership.33 McLaren 
(2001) sees Guevara’s pedagogy as essentially based on the transformative power for the 
individual through the development of a revolutionary consciousness and sensibility defined 
as becoming intellectually, morally and socially active (p.123). In Guerrilla Warfare (1969) 
Guevara sets out his basic principles for a programme of training and education for recruits to 
a revolutionary cadre, with what could be termed ‘revolutionary literacy’ featuring large on 
the syllabus. 
                                                 
31
 While prisons are often dubbed ‘universities of crime’ for their criminal inmates, they have long been 
‘political universities’ for revolutionary and terrorist cadres, places of study, debate and intellectual training and 
development. Notable examples include The Maze in Northern Ireland (English, 2003) and the Egyptian prisons 
where Muslim Brotherhood activists like Sayeed Qutb taught revolutionary doctrine.   
32
 Shortly after Castro overthrew the Batista government in Cuba in 1959, a newspaper reported on Castro’s 
‘revolutionary reading list’, The Prince being a notable feature (Karolides et al., 1999, p.128). 
33
 Peter McLaren is a leading figure in the Critical Literacy Theory discussed in Chapter Four. 
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“Reading should be encouraged at all times, with an effort to promote books that are 
worthwhile and that enlarge the recruit’s faculty to encounter the world of letters and 
great national problems. Further reading will follow as a vocation” (Guevara, 1969, 
ps.115-6). 
 
Where the responsibility and freedom to determine which books are ‘worthwhile’ – with each 
individual or with the organisational leadership – is left to the reader to judge, collective 
experience of ideologically intense communities since the advent of mass printing (Karolides 
et al., 1999) would suggest that, in practice, reading choice would likely be heavily 
prescribed from ‘above’. Despite the popularity of Guevara’s theories, Petras (1998) has 
argued that Guevara’s tactical and strategic theories for armed guerrilla struggle are 
historically limited in their utility and relevance (ps.9-10).34  Fairbairn (1974) believes 
Guevara mistakenly derived and proselytised universal or generic ‘laws’ from non-replicable 
local or specific conditions (p.263). 
Earlier, the view was put that from an English-speaking perspective, the defining ‘limited’ 
and guerrilla war of the Cold War era was the second Viet Nam war. However, from a 
theoretical, professional reading perspective, the more definitive example might be the 
Algerian War, 1954-1962, Horne’s (1977) classic account being a common feature of modern 
military reading lists (Crane, 2007, p.391). Wolf (1971) stated that the war was important, not 
just for its tactical and political lessons, but because it also gave rise to two influential 
theories on revolutionary war (p.242).  
The first was the theory of colonial revolutions developed by Dr. Frantz Fanon, propagandist 
and “diplomat” for the Algerian liberation movement (Wolf, 1971, p.243). Fanon’s military 
theory was hugely influential among the young intellectuals of the various African national 
liberation movements (Adam, 1993). As Oppenheimer (1970) points out, the tragedy of both 
Fanon and Debray’s intellectual journeys is that, what were initially challenging ideas that 
                                                 
34
 Petras believes Guevara’s true intellectual legacy rests in his general analysis of politics and his reflections on 
political action and economic structures. 
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aimed to promote thought became antithetical to this when they and their followers 
increasingly adopted rigidly doctrinaire modes of thought, accentuated by an anti-intellectual 
cult of violence underpinned by narrowly prescribed, ‘politically correct’ reading (p.52-6). 
There is an irony here in Clausewitz, a liberally educated autodidact, contributing to an 
intellectual culture of narrow dogmatism. 
The second theory developed in Algeria is much the more important one in relation to our 
research, one that has contemporary resonance and takes us back to our professional subjects. 
Wolf (1971) describes how, in response to their defeat in Viet Nam a group of French 
officers developed a ‘theory of revolutionary war’ or guerre revolutionaire, drawing from the 
writings of Mao and France’s long experience of colonial warfare or ‘small wars’ in Algeria, 
Indochina, and Africa (ps.242-4). An important member of this circle of theorist-practitioners 
was David Galula who, by the late 1950s, had led an extraordinary military career that had 
taken him to every theatre of war “that a military theorist of his time needed to be” (Marlowe, 
2010, p.iii). 
In her timely biography, Marlowe (2010) shows how between 1960 and 1963, Galula, who 
died, still young, in 1967, participated in the first American investigations into counter-
insurgency theory under the auspices of President Kennedy. This part of his life saw Galula write 
Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964), a major work among the 
“voluminous literature” on the subject produced during this period (Marlowe, 2010, p.iv). For a 
variety of reasons, this body of literature in English and French was, by the 1980s onward, 
forgotten by all but a few military historians. That was until its rediscovery in the wake of the 
early post-conquest failures in Iraq by the cadre of American “two-minded” warrior-scholars 
described by Brooks (2010) at the beginning of this chapter.  
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Worldwide, militaries are immersed in reading and writing about counter-insurgency (Gumz, 
2009). Outside of specialist forces, this phenomenon has only been widespread since the mid-
2000s. As Nagl (2007) notes, in Iraq the U.S. Army found itself unready to fight an 
insurgency because of its early unwillingness to internalise and build upon the lessons of Viet 
Nam, and its blind insistence on focussing its force development for conventional warfare. 
Despite its experiences in the wars in Central America in the 1970s and 1980s, no counter-
insurgency doctrine had been published since then, and thus, American soldiers were not 
educated or trained to conduct counter-insurgency campaigns (ps.xiii-xiv). Belatedly 
recognising this omission by the time the insurgency in Iraq was taking shape, the U.S. Army 
and Marine Corps set out to remedy the situation through the rapid development of what 
became the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Crane, 2007).  
Overseen by Petraeus, the field manual was developed by a team of academics and war 
veterans who drew from the literature on counter-insurgency including the ‘forgotten’ 1950s 
and 1960s literature just noted (Nagl, 2007, ps.xv-xix). In his introduction to the Chicago 
University Press edition of the manual, Nagl (2007) states that, of the many books that 
informed the writing of the manual, “none was as important as” Galula’s (p.xix). An 
important feature of the manual is that, for the first time in a U.S. Army doctrine manual, it 
features an annotated bibliography listing both classic and contemporary texts on 
counterinsurgency. Nagl (2007) stated that this inclusion of predominantly “non-military” 
texts is evidence of the military’s acceptance of its need to “learn and adapt” (ps.xviii-xix)  
Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency was published in December 2006 to extraordinary 
international media attention, its leading contributors like Conrad Crane, David Kilcullen and 
John Nagl achieving near-celebrity status. It was downloaded over 1.5 million times in its 
first month of publication and was subsequently republished in 2007 in a civilian version. Its 
impact on professional reading and discourse went beyond the regular military. It was widely 
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reviewed on Jihadi websites and copies have been found in Taliban training camps in 
Pakistan (Nagl, 2007, p.xvii). 
Through it’s nearly ninety years of existence, Al Ikhwan El Muslimin, the Society of Muslim 
Brothers (MB), has been a powerful force in Arab society. The Brothers have been the font of 
a potent and evolving ideology; the effective opposition to repressive, largely secular, 
regimes and the vanguard of Islamic revivalism. The MB is the founding movement of 
political Islam (Massoulie, 1999, p.32), an international fraternity of like-thinking minds and 
still the most influential Islamist organisation in the Middle East (Abdo, 2000, p.71).  
The movement’s leadership considers the MB, having provided the others with their 
ideological basis, to be “the Mother” of all Islamist groups (Novikov, 2004). For Salafists, the 
Muslim Brotherhood is a cornerstone organization. They articulated the original philosophy 
on which all subsequent Salafi-Jihadist activism is based. An understanding of this movement 
and its message is fundamental to an understanding of the current and future ebbs of the 
affairs of the near East and its geopolitical progeny.  
The Muslim Brotherhood wears many faces and talks in many tongues. In the eloquent words 
of Jewish American writer Robert D. Kaplan, “like the Egyptian landscape, whose pigments 
are dulled by the dust from the surrounding desert and the mud of the Nile, the Brotherhood 
is concealed in layer upon layer of ambiguity and historical complexity” (Kaplan, 1996, 
p.108). In the Middle East, where government attitude  ranges from wary tolerance to overt 
hostility, the Brotherhood is a “fluid mass movement” whose loose structure and generalist 
embrace of a range of Islamist thought and expression has helped it survive successive waves 
of official repression (Ruthven, 2000, p.318). In the West, the Brotherhood is a shadowy 
creature, working through fronts and proxies among the Arab diaspora to further its long term 
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objective (Economist, 2006): the purifying of Muslim society and the Islamification of non-
Muslim ones. 
The parallel with aspects of communist activism has been widely acknowledged. Despite the 
Brotherhood’s early battles against the Egyptian communists (Ali, 2002, ps.97-8) and its 
antithetical opposition to any form of secular thought, the movements founder Hassan Al-
Banna was strongly influenced by left-wing revolutionary thought and the Bolshevik notions 
around the use of propaganda (Stern, 2003, p.45). The Brotherhood has certainly displayed 
the resilience that twentieth-century communist groups did.  
The intellectual roots of the armed offshoots of the Brotherhood were hinted at in the 
discovery of a well-thumbed copy of On War in an Al Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan after 
U.S. post September 11 counter-attack. What was most of interest was not so much that 
jihadis were reading it, but that what they were reading – On War’s exhortations on courage – 
were not the ‘Clausewitzian’ points that are usually concentrated on by Western readers 
(Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, 2007, p.1). 
In this section on professional reading in the era of ideology I have predominantly focussed 
on the ‘professional reading’ of irregular, or non-professionally developed martial theorists 
and leaders who built formidable and enduring military institutions and directed effective 
campaigns against professional soldiers. I justify this deviation by noting that, while 
irregular, these paramilitiaries, guerrillas, militias, warlords and terrorists, may well be as 
Ignatieff (1999) dubbed them, “the new architects of postmodern war” (p.5).  
I conclude this survey with a brief consideration of professional reading in two military 
contexts which have a direct bearing on our quantitative and qualitative findings. The first, on 
Soviet professional reading, is important, highlighting as it does the existence of a rich 
written intellectual oeuvre that receives scant attention in the reading lists I have analysed. 
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The second case, on the Canadian Forces, has been chosen because it highlights the debate 
within the caste/professional model.  
Soviet professional reading 
As Whiting (1976) observed, until 1963 and the appearance of the full translation into 
English by strategic scholar Harriet F. Scott of Russian strategist Marshal Sokolovsky’s 
Soviet Military Strategy, the study by outsiders of Soviet military literature was limited, 
students depending on Western academics’ secondary source interpretation of Soviet doctrine 
(p.78). Soviet Military Strategy, the product of the collective endeavour of fifteen senior 
Soviet officers working under Chief of the Soviet General Staff Sokolovsky (p.78), 
introduced ‘Western’ defence scholars and practitioners directly to the literature of an 
“intensely professional defence community” (Gray, 1992, p.38). 
The interdisciplinary nature of the study of military affairs was particularly emphasised in the 
post-WWII writings of Soviet theorists, Savkin (1972) noting that the development of 
practical recommendations from an investigation of war required a unification of disciplinary 
effort, military science occupying the ‘borders’ between the humanities, social and natural 
sciences (p.1). Kipp (2011) summarises this intellectual endeavour where a culture of 
doctrinal discourse developed through intense formal and non-formal military education 
including the provision of the Officer’s Library series of works on tactics, operational art and 
strategy (p.81). Interestingly, a work that was to becoming a required reading for officers in 
the early 1990s, Aleksandr Svechin’s 1927 Strategy, had long only been available to select 
readers through closed reading collections (Kipp, 2011, p.78). 
The elite military journal known in Russia as Voennaia mysl’, or Military Thought, was 
founded in 1918 and remained classified for nearly 70 years. Since its declassification the 
journal has become a unique source of information for scholars on the development of 
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Russian military theory, tactics and strategy. A journal of the now Russian Defence Ministry, 
it published contributions from senior military personnel and leading lecturers from Soviet, 
and now Russian, military universities and colleges.  
The Soviet military was the first to foresee the transformative impact of the information 
technology revolution on war. Soviet military leaders in the 1970s theorised about the 
implications of precision-guided munitions and classified them as part of an emerging 
"military-technical revolution." Russian strategic culture, which, according to Adamsky 
(2010), inclines toward a holistic examination of issues and therefore tends to promote the 
big picture over technical details, undoubtedly helped Soviet military leaders conceptualise 
new operational methods based on precision-guided munitions; improved command-and-
control capabilities; and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, 
despite the fact that the Soviet Union lacked the capability to produce the needed armaments 
to realise those methods in practice. 
The Soviets were more successful than the U.S. and Israeli militaries in conceiving the 
military-technical revolution because they placed the emerging technology firmly within the 
context of Soviet deep battle theory, in which the Red Army executed incursions by 
armoured forces, supported by airpower, deep into enemy rear positions to disrupt command 
and control, hamper logistics, and destroy enemy forces in massive encirclements. The Red 
Army implemented this innovative operational theory of war in the drive to Berlin from 1943 
to 1945, the greatest land campaign in the history of war. Deep battle theory gave Soviet 
military leaders a historical and cultural lens through which to examine the application of 
new technologies on the modern battlefield, which facilitated their ability to incorporate 
precision-guided munitions and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
systems into a new operational theory of warfare in the 1970s (Mansoor, 2011). 
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The Canadian Forces 
The importance of the maintenance of an intellectual culture in an armed service is illustrated 
by the traumatic experience of the Canadian Forces (CF) in the 1990s. Long relying on 
experience as the preferred, if not exclusive, organisational learning tool, by the end of the 
Cold War the CF had developed an anti-intellectual culture which saw scholarship among 
officers as anathema to the CF ‘warrior culture’ (Horn, 2011). As Pinch (2000) relates, a 
“warrior syndrome”, perpetuated within a “dysfunctional form of tribalism”, was developed 
in response to, and to counter the effect of, the integration and unification of the armed forces 
in the 1960s and 1970s (p.161).  
Rocked by a series of scandals in the 1990s relating to their peacekeeping mission in 
Somalia, the CF lost the trust of the government and wider public and exposed “an apparent 
lack of ethical behaviour and leadership as well as an inability to adapt to, or cope with, 
significant changes in society and military affairs” (Horn, 2011, p.3). Among other findings, 
the external inquiry into the affair recommended an overhaul of officer education and 
development in CF under the guidance of a new generation of leadership (Inquiry, 1997). 
After a searching and highly critical internal debate about past organisational learning failings 
in the CF (see e.g., Grodzinski, 2002, Hope, 2002), particularly with regard to leaderships’ 
role as learning facilitators, the 2000s saw the CF dramatically revitalise its professional 
development framework, particularly the ‘self-directed’ strand. A suite of professional 
reading programmes including  A Guide to Reading on Professionalism and Leadership was 
created to further develop leadership skills supplementary and complementary to existing 
professional military education programmes (Horn, 2006). Judging by the publicly 
discernible research, writing, publishing, and knowledge diffusion culture now in the CF, it 
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appears that leadership has shaped CF’s inner environment to make a context more conducive 
to learning than previously existed (Vera and Crossan, 2004).  
Summary 
This survey of professional military reading historically has been necessarily brief and 
deliberately selective. A focus on the ancient world was taken to emphasise the enduring 
philosophical impact of these works. The Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment 
autodidacts were touched on to show the influence of professional reading prior to the 
establishment of formal military education structures. Through pressures on space, 
professional reading in the naval and aeronautic services has largely been omitted.  
In the examination of canon in Chapter Four, I noted that a focus of my research would be to 
determine whether there was a discernible canon of core military texts. This review of 
professional reading historically has raised some pointers for discussion, particularly with 
regard to the enduring influence of the military theorists.  
In this literature review section of the thesis I used the conceptual framework to examine the 
research topic from four perspectives. These were: 
• the modern warrior-leader, a product of both past and present, in pursuit of the skill 
essential for command: the ability to make wise decisions 
• the development of the intellectual component of military leadership through reading 
• professionalism and professional military education, and 
• professional military reading. 
In Chapters Seven to Nine I present my research findings from the analysis of the military 
reading lists and research conversations with military leaders and defence academics. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: READING THE READING LISTS 
In Chapter Two, I note that I modelled the seemingly diverse contexts confronting me during 
the data gathering stage of the research – e.g. military history, professionalism, or 
technological change –into a single conceptual framework that I could use to aid the data 
analysis, and then relate that analysis back towards the key focus (i.e. professional reading 
and its role in developing military leaders). In the following three chapters, I consider the 
framework and its elements against my research data, testing the validity of its conceptual 
foundation, highlighting the key findings, and drawing towards the conclusions I outline in 
Chapter Twelve.  
In this first findings chapter I outline the findings derived from the documentary analysis of 
the artefact of the professional military reading lists. The findings include those from: the 
analysis of the construction of the lists by topic and textual content; the analysis of the lists to 
identify the existence of core texts across service and national boundaries; the analysis of 
dominant genres and authorial provenance for the core texts; and the consideration of 
selected individual reading lists to determine what they can tell us about differing structural 
and cultural approaches to professional reading in the military. 
Development of the reading lists 
I have analysed 67 professional military reading lists (see Annex One) across services and 
countries (including non-Anglo Europe, Asia & Latin America). I use the term ‘reading list’ 
broadly because the artefacts gathered range in substance from simple lists of recommended 
readings unsupported by annotation, to sophisticated reading programmes supported by 
extensive supporting information and resources. This second category, exemplified by the 
U.S. Marine Corps’ reading programme and the French Armée de Terre Culture Militaire 
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website, is the rarest I have found, the majority of lists opting for a middle ground of 
annotated listings. 
 
Figure Seventeen: New Zealand Army reading list 
The lists also vary in terms of their target audience. Some, for example the New Zealand 
Army Professional Reading List and the Australian Chief of Army’s Reading List, are aimed 
at all ranks to assist general career development and progression. Other lists, for example the 
Singapore Armed Forces SAF Professional Reading Programme, are aimed at commissioned 
and warrant officers. Where an all-ranks list has been examined, the analysis has generally 
concentrated on the aspects of the lists relating to commissioned and warrant officers. 
 
Figure Eighteen: Canadian Forces and Netherlands Institute for Military History reading lists  
165 
 
With some exceptions, the lists are supported by endorsing statements from sponsoring 
authorities. In the case of all-service lists this is a statement from the service chief, for 
example the Dutch Commander of the Armed Forces; sub-service, institute or joint-forces 
lists are typically endorsed by the appropriate commander. These statements are generally 
earnest in tone, promoting the positive benefits of professional reading to self and service and 
encouraging, or in some cases actually mandating the engagement with the works on each 
list. Broad positivity aside, analysis of the endorsing statements reveals the purpose and 
utility of the reading lists. These are: 
• To enhance professional military knowledge in breadth and depth - this is the most 
prominent goal for the majority of lists and can be interpreted as a means of 
supplementing formal training and education programmes through the provision of an 
informal curriculum. 
• To enhance general knowledge – though much less common in the lists I have 
studied, the enhancement of non-military knowledge is found both within larger lists 
and in niche purpose lists. These typically seek to enhance broader disciplinary 
knowledge, for example ethics, law, political science or non-military history, or to 
familiarise personnel with popular culture works on psychology, leadership, 
economics, personal development etc. The purpose and utility of these lists or list 
components seems ephemeral. They appear to be largely driven by fads and bestseller 
lists. 
• To prepare for a posting or campaign – these represent military reading lists at their 
most specifically utilitarian and provide sets of readings to assist personnel gain a 
broad understanding pre-deployment of the culture, history and characteristics of a 
particular theatre. My case studies will examine one such list, the Brave Rifles 
Reading List, later in this chapter. 
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• To prepare for a course or promotion – career progression through course attendance 
and professional examination is more entrenched in the military than in other 
professions. While many of the lists examined have an unstated objective of assisting 
officers prepare for course and/or promotion, some are specifically prepared by 
military education institutions as preparatory readings. Because all officers would be 
expected to aspire to entry into these institutions, for example the Defence Academy 
of the United Kingdom, these have been included in our analysis. 
• To educate civilians on the military – there are both overt and covert aspects to this 
purpose. Overtly the lists show that they are also meant for the use of civilian defence 
personnel for their professional development. Covertly, I have learned through 
discussions with list developers that some lists have an additional objective of 
educating politicians, policy-makers, and people of influence on the role and value of 
particular services. This is important in the age of the all-volunteer force where few 
politicians will have given military service, particularly for services like air forces 
whose technological nature and ‘distant’ operational role make an appreciation of 
their ‘worth’ less obvious for the uninitiated. 
Construction of the reading lists 
Wavell (1953) listed the subjects he believed should be studied by an officer “desirous of 
perfecting himself in the military profession”. His reading ‘curriculum’ covered: military 
history; geography; mathematics; engineering; law; administration; political economy; 
foreign languages; science; and current affairs (p.143). If, as the findings are suggesting, a 
reading list can act as an informal curriculum to augment formal education programmes and 
‘fill their gaps’, then it is of interest to see how closely (or not) they match with Wavell’s 
ideal self-development programme, with sixty years of change acknowledged. 
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Of the 67 reading lists analysed, 26 were structured by subject. These varied in the extent that 
they met Wavell’s broad educational aspirations. As highlighted in Table Two, five dominant 
subjects were covered by a majority of the structured lists. These subjects can be broadly 
termed as strategy, doctrine, military operations, military history, and leadership and 
command.  
My documentary analysis suggests that, when considered from a curriculum perspective, 
these subjects are emphasised because the scope of the writings on each topic mean that they 
can only be covered in either breadth or depth in formal military education programmes, not 
both. Their fundamental importance for the development of professional military wisdom 
necessitates they be mastered through the provision of an informal curriculum of study. It can 
be inferred that the lesser emphasis given to subjects like administration and logistics, law, 
and intelligence is due to their being adequately covered through formal education and on-job 
training. 
 
168 
 
Table Two: Reading list topic analysis 
   Administration Law Military 
History 
Current Affairs       
Strategy Doctrine Warfare Administration Law Military 
History 
Current Affairs Intelligence & 
Security 
 Leadership & 
command 
Society & 
culture 
Fiction  
Historical 
strategy and 
doctrine  
Contemporary 
strategy & 
doctrine 
Air power concepts   History & 
analysis 
Contemporary 
issues 
  Command & 
leadership & 
management 
   
  Theory of war and 
conflicts 
 Ethics Military 
History 
 
 
Future security 
environment 
 Psychology Command; 
Biographies 
Leadership 
theory; 
Leadership 
doctrine 
  Professionalism 
 Theory, 
doctrine and 
tactics 
   Military 
history 
 Low intensity 
conflict and 
peacekeeping 
 Leadership, 
memoires and 
biography 
Society   
The art of war  Science and war      Man and war  Society and 
war 
  
     History 
 
Military 
history 
Contemporary 
history 
Current areas of 
conflict 
 Military 
psychology 
Management 
philosophy & 
leadership 
 Classic 
literature of 
the world 
Values & ethics 
of the profession 
Strategy  Campaign history; 
Specialist skills 
  Military 
history 
   Leaders and 
leadership 
   
Strategy  General warfare      Experience of 
war 
    
Theory of war Policy, 
strategy, tactics 
Battles, campaigns 
& wars 
Organisational 
management 
 Units at 
war 
 Logistics and 
intelligence 
Experience of 
war; 
Psychology of 
war 
Leadership; 
 
Biographies & 
autobiogs 
   
National 
security 
 Military operations Organisation 
and 
management 
  Security  
and  
regional studies 
  Leadership    
National 
security decision 
making 
Strategy and 
policy 
Military operations           
 Keynote works Fighting arms       Leadership & 
campaigning 
   
Classical 
strategy; 
Contemporary 
strategy 
Primers          Thought 
provoking 
Political military 
relations 
Strategy, policy, 
conflict, utility 
of force, 
instruments of 
power, 
Classical 
thought and 
principles of 
war; 
Concepts and 
doctrines 
Components of 
fighting power; 
 
Operational art and 
campaigning 
 Law & 
ethics 
Lest we 
forget 
   Higher 
command 
Media 
 
Understanding 
others 
  
Philosophy of 
war & strategic 
thought 
Doctrinal 
development 
Technology 
Pre-mech warfare; 
Mechanised 
warfare; 
   Contemporary 
issues for 
soldiers 
  Personalities    
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Low intensity 
conflict 
 Doctrine 
Tactics 
Techniques and 
Procedures 
(TTPS) 
Counter insurgency 
history & theory; 
Lessons learned; 
Urban combat 
 Ethical 
dimensions 
of combat 
   Psychological 
dimensions of 
combat 
 Culture & 
history of 
others 
  
Strategy; 
Theory 
General 
studies; 
Tactics 
Air power; 
Sea power; 
Specific wars 
Logistics  Military 
history 
  Men in battle Command 
Leadership 
 Literature 
of war 
 
     Service 
history 
and 
culture 
Contemporary 
issues 
  Leader of 
leaders; 
   
  Counter insurgency      Human factors  Culture & 
history 
  
 The military 
classics; 
 
Doctrine 
Nature and practice 
of war; 
Fortifications; 
Revolutionary & 
low intensity and 
unconventional 
warfare; 
Military technology 
Economics of 
national 
security; 
Logistics; 
Training & 
education 
Staff  
 Military 
history 
  The face of 
battle 
Memoires & 
biographies; 
 
Command 
leadership & 
generalship 
 Literature 
of war 
Profession of 
arms 
         Leadership & 
management 
 PD  
Strategy Tactics and 
doctrine 
Science technology 
& industry; 
Campaigns 
operations and 
battles 
  General 
histories 
   Leadership   Core values 
The art of war & 
strategy 
The military 
classics 
Unconventional 
warfare; 
Technology info 
Logistics Ethics General 
military 
history 
Contemporary   Command & 
leadership 
   
The art of war Tactics    Military 
history 
   memoires    
   Management & 
the army 
enterprise 
 History Global 
perspective 
  Strategic 
leadership 
   
 Future 
capabilities; 
Military 
transition 
Support   Military 
history & 
heritage 
  Quality of life Profess & 
leadership 
Cultural 
awareness 
 Teamwork 
discipline 
standards & 
safety 
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Table Three: Reading lists construction analysis matrix 
 Judgment 
statements 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
A1 Accessible 
Works 
List is totally 
dominated 
by accessible 
and popular 
press works 
List  is 
mostly 
dominated 
by 
accessible 
and popular 
press works 
List is 
modestly 
dominated 
by 
accessible 
and popular 
press works 
List balances 
evenly 
accessibility 
and challenge 
List is 
modestly 
dominated by 
works of 
complexity 
and challenge 
List is mostly 
dominated by 
complex and 
challenging 
works 
List is totally 
dominated by 
complex and 
challenging 
works 
Works of 
Complexity  
and 
Challenge 
A7 
T1 Narrative  
and Discursive 
List is totally 
dominated 
by narrative 
and 
discursive 
works 
List  is 
mostly 
dominated 
by narrative 
and 
discursive 
works  
List is 
modestly 
dominated 
by narrative 
and 
discursive 
works 
List balances 
evenly 
narrative and 
discursive 
texts with 
conceptual and 
theoretical 
List is 
modestly 
dominated by 
conceptual 
and 
theoretical 
works 
List  is 
mostly 
dominated by 
conceptual 
and 
theoretical 
works 
List is totally 
dominated by 
conceptual and 
theoretical 
works 
Conceptual 
and 
Theoretical 
T7 
C1 Contemporary 
text content 
List is totally 
dominated 
by texts 
written about 
the post-
modern era 
List  is 
mostly 
dominated 
by texts 
written 
about the 
post-modern 
era 
List is 
modestly 
dominated 
by texts 
written 
about the 
post-modern 
era 
List balances 
evenly a mix 
of post-
Modern texts 
with texts 
from or about 
the late-
modern era 
and before 
List is 
modestly 
dominated by 
texts from or 
about the 
late-modern 
era and 
before 
List  is 
mostly 
dominated by 
texts from or 
about the 
late-modern 
era and 
before 
List is totally 
dominated by 
texts from or 
about the late-
modern era and 
before 
Classic text 
content 
C7 
D1 Narrow 
Domains of 
Learning 
List is totally 
dominated 
by works of 
military 
history, 
theory and 
biography 
List  is 
mostly 
dominated 
by works of 
military 
history, 
theory and 
biography 
List is 
modestly 
dominated 
by works of 
military 
history, 
theory and 
biography 
List balances 
evenly 
traditional 
military 
domains and 
broader 
disciplines 
List is 
modestly 
dominated by 
broader 
disciplinary 
works 
List  is 
mostly 
dominated by 
broader 
disciplinary 
works 
List is totally 
dominated by 
broader 
disciplinary 
works 
Broad 
Domains of 
Learning 
D7 
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My next consideration was to determine how the lists were constructed through a qualitative 
analysis of their textual content. My interest was to make four criterion-based judgements for 
each list: 
• their relative accessibility to an ‘average’ reader 
• their relative reliance on narrative and discursive works 
• their inclusion of texts from, or about, the late-modern era35 and before 
• their inclusion of works from non-traditionally military domains of learning. 
To do this I developed and refined a series of judgement statements for each criterion as 
shown in Table Three. The matrix uses a rating scale to score against each criterion 
judgement on a range of 1-7 representing a continuum of qualitative statements relative to 
each criterion. The criteria were assigned the codes A, T, C and D.  
The judgements were arrived at hermeneutically: the assessment of the quantity of books on 
each list and a qualitative ascription of their relationship to the judgement statements required 
a deep familiarity, or submersion a la Hall (1977), with the broader body of literature; 
familiarity with the audience targets of the various publishing imprints; and hard and soft 
copy access to the text of non-familiar works so that judgements could be made. 
Cumulatively this involved: prior learning and textual familiarity; close and speed-reading of 
hard and soft copies of non-familiar texts from the lists; reading and evaluation of book 
reviews and bibliographies; and research trips to libraries and special collections relevant to 
the research.  
Criterion A required a holistic judgement to be made regarding the relative accessibility of 
the books on each list to an average reader. This took into account a determination of 
                                                 
35
 In line with Moskos’ delineation referred to in Chapter Five, the term late-modern has been used here to refer 
to the period roughly contemporaneous with the Cold War, the beginning of the post-modern period being 
marked by the First Gulf War. 
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accessibility in relation to the predominant linguistic and scholastic character of the books in 
each list (i.e. whether the balance favoured books written with a general or an academic 
audience in mind). While the evaluation of this criterion depended on a large degree of 
subjective judgement, it was underpinned by my grounding in adult literacy theory and 
practice, particularly the body of knowledge relating to the ‘reading age’ of adults. 
Criterion T required a holistic judgement to be made regarding the relative dominance of 
each list by narrative and discursive works as opposed to works focusing on more conceptual 
and theoretical concerns. It is important to distinguish between the qualitative difference 
being judged here and in Criterion A. While the former required judgement on linguistic and 
scholastic characteristics, Criterion T focused on stylistic approaches. That is the extent to 
which the author(s) was more inclined towards a narrative or discursive approach to the topic 
matter at hand or whether a more detached theoretical approach was adopted.  
It must be stressed that the approach to the judgement of Criteria A and T was not taken from 
a value-laden perspective. Normatively I appreciated the tension inherent in an exercise that 
sought both to challenge and engage. Too much challenge could realistically discourage 
engagement by segments of the target audience, particularly those who needed to be 
encouraged to ‘read up’ professionally, not enough challenge could alienate more advanced 
or adventurous readers and stereotype the list or programme in their minds as a ‘remedial’ 
artefact. 
Criteria C and D involved comparatively straightforward assessments of list content. 
Criterion C determined the relative dominance of lists by books written about the post-
modern era. Criterion D determined the relative dominance of the lists by more ‘pure’ 
military domains of learning. However, Criterion C has a catch built in that impacts the 
development of conclusions from its findings. This is that the term ‘from or about the late-
173 
 
modern era and before’ potentially includes works that have been ‘road-tested’ over time, and 
therefore can be potentially canonical, as well as recent texts with a historical focus, but of 
such recent vintage as not to have indeterminate longevity. 
 
Figure Nineteen: Reading list construction analysis 
The analysis of the reading lists against Table Three’s seven scale criterion referencing is 
presented in Figure Nineteen. For Criterion A the analysis indicates that the construction 
emphasis is on providing balance between accessibility and challenge, albeit with some bias 
towards works that push the prospective reader. 
Criterion T analysis indicates that while the construction emphasis is on providing a balance 
of narrative and conceptual works, the lists tend towards favouring the narrative and 
discursive style of presentation. 
The finding from the Criterion C analysis is less clear. Ostensibly, it appears to indicate a 
favouring of texts from or about the late-modern era and before. This would support the 
argument regarding the immutability of lessons from the past. However, drilling further into 
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the data, a trend in the newest reading lists analysed can be discerned that sees more 
metaphorical shelf-space given over to texts relating to the post-Cold War interregnum and 
the twenty-first-century wars following September 11. It can be predicted that this trend will 
continue as the vantage of time sees the writing, or maturing, of texts, for example on the 
Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, that are less reportage and ‘political’ and more analytical 
and objective (and thus instructive). 
For Criterion D it is indicated that the reading lists strongly gravitate towards works directly 
related to the military profession. This supports the conception of the reading lists as ‘shadow 
curriculums’ that complement the formal professional military education programmes by 
encouraging broader and deeper engagement with topics that cannot be adequately covered in 
formal programmes and also need long emersion in to grasp. 
So far, the analysis has provided strong findings towards an understanding of the construction 
and utility of the reading lists. I will now focus on the content of the lists to determine 
whether a list of key texts is discernable.  
Identification of core texts 
The analysis of the lists involved: quantifying the texts identified by the 67 lists; assigning 
each text a code designating a typological categorisation; assigning each text a code 
designating author provenance; ranking the texts according to the frequency of their 
appearance across all the lists; ranking the texts according to the frequency of their 
appearance across the lists from the U.S.; and ranking the texts according to the frequency of 
their appearance across the lists from outside the U.S.  
While they also recommend journal articles, doctrinal manuals, government publications, 
films etc. as recommended ‘readings’, the military reading lists in our study primarily focus 
on recommending ‘books’ for their audiences’ attention. Prompted by the idea of canon as a 
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set of key ‘books’, my selection was thus narrowed down by excluding from the study all 
texts that were not books as traditionally understood. Edited collections were included and 
academic monographs, text books, and manuals were excluded. Then, using both deductive 
and inductive approaches to content analysis (Harris et al., 2011), the texts within each list 
either explicitly or implicitly contributing to set of key texts for the military were isolated and 
logged. This process was in some cases aided and in some cases impeded by the variety of 
structural approaches each list compiler has taken.  
The most sophisticated lists, some backed up by the hyperlinking power of the Internet, 
categorise texts by themes and sub-themes or suitability for rank or career path and provide 
synopsis or reviews to guide the reader. The most sophisticated provide tutorials and 
resources to assist the audience’s critical reading skills. The reading list produced by France’s 
foremost military academy, L’École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, is an example. Culture 
Militaire (Grandchamp, 2007) is divided into four macro-sections – ‘the art of war’, ‘society 
and war’, ‘man and war’, and ‘science and war’ – themselves further sub-divided into further 
micro-topics. Sub-divisions like ‘command style’, ‘typology and analysis of leadership’, and 
‘biographies’ gave a clear steer to the authors on which texts were being recommended for 
their relevance to the development of command and leadership skills. 
At the other extremes were reading lists which did little more than list an often concise range 
of texts which the compiler felt were the key works all military professionals should read. 
This type of list is exemplified by that published by a former Director of the UK Defence 
Academy. With the rationale that “reading military history…is an essential contributor to the 
development of sound judgement, intuition and wisdom in military decision making”, 
General Kiszely (2006) listed ten key books, seven of which can be deduced from his 
commentary to relate directly to the development of command and leadership skills.  
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This qualitative approach to the content analysis using combinations of reasoning styles was 
followed until 585 individual texts were identified and catalogued. Two further processes 
were applied before the frequency of appearance across the lists by individual books was 
calculated. The first process involved assigning each text a code designating a typological 
categorisation; the second, assigning each text a code designating author provenance. In the 
first process, seven typologies were defined to create a meta-category to classify each text. 
This process sought to provide data that would explain which typological vehicle was most 
favoured by the militaries for understanding and developing command and leadership skills. 
The final process involved assigning each text a code designating author provenance. When 
considering and categorising books the reading lists recommend, it was considered that 
author provenance would be a factor of importance when evaluating the particular books the 
lists, through inclusion, invested authority in. The notion of ‘authority’ in this sense relates to 
a text which remains ‘key’ out of consideration for its continued relevance in contemporary 
debates (Kubik, 1997, p.7).  
To better understand any oblique factors that may have influenced the seeming authority of 
one text over another, an analysis of the author biographies of the 585 command and 
leadership related books on the reading lists under consideration was completed to determine 
author provenance, something which might be of little importance to a lay person, but 
potentially decisive in a ‘tight’ profession like the military for signalling authority or 
otherwise.  
This analysis determined that the military profession was, varyingly, recommending to its 
members works from authors, who were at time of publication, from eight determinable 
categories: 1 – Serving military professionals writing non-fiction; 2 – Retired military 
professionals writing non-fiction; 3 – Public sector civilian diplomatic/defence/security 
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professionals writing non-fiction; 4 – Academics from inside the military environment 
writing non-fiction; 5 – Academics from outside the military environment writing non-
fiction; 6 – Popular authors of non-fiction; 7 – Fiction authors with a military background; 
and 8 – Fiction authors with a non-military background. Of the seven categories, only 
categories 1, 3 and 4 may need further definition.   
For Category 1 the term ‘serving’ is applied strictly when related to an officer or soldier 
below the rank of General officer. For authors above the rank of General officer their 
category was determined on a case-by-case temporal basis. For example, while Field Marshal 
Sir William Slim was, on publication of Defeat into Victory (1956), Governor General of 
Australia, and so more a political than a military figure, his titles, duties, responsibilities and 
public demeanour of the time place him squarely within those upper echelons of the military 
of the WWII-era and before, who never truly retired from service. On the other hand, works 
by contemporary General officers that feature on military reading lists like, for example 
Anthony Zinni’s Leading the Charge (2009), are by military leaders with post-retirement 
careers actively within the public and private corporate sectors, and so fall within Category 2.  
Category 3 is largely a U.S. group who shift from academia to government and back and 
exert an influence on U.S. defence thinking to a degree their UK academic counterparts can 
only dream of. Eliot Cohen, whose Supreme Command (2002) is highly valued by militaries 
outside the U.S., has been a Professor of Strategic Studies at John Hopkins University and an 
official in both the U.S. State Department and Department of Defense.   
Category 4 applies to two distinct, yet related, groups of academics. The first, exemplified by 
British military historian Sir Michael Howard, sees military officers smoothly transition to an 
academic role that feeds back into, and directly shapes and influences the institutional 
military thought of the governing elite. The second group, oddly more important as our 
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findings will reveal, are those civilian theorists, exemplified by John Keegan, who have never 
entered or engaged in military service, yet have devoted their careers to both understanding 
the phenomenon of war and engaging with, tutoring, and observing the warrior caste (see, 
e.g., Introduction to, in Keegan, 1976).  
Once the coding was complete the frequency of appearance across the lists by individual 
books was calculated. Of the 585 texts identified as contributing to the leadership education 
of the military, a majority were texts that appeared only on one list once. However, it became 
clear that a set of key texts appeared to be beginning to form, a significant number of texts 
appearing in multiple lists, across nations and service lines. Three separate tables were 
compiled: Table Four ranking the texts according to the frequency of their appearance across 
all the lists; Table Five ranking the texts according to the frequency of their appearance 
across the lists from the U.S.; and, Table Six, ranking the texts according to the frequency of 
their appearance across the lists from outside the U.S. Listing in the tables was restricted to 
texts which had appeared on a minimum of four different reading lists. A four-list filter was 
chosen after the initial data analysis showed a more coherent and representative list emerging 
than that when a three-list filter was used.  
Table Four: List of key texts global 
Key texts recommended in professional military reading lists (N=585) f 
Ω = Pre-WWII  ♠ = Anglo-American authorship 
 
The Art of War – Sun Tzu    Ω 23 
The Face of Battle – John Keegan    ♠ 22 
The Art of War – Carl von Clausewitz    Ω 16 
Defeat into Victory – William Slim    ♠ 15 
The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence – Roger Nye    ♠ 13 
We Were Soldiers Once and Young – Harold Moore & James Galloway    ♠ 13 
The Mask of Command – John Keegan    ♠ 13 
Masters of War – Michael Handel    ♠ 12 
Supreme Command – Eliot Cohen    ♠ 11 
Command in War – Martin Van Creveld 10 
The Killer Angels – Michael Shaara    ♠ 9 
Company Commander – Charles McDonald    ♠ 9 
Dereliction of Duty – H.R. McMaster    ♠ 9 
Battle Studies – Ardant Du Picq    Ω 9 
This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness – T.R. Fehrenbach    ♠ 9 
Band of Brothers – Steven Ambrose    ♠ 8 
179 
 
Acts of War – Richard Holmes    ♠ 8 
Thinking in Time: Uses of History for Decision Makers – R. Neustadt & E. May    ♠ 8 
In Defence of Duffer’s Drift – Ernest Dunlop Swinton    Ω♠ 8 
Leadership: The Warrior’s Art – Christopher Kolenda    ♠ 7 
Panzer Leader – Hans Guderian 7 
Diplomacy – Henry Kissinger    ♠ 7 
The Prince – Niccolo Machiavelli    Ω 7 
Small Unit Leadership: A Common-sense Approach – Dandridge Malone    ♠ 7 
Once an Eagle – Anton Myrer    ♠ 7 
The Forgotten Soldier – Guy Sajer 7 
History of the Peloponnesian War – Thucydides    Ω 7 
The World is Flat – Thomas Friedman    ♠ 7 
Red Badge of Courage – Stephen Crane    Ω♠ 6 
On The Psychology of Military Incompetence – Norman Dixon    ♠ 6 
Leadership Without Easy Answers – Ronald Heifetz    ♠ 6 
Follow Me: The Human Element in Leadership - Aubrey Newman    ♠ 6 
One Hundred Days: Memoir of the Falklands Battle Group Commander - Sandy Woodward    ♠ 6 
Caesar’s War Commentaries - Julius Caesar    Ω 6 
Into the Storm: A Study in Command – Tom Clancy & Frederick Franks     ♠ 5 
Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel - David Fraser    ♠ 5 
The General’s War – Michael Gordon & Bernard Trainor    ♠ 5 
Starship Troopers – Robert Heinlein    ♠ 5 
Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Battle – James McDonough    ♠ 5 
The Anatomy of Courage – Lord Moran    ♠ 5 
War As I Knew It – George S. Patton    ♠ 5 
My American Journey – Colin Powell & Joseph Persico    ♠ 5 
Infantry Attacks – Erwin Rommel    Ω 5 
Hope is Not a Method – Gordon Sullivan & Michael Harper    ♠ 5 
It Doesn’t Take a Hero – Norman Schwarzkopf & Peter Petre    ♠ 5 
George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century - Mark Stoler    ♠ 5 
Good to Great – Jim Collins    ♠ 5 
Battle Leadership – Adolf von Schell    Ω 5 
Fields of Fire – James Webb    ♠ 5 
All Quiet on the Western Front – Erich Maria Remarque    Ω 5 
Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground – Robert D. Kaplan    ♠ 5 
The Soldier and the State – Samuel Huntington    ♠ 5 
On Killing – David Grossman    ♠ 5 
Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking – Malcolm Gladwell    ♠ 5 
Eisenhower: Soldier and President – Steven Ambrose    ♠ 4 
On Becoming a Leader – Warren Bennis    ♠ 4 
The Military Maxims of Napoleon – Napoleon Bonaparte    Ω 4 
The Starfish and the Spider – Ori Brafman & Rod Beckstrom    ♠ 4 
Ender’s Game – Orson Scott Card    ♠ 4 
Seven Habits of Highly Effective People – Stephen Covey    ♠ 4 
A Genius for War: A Life of General George S. Patton – Carlo D’Este    ♠ 4 
The Instruction of Frederick the Great for His Generals – Frederick the Great    Ω 4 
The Generalship of Alexander the Great – J.F.C. Fuller    ♠ 4 
With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa – Eugene B. Sledge    ♠ 4 
Personal Memoirs – Ulysses S. Grant    Ω♠ 4 
Commander in Chief – Eric Larrabee     ♠ 4 
The Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a Nation – S.L.A. Marshall    ♠ 4 
Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War – S.L.A. Marshall    ♠ 4 
Reveries – Maurice, Comte De Saxe    Ω 4 
Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character – Jonathan Shay    ♠ 4 
Lexus and the Olive Tree – Thomas Friedman    ♠ 4 
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Table Five: List of key texts US 
Key texts recommended in U.S. military reading lists (N=416) f 
The Art of War – Sun Tzu 13 
The Face of Battle – John Keegan 13 
The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence – Roger Nye 10 
We Were Soldiers Once and Young – Harold Moore & James Galloway 10 
The Art of War – Carl von Clausewitz 9 
This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness – T.R. Fehrenbach 9 
Company Commander – Charles McDonald 7 
Once an Eagle – Anton Myrer 7 
Thinking in Time: Uses of History for Decision Makers – Richard Neustadt & Ernest May 7 
The World is Flat – Thomas Friedman 7 
Defeat into Victory – William Slim 6 
The Killer Angels – Michael Shaara 6 
The Forgotten Soldier - Guy Sajer 6 
History of the Peloponnesian War - Thucydides 6 
Band of Brothers – Steven Ambrose 6 
The Mask of Command – John Keegan 5 
Dereliction of Duty – H.R. McMaster 5 
Acts of War - Richard Holmes 5 
George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century - Mark Stoler 5 
In Defence of Duffer’s Drift – Ernest Dunlop Swinton 5 
Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground – Robert D. Kaplan 5 
Diplomacy – Henry Kissinger 5 
Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking – Malcolm Gladwell 5 
Battle Studies - Ardant Du Picq 4 
Panzer Leader - Hans Guderian 4 
Good to Great – Jim Collins 4 
Battle Leadership – Adolf von Schell 4 
Seven Habits of Highly Effective People – Stephen Covey 4 
Starship Troopers – Robert Heinlein 4 
Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Battle – James McDonough 4 
The Anatomy of Courage – Lord Moran 4 
War As I Knew It – George S. Patton 4 
Commander in Chief – Eric Larrabee  4 
Follow Me: The Human Element in Leadership - Aubrey Newman 4 
Infantry Attacks – Erwin Rommel 4 
Supreme Command - Eliot Cohen 4 
The Soldier and the State – Samuel Huntington 4 
With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa – Eugene B. Sledge 4 
Fields of Fire – James Webb 4 
All Quiet on the Western Front – Erich Maria Remarque 4 
Lexus and the Olive Tree – Thomas Friedman 4 
Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character – Jonathon Shay 4 
Table Six: List of key texts Non-US 
Key texts recommended in non-U.S. military reading lists (N=258) f 
The Art of War – Sun Tzu 10 
The Face of Battle – John Keegan 9 
Defeat into Victory – William Slim 9 
Masters of War – Michael Handel 9 
The Mask of Command – John Keegan 8 
The Art of War – Carl von Clausewitz 7 
Supreme Command - Eliot Cohen 7 
Command in War – Martin Van Creveld 7 
The Prince – Niccolo Machiavelli 5 
Small Unit Leadership: A Common-sense Approach – Dandridge Malone 5 
On The Psychology of Military Incompetence – Norman Dixon 5 
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Battle Studies - Ardant Du Picq 5 
Into the Storm: A Study in Command – Tom Clancy & Frederick Franks  4 
Dereliction of Duty – H.R. McMaster 4 
Hope is Not a Method – Gordon Sullivan & Michael Harper 4 
Leadership: The Warrior’s Art – Christopher Kolenda 4 
On Killing – David Grossman 4 
 
The relative homogeneity of all three tables is striking. Subtle differences apart, the non-
appearance of fictional works in Table Six being a notable distinction, all three tables reflect a 
continuity of key recommended texts across national and service boundaries. The ‘vintage’ of 
the texts being presented is interesting, with 15 of the 71 texts listed, approximately 21% of 
the whole, written before the outbreak of World War II. Three of the most frequently 
recommended of these, Sun Tzu’s Art of War (c. 400 BCE/1910), Thucydides History of the 
Peloponnesian War (c.395 BCE/1972) and Caesar’s Commentaries (c.50 BCE/2008) have 
been educating military leaders across the world for over two millennia. This proportion of 
vintage texts is consistently maintained across all three tables indicating that historical works, 
pre-dating the digital revolution, are universally accepted by the world’s militaries as having 
contemporary authority and relevance. This would appear to indicate a shift in contemporary 
military thinking about the immutability of lessons from military history. 
The military view of the hierarchical distribution of leadership can be considered through the 
typological categorization of the texts in Table Four as illustrated in Figure Twenty. 
It may sound self-evident but, as Figure Twenty-one illustrates, leadership in the military is 
taught from within the context of the military. This may be unique because, as scholars like 
Adair (2002) highlight, while the modern world of commerce and business looks to the 
military for leadership lessons, the military itself, some small concession to external 
disciplines notwithstanding, is, with some exceptions, largely self-referential in its conception 
of leading, leadership and led.  
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Figure Twenty: Recommended leadership texts by book category  
 
Figure Twenty-one: Most recommended leadership text authors by author provenance 
Author provenance and ‘authority’ for military audiences are directly related. Quantitatively 
and qualitatively, militaries recommend to their internal audiences texts by serving and 
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retired military leaders, and civilian academics working within military/defence institutions, 
by a factor of over 3:1 against all other authors including ‘pure’ civilian academics, popular 
authors, and journalists.  
As indicated in Table Four, 56 out of 71 of the texts on the global list are by Anglo-American 
authors. This dominance indicates that (a) English is the current military lingua franca and all 
writers of interest or perceived worth are publishing in English, and (b) the cultural 
dominance of the U.S. and the lack of funds for/interest in translation services have led to a 
disinterest or devaluing of the importance of ideas and texts from other cultures including 
within the West, for example France. 
I will conclude this chapter by presenting a brief analysis of three reading lists. These have 
been chosen both to highlight the variety of utilitarian and teleological approaches used in 
developing individual lists, and the particular cultural perspectives that can be gleaned from 
these. 
Case studies 
The Irish Army Professional Reading Programme 
This programme is maintained by the Infantry School of the Irish Military College. Beyond 
the expected generic benefits, the stated aims of the programme include: 
• an increase in the understanding of military operations / activities that the Defence 
Forces does not conduct regularly [italics added] 
• a greater understanding of the ethos of various military organisations 
• the development of sources of information that will assist in preparatory study and 
research in advance of career courses. 
The first point is key, reflecting as it does a perceivable tension between the long military 
heritage that the Irish Defence Forces sprang from, and their non-participation in WWII and 
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constitutionally quasi-neutral confinement to give ‘aid to the civil power’ and provide support 
for U.N authorised peace-keeping deployments. The Irish Army Professional Reading 
Programme is thus a curious artefact. While it provides readings relevant to the professional 
development of an Irish soldier, this feels more instinctively orientated towards service 
within the old Imperial order.  
The conventional warfare of WWI and WWII dominates the readings, which while rich in the 
campaigns that many tens of thousands of Irish participated in, are understandably short on 
war from a politically Republic of Ireland perspective. Interestingly, some of the campaign 
studies and specialist readings are of limited spectrum and technology actions like Falklands 
War study which suggest the Irish Defence Forces are focused on the intellectual preparation 
for niche, low intensity warfare. 
Curiously, considering twentieth-century Irish history, while the list reflects the guerrilla 
years of pre-independence and Civil War, the literature on counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism is absent from the reading programme. While this may officially be due to the 
responsibility of the civil power, the Garda Síochána, for law and order in Ireland, a disjoint 
can also be perceived between the stated root of the modern defence force in the Irish 
Republican Army of the independence struggle, and its actual origin as a trained and quarter-
mastered off-spring of its British parent. 
Overall, the list sets out a solid and ‘traditionalist’ reading programme, sticking to a set of 
readings that explore the ‘content’ of military leadership. This is done from a predominantly 
Anglo-American perspective. 
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Brave Rifles Reading List for Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Analysis of the Brave Rifles36 list has been important for two reasons. First, it was the first 
list I encountered that had been developed to prepare regimental leaders for a particular 
campaign. Secondly, its developer, the then Col. H.R. McMaster was interviewed for this 
thesis, his opus Dereliction of Duty features prominently on reading lists across services and 
nations, and commentators like Ricks (2006) highlight his intelligence and exemplary 
command record. 
The purpose of the list is concisely articulated in its introduction: 
“While the fundamentals of cavalry combat operations clearly apply to fighting in 
Iraq, counterinsurgency operations demand that leaders possess a very broad base of 
knowledge and understand how military operations affect the political situation. 
Religious, ethnic, and social dynamics make the situation in Iraq particularly 
complex. Leaders must understand those dynamics and how our presence and actions 
affect them…This reading list is meant to guide self-study…The knowledge gained 
from reading, thinking about, and discussing this material will permit leaders to better 
prepare their troopers for combat and assist leaders in taking the initiative when they 
encounter complex situations”. 
 
What follows is a thoroughly considered and balanced multi-disciplinary reading programme, 
studded with online, downloadable content that either mandates or recommends book, 
doctrinal, journal and multimedia readings on: 
• Doctrine, TTPs37 and lessons learned 
• Counterinsurgency history and theory 
• Arab and Islamic culture and history 
• Iraqi culture and history 
• Iraq ethnicities and sects 
• Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and ethnic/sectarian violence in Iraq 
                                                 
36
 The U.S. Army’s 3rd Cavalry Regiment – the ‘Brave Rifles’ – is one of that nation’s most distinguished 
combat units. The Wikipedia entry on ‘the Brave Rifles’ gives a potted history of their history from 
‘antebellum’ to contemporary Iraq. –
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3d_Armored_Cavalry_Regiment#Occupation_of_Iraq [accessed 10 January 2013]. 
37
 Tactics, techniques and procedures. 
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• Urban combat 
• Psychological and ethical dimensions of combat. 
The annotated commentary on the selections is critical, promoting the strengths and 
weaknesses of some selections38 and making honest commentary on the failings of the Iraqi 
campaign to date and the real dangers and dilemmas facing the combat soldier in Iraq.  
The Brave Rifles Reading List is an artefact worthy of a specific study in its own right, 
primarily to determine if there was a correlation between the implementation of the list in 
2004 and the exemplary performance of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in North-
Western Iraq in 2005 as documented by Ricks (2006, 419-424). For this study, the list is 
instructive through its provision of a mix of textual sources, and its mix of immediately 
utilitarian context specific works, and ones with a broader applicability. 
Culture Militaire  
The Culture Militaire website is maintained by the Écoles de Saint Cyr Coëtquidan, the 
French military education facility that comprises of the French military academy (École 
Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr), the inter-services military school, and the military school of 
the technical and administrative corps. The site hosts a sophisticated reading programme 
particularly notable for its model of, to my eyes, structural brilliance, distilling the total 
military curriculum down to four main headings: the art of war; science and war; man and 
war; and society and war.  
These main headings are further broken down into further layers of sub-headings which give 
a reading focus that is both granular and holistic. The overall effect is of the presentation of a 
single, unitary ‘house of learning’ held together by separate but inter-dependent pillars of 
knowledge. This effect conveys parallels between how knowledge is conceived by the 
                                                 
38
 One entry states, “the author portrays the Arabs too stereotypically and may over generalise”. 
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modern ‘tribe of the war god’ and that of indigenous peoples reconsidering their traditional, 
pre-Western conceptions of the lived phenomena (Tangihaere and Twiname, 2011). 
 
Figure Twenty-two: Culture Militaire website 
The Culture Militaire list, more precisely a reading programme, is highlighted because of its 
approach to content, and because of the resources allocated to it. Regarding content, and 
considering the long, rich and formally preeminent tradition of French military thought, what 
was surprising on first examination was the prominence given to works of Anglophone origin 
and their abundant availability in French translation.  
However, no quarter is given to the Anglophone militaries’ openness to include readings 
from the business-management and pop-culture literatures. The reading ethos of the 
programme is encapsulated in De Gaulle’s aphorism, “Au fond des victoires d'Alexandre, on 
retrouve toujours Aristote”, or “Deep in the victories of Alexander one always finds 
Aristotle” (Pedley, 1996, p.79). The readings recommended comprise a deeply academic 
programme of study designed to produce intellectual officers grounded in military, political, 
legal and economic thought. 
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From a resourcing perspective, the list is only comparable among those studied to that of the 
U.S. Marine Corps in the dedicated support it provides to the act and teleology of 
professional reading. Utilising and leveraging off the androgogical opportunities provided by 
a web-based programme, the list is supported by extensive commentary and instructionally 
designed reading support guides for many of the key texts. As in the Marine Corps 
programme, the combination of digital technology and dedicated resourcing is creating an 
evolving, interactive reading programme that is both accessible and challenging. 
Summary 
This exploration of the artefact of the professional military reading list has been conducted 
quantitatively and qualitatively to derive findings and meaning towards the answering of my 
research questions. As artefacts they provide indicative data on the respective militaries’ 
approach to, and support of, professional reading.  
The findings have given insights into: 
• the purpose and utility of the lists 
• their disciplinary focus and role as a shadow curriculum 
• their construction in relation to accessibility for the reader, textual and authorial 
provenance, and cultural influences 
• the existence of a set of common texts recommended by militaries globally, and 
• the variety of approaches to designing and supporting the reading lists. 
However, this data presents an interpretive or hermeneutic challenge. This is whether I can 
rely on the ‘espoused’ nature of the lists as indicated by the data, or whether I need to enquire 
more deeply into the ‘theory in use’ of professional reading in the military. This requires an 
exploration of the key themes of the research, and the components of the conceptual 
framework, with my interview subjects. I do this in the following two chapters. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONVERSATIONS ON PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
In this chapter I present the first of two chapters of qualitative findings derived from an 
analysis of interviews and personal correspondence conducted between 2009 and 2013. In 
both chapters I present my findings using illustrative quotations from the interviews selected 
to represent the different opinions and perspectives that I encountered. 
In the literature review, I used the conceptual framework to examine the research topic from 
four perspectives. I bring interviewee viewpoints to two of these perspectives in each of the 
following two chapters. In this chapter these viewpoints focus on the modern warrior-leader 
and professionalism and professional military education. In Chapter Nine they focus on the 
development of, and support for, the intellectual component of military leadership through 
professional reading, and the narrower question of canon. 
To provide context on the provenance and authority of the interviewees at the point I 
interviewed or corresponded with them, I introduce each one by footnote the first time they 
appear in the text. A full list of interviewees is in Annex Two. Direct quotations were not used 
from a small number of interviews. This was a stylistic decision, all interviews contributing 
to the overall thematic analysis. 
The professional context 
In outlining my methodological approach I illustrated the data gathering process as an 
interpretive interaction with the cultural texts of my locus, military leaders. It became clear 
when I began to engage in our enquiry ‘conversation’ that, to get to the heart of our topic – 
the role of professional reading in the development of military leaders –  it would be 
necessary to gain an understanding of the broader contexts our phenomenon nestled in.  
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In the literature review I encountered much debate about the eternal nature of war versus the 
evolving conduct of war and how the competing understandings of this shaped doctrine, 
policy and thus the content and disposition of professional military education. 
 “War is between people…conflict is generated between people and is executed by 
people…The other drive has been the technologists who say, ‘there’s got to be a silver 
bullet somewhere here…we are eventually going to create a process that is going to 
[create] a totally transparent battlefield, everything will be apparent…you won’t even 
need to make a decision, it will present itself to you and you just need to push one 
button and [the solution] will occur’…[that] has never been the case” (Jones, 2011).39 
 
This belief, that techno-centric conceptions of future war require careful considerations of 
both change and continuity, resonated strongly in my conversations. 
“I think there was a feeling…at a particular point in time that you can solve 
everything.  I think we have come past that now…every technology alters how you 
conduct warfare, but it doesn’t alter the fact of war itself…[though] how you conduct 
it may vary” (Alagappa, 2010). 40 
 
Despite the emphasis given to political and military history in military education, the 
interviewees showed concern that the importance of both of the forces of continuity and 
change were not properly appreciated by the profession. 
“When I think of all the frustrations we’ve had in recent conflicts and problems with 
strategies…strategies that were disconnected with reality, it is in large measure due to 
neglect of the enduring nature of war. We thought these situations were somehow 
novel or unprecedented” (McMaster, 2012). 41 
 
An interview theme with implications for military education related to changing conceptions 
of the role of the military. This was fuelled by a belief, predominantly in ‘the West’ that the 
end of the Cold War had brought in an era where mass conventional war would largely be 
replaced by a ‘Long War’ of state against non-state actors, thus signalling a need to ‘rethink’ 
the military’s role.  
                                                 
39
 Lt-General Rhys Jones, Chief of Defence Force, New Zealand. 
40
 Retired officer, Professor Muthiah Alagappa, East-West Centre. 
41
 Maj-General H.R. McMaster, U.S. Army. 
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“Fighting in the deep [Malaysian] jungle was the military’s responsibility.  But in 
terms of actual policing operations…there were paramilitary forces that were 
developed which were not strictly police, not strictly armed forces, but [something] in 
between… it raises this fundamental question, what does it mean to be a military 
officer.  What is the military profession all about?  This needs some fundamental 
rethinking” (Alagappa, 2010). 
 
As was seen in the examination of the reading lists, while the literature relating to 
conventional, large-scale warfare, particularly of WWII, is still relatively dominant, the 
increasing prominence given to literature from the ‘unconventional’ conflicts of 
decolonisation, insurgency, ideologically inspired guerrilla warfare, and peacekeeping in 
land-forces reading lists suggests that this conception of change in the purpose or focus of 
modern militaries has more than a speculative foundation to it. However, this sense of a 
changing distinction between purely military and civilian/political affairs, and the impact this 
would have on officer education, is not universally shared by other services. 
 “This is fundamentally an Army ‘truism’ that ignores Navies’ long history of 
diplomatic and constabulary work. The Fishery Protection Squadron of the Royal 
Navy is its oldest formed squadron. The [Royal Australian Navy] has been doing such 
operations ‘less than war’ for over a hundred years. What has happened is that the 
USA in particular, but much of Western Europe, has relatively recently emerged from 
a historically relatively simple Cold War paradigm into complex environment that 
calls for a multitude of approaches to a multitude of problems” (Goldrick, 2013).42 
 
As will become more apparent, this theme, suggesting barriers to learning both between 
services and nations and across time and context, occurred frequently. A strong sense of 
concern, confusion even, about the future direction of the military profession(s) permeated 
my conversations.  
The intellectual component 
Through my engagement with the literature, contemporary and historical, military leadership 
seemed to be a phenomenon that co-resided in the physical, emotional and intellectual 
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 Rear Admiral James Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy. 
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realms. My enquiry sought to gain a better understanding of the intellectual dimension of 
military leadership and from there some conception of how this developed. 
“War throughout its history has been complex.  Unless you are intellectual enough to 
be able to handle the complexity and understand the social environment or the wider 
environment, you are not going to be able to be a good strategic or higher level 
leader…even at the lower level, increasingly more so in modern operations where 
junior leadership is placed in very complex environments, such as insurgency 
operations. But needing to be able to cope with complexity and having the intellectual 
ability to cope with uncertainty and greyness becomes quite important.  I define that 
as street nous” (Jones, 2011). 
 
This is an almost Clausewitzian conception of military intellect, the ability to cut through the 
metaphorical fog of war, and a conception primarily centred around the ‘sharp end’ of the 
military function – the conduct of war. The reference to “street nous” was striking, the 
etymology of the term seeming to acknowledge the ‘practical wisdom’ essential to effective 
command. The articulation of the object or purpose – essence almost – of this practical 
wisdom had something of an immutable quality to it; one could be describing command in 
both the ancient and the post-modern worlds. 
“Even in…much simpler times when we were talking about conventional wars, 
understanding what the battlefield was often more about understanding the 
complexities of decision cycles, understanding the enemy, and how that’s going to 
dictate [or] shape the battlefield. It is often defined as a war of wills between 
commanders.  It might not have been as simple as that but it is the ability to think 
through and understand not just the next step but what is going to happen as 
consequentials and whether we are ready for that” (Jones, 2011). 
 
However, this is primarily a ‘war leadership’ depiction of the intellectual dimension of 
military leadership. Outside of the combat arena, officers fulfil a variety of roles that could 
variously be described as managers, organisers, bureaucrats, advisors, knowledge holders and 
educators. Is there a particularly martial aspect to these non-combat intellectual contexts?  
“The three main intellectual components required of an officer are, first and foremost, 
a keen sense of perception. Second, good all-round knowledge…not necessarily to be 
an expert in every area, but to have sound, broad knowledge. Finally, good 
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communication skills…officers are leaders of [people]…they influence through 
communication” (Ghazali, 2011). 43 
 
This description could easily be applied to leaders and managers in any organisational 
context. Throughout the research the martial or warrior ideal of command juxtaposed the 
everyday of the modern military professional manager.  
“The peace time environment is more managing. [In wartime, command] is to drive 
[subordinates], inspire them, motivate them to get the best from whatever we do” 
(Alatiff, 2011). 44  
 
The dual roles of commander and manager were articulated by the interviewees through the 
all-encompassing notion of leadership.  
Leadership 
Much of the older literature I have encountered examined military leadership through trait, 
heroic, and what would currently be termed authentic or charismatic lenses (i.e. those 
conceptions that emphasised the relative importance of the presence of certain innate 
qualities). While the contemporary literature has shown the need to concentrate on the 
learned conceptions of leadership – contingent, situational etc. – the notion of the naturally 
talented military leader is persistent. For example: 
 “There are two types of leaders. One is a born leader, the other one is a developed 
leader.  Like soccer players.  One is a born soccer player, the other one he has to train 
so hard to become a soccer player” (Alatiff, 2011). 
 
In this paradigm, leadership development is understood in more experiential terms, the 
individual’s leadership skills developing over time relative both to the presenting context and 
the degree of innate talent present.   
“You are at the tactical level when you are new…[a] young officer…The moment you 
have engaged into tactical situations, you’ve got experience…only then can you move 
into operational thinking…you understand what people on the ground need to 
do…you are able to come up with [effective] plans that can be executed by the people 
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 Lt-Col Professor Ahmed Ghazali, National Defence University, Malaysia. 
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 Lt-General Mohd Alatif, Vice Chancellor, National Defence University, Malaysia. 
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on the ground. This experience cannot be bought anywhere.  It is also difficult to be 
taught” (Zakaria, 2011). 45 
 
Thus, from this perspective, leaders develop ‘on-the-job’, through ‘hands-on’ learning, their 
various experiences – combat being the ultimate teacher – providing them with the 
consummate skills they need for effective command. 
“I think that the British Army traditionally [and] a lot of other armies that are doing a 
lot of hands-on warfare of various sorts…and they would tend to say the practical 
business, the warrior business is what is essential. That to have command is more 
important than to have studied” (Strachan, 2009). 46 
 
I have referenced Janowitz’(1960) conception of the ‘military intellectual’ and the 
‘intellectual officer’ and noted his distinction between officers who brought an intellectual 
dimension to their job, but where this intellectualism was held in check by the needs of the 
profession, and the military intellectual whose attachments and identifications were primarily 
with intellectuals and intellectual activities. Janowitz thought the second fundamentally 
unsuitable for higher command. Janowitz’ notion will be considered in more depth presently, 
but his model does have some application at this point. 
“The problem which Janowitz is touching upon is that of the balance between 
practical experience and theoretical development. The problem is in fact more acute 
for the Navy than the Army because the time taken to develop a major ship 
commander is somewhat longer than that for an equivalent unit commander on land - 
the U.S. Navy has suggested two years more for destroyer command than battalion 
command” (Goldrick, 2013). 
 
The conception then of the pedagogical foundations and function of professional military 
education needs scrutiny, if only in the narrow context of developing individuals for 
command responsibilities. If command skills develop in a purely experiential fashion then 
both the institutional and some situational quadrants of Livingstone’s Learning Framework 
would surely be superfluous.  
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“You can’t teach leadership, but you can learn it. I can’t sit in a classroom and teach 
you leadership.  I can tell you all the theories…the different types of leadership 
models… junior leadership versus senior…but you’ve actually got to experience it 
until you are able to build up that repertoire…and understand it as well.  You can’t 
really understand it unless you do it.  Education has its role of providing the basis of 
an understanding of what needs to be achieved but the actual achievement of it needs 
to be coupled with practical experience” (Jones, 2011). 
 
So here, the formal educational experience serves to deliver the ‘underpinning knowledge’ of 
leadership; not so much a theoretical foundation – in this articulation the base leadership is 
built upon is experience – as a complementary, though optional, veneer. What then of the 
situational modes of leadership development, the role of professional reading being our 
topical focus? 
“There are books that we selected that will give [cadets] exposure but actually in the 
military, it is only combat that really shapes your leadership, where your leadership is 
tested... the real test is [combat]” (Alatiff, 2011). 
 
To this point, the idea has been presented that war is an inherently complex activity, the 
military professional must have a sophisticated intellect to grapple with it, and that the 
development of this intellect is primarily done experientially. It has yet then to be determined 
the purpose of or worth of military education, whether institutional, situational, teacher-
centric or learner-centric. 
 “In this army, we have emphasised small ‘e’ education; we actually need to have 
people who can think.  We need to have people who can analyse the circumstance, put 
it into a perspective, and quite often say, “Hey, this is totally different to what I was 
briefed about, how do I put this into the perspective of what has to be achieved?  How 
do I understand what is the right thing to do?”  We actually do need an intellectual 
commander, someone who has the intellect to able to think through an issue.  And it is 
different to educated.  It is intellectual.  But often education leads to that intellect in 
the end” (Jones, 2011).   
 
There are three interrelated ideas to be teased out from this and further considered. The first 
begs an examination of the very conception of ‘education’. Second is the question of what it 
is to be ‘intellectual’ in a military context and how this relates to conceptions of 
intellectualism in civilian spheres. The third is whether the ultimate purpose of the 
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professional developmental activities we label education are there primarily to cultivate 
thinking skills. I will examine these questions in some depth before continuing to a direct 
consideration of self-development, professional military reading, the reading lists themselves 
and canon. 
The nature of education 
The differing conceptions of ‘education’ developed as a fundamental component of my 
investigation into the role of professional reading in the development of military leaders and 
leadership. These conceptions – broadly, the question of what education is versus what 
education does and the related question of what it is to be educated – guided, though did not 
explicitly form, the direction of our questioning. 
While my critique of the Professional Development Framework model noted that it was too 
simplistic a model to capture the nuances of the different forms of learning, I did note its 
utility for broad-brush evaluative considerations of the efficacy of the various learning 
activities, programmes or modes. The ‘observable progress’ continuum was a particularly 
useful means of considering the rate of impact of particular initiatives. 
“You can observe the application of training and also you can see the [impact of] 
experience as [officers] grow up” (Alatiff, 2011).  
 
Thus, broadly-termed, ‘training’ and ‘experience’ have been the traditional mainstays of 
military education for millennia for the simple reason that their impact on individuals and 
groups is quickly, even immediately, apparent. However the traditional emphasis on training 
in a soldier’s formative years may be educationally unsound.  
“At the very junior level, you are operating machinery, the tactics are reasonably 
drilled.  The technical concepts are reasonably simple.  So there is a lot more 
investment into the technical side, the training side. But at the same time it has been 
proven educationally that that is the time where you actually want to diversify 
[soldiers’] thinking. So there is the dilemma. Most [military] education programs do 
tend to do the technical training first and the broader education last” (Jones, 2011). 
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I will consider the role of military education regarding the development of ‘thinking skills’ in 
due course. For now, this representation is noteworthy, highlighting as it does the importance 
of a ‘blended’ learning approach to education or instructional learning; finding the right mix 
or blend of educational modes to achieve both learner and organisational needs and goals. 
Livingstone’s learning framework division by ‘knowledge structure’ saw learning as either 
‘institutional’ or ‘situational’, with the experiential form of learning in the learner-centric, 
situational quadrant of the framework.  
“When I was teaching tactics, there was another instructor who was very theoretical. I 
was sitting in one of his classes he said, nothing beats good book-learning. He turned 
to me and said, “Isn’t that right?” I kind of mumbled my way out of that one. 
Afterwards I kept thinking, well, it isn’t.  Good book-learning combined with 
experience is the best way” (Jones, 2011).   
 
While the educational blend presented here does not on the surface appear problematic, the 
discussion of book-learning in an instructional context highlights the need to define what is 
meant by book learning; a one-way engagement where the reader is a passive or rote 
‘consumer’ of the text, or a two-way exchange, where the reader is actively engaged in an 
‘intellectual conversation’ with the text. This question will remain an on-going theme and is 
particularly pertinent to the consideration of what is meant by self-directed learning.  
Livingstone placed what might be considered the ‘purest’ form of self-directed learning in the 
situational zone. 
“You will see self-directed learning especially in peace time. When [officers] are 
young… they are still saying, “Oh, I have these courses to do,” so self-directed 
learning is less [evident].  But when they are major, they say, “Oh, I’m going to start 
college,” they know how to plan, if I’m not going to do this staff appointment, I can 
go for a tertiary education.  Every time you do a tertiary education it has something to 
do with self-directed learning.  There is a drive [to learn]” (Alatiff, 2011).  
 
Articulated like this, self-directed learning is framed as something that occurs post-formal 
schooling as the adult learner matures into their career and begins to ‘strategically’ plan their 
future career progression. Associated as it is with institutional learning, this conception would 
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conform with Livingstone’s classifications non-formal and/or further education rather than 
self-directed learning per se. This confusion is not merely an academic issue in that 
developing coherent policy for something that is not consistently understood or defined might 
surely be an exercise in imprecision.  
“Only about a third of our officers get caught within the formal Joint PME continuum 
and have the benefit of the insights that can be gained and which serve as a foundation 
for further learning. On the other hand, although a certain amount of credentialism is 
apparent, there is a strong culture of self-development through external and part time 
degree programmes within the officer corps. Where this culture needs to develop is to 
make very clear at what point course work should stop and either self-directed reading 
or formal research work should start” (Goldrick, 2013).  
 
So, getting the educational ‘mix’ right to support career-long officer development is a 
concern of senior military educators. The insights so far have provided some initial 
indications on the military approach to the ‘what’ of education. Leaving aside the issue of 
credentialism for the time being, it has been shown that while the literature review rejected 
the Professional Development Framework model for its too simplistic representation of the 
various forms of learning, it does provide a closer representation of how the military actually 
conceives, and thus provides, professional development than Livingstone’s does.  
What education does 
Having considered what education is, we move to the related question of what education does 
or, what is the point of it? So, what are the broad outcomes that military education may be 
seeking to achieve? 
“[Cadets] must develop good academic values, good leadership values and good 
ethical values” (Arafin, 2011). 47 
 
This values-based conception suggests the educational goal is as much about building 
character as it is about equipping the young officers with specific skills and that it should help 
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them exercise ethical judgment and understand and develop personal and command 
responsibilities. It is therefore, in this conception, to inculcate the officer into the profession. 
In contrast, Masland and Radway (1957) argued that a major function of formal military 
education was to inculcate a sense of intellectual curiosity among young officers and enable 
them to be able to continue their development under their “own steam” (ps.509-510). I 
discussed this with my interviewees. 
“Nothing can replace diligent independent study. The aim of education at all levels is 
precisely to provide students with the tools needed to engage in such study” (Van 
Creveld, 2012). 48 
 
So formal education, rather than being an end in itself, is here, a means to an end; that end 
being the development of a self-directed learner. 
“During my time, I didn’t have funding from the army to pursue my tertiary 
education. So I funded my own. Even if I had to do distance learning I did it. Why? 
To stay relevant and keep ahead. It costs but it pays.  If I see where I am now, when I 
was a major, whatever I spent to do my [professional development]…it has paid 
back” (Alatiff, 2011). 
 
As shown through the literature review, achieving one’s military education – i.e. through 
successful attendance at service staff or defence colleges and gaining the esteem of one’s 
peers and superiors – has historically been a notable, though not primary, part of career 
progression, particularly in the land forces.  
“Professional military education is a must for promotions. If you have not achieved 
your appropriate military [education] it doesn't matter what you've done, you will not 
be promoted. It's that simple”(Arvizo, 2010). 49   
 
Despite the earlier claims to the primacy of experience as the prerequisite for leadership 
development, and historically there is much evidence to back this up, our interaction with the 
modern military indicated a shift from experience to educational attainment as the lingua 
franca of career progression. Once something becomes a tradable commodity in the career 
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marketplace, its perception as a good, its intrinsic value in other words, will change. So, in 
some quarters a drive to study forms part of a ‘virtuous’ cycle of learning and 
credentialisation – one driven by a sense that it actually makes a difference to one’s ability to 
command. However there is career pragmatism to consider.  
 “There are two types of officer. The majority type does things just to tick a 
box…they do what they have to do. For the minority, reading, training, writing are all 
part of being a [professional] officer” (Idris et al., 2011). 50 
 
So, for some officers the ‘what’ of education is to do a better job, to be a better officer, while 
for others it is something to be obtained solely to advance one’s career.  
“[Professional military education] provides that core knowledge required of military 
personnel because if not provided to them, very few would venture out and get it 
themselves” (Horn, 2012). 51 
 
This introduces the ‘what’ of education as the transmitter of the core knowledge necessary to 
do the job. What is this core knowledge? In the previous chapter, during the consideration of 
the reading lists as possible ‘shadow curricula’, a range of broad military-related fields of 
knowledge were identified that the list designers appeared to broadly concur that a thorough 
grounding in was essential for a rounded professional development.  
“[Professional military education]…needs to embrace good economic, social, political 
and cultural history, as well as a host of other technological, financial and social 
matters. Obviously, one size does not fit all and the idea of a single [Professional 
military education]… path is nonsense, both in Joint terms and for the individual 
Services” (Goldrick, 2013). 
 
This advocates for a broader thematic content for programmes than one might assume would 
be the focus of military education, particularly when the already substantial body of military 
knowledge that the lists reveal is considered. Throughout the research, this broader form of 
education, commonly referred to as ‘the liberal arts’ model was consistently mentioned as an 
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ideal for the development of the intellectual skills young officers needed to progress to senior 
command.  
“[A liberal] education is essential and that it should include one subject about which 
the student knows little or nothing, Chinese philosophy for example. The objective 
would be to make students think "out of the box." I also argued [in The Training of 
Officers] that there is no point in such a course unless it is given not by some 
mediocrity but by the very best available experts” (Van Creveld, 2012). 
 
So, while we have seen the point of education as the transmitter of core knowledge, we then 
find a range of ideas on what that knowledge should be; purely military or, taken to its logical 
conclusion, such an open-ended range of options that the military education becomes 
indistinguishable from the education available to any undergraduate student. The knowledge 
then becomes secondary to the process followed to assimilate and comprehend the 
knowledge. 
“In [some armies] they have got this reference book [the field manual]. This is 
question, this is the action, this is [another] question, this is the action for that.  But 
when you come to something that is not in the manual what do you do?  That’s the 
question. What this is trying to do is to fill [the young officer] with every single detail 
of how to act” (Zakaria, 2011).  
 
Here we encounter the importance of study as an interpretive rather than merely imitative 
exercise, the difference between doctrinal – i.e. established procedures to a complex 
operation - and dogmatic – i.e. stubbornly held beliefs – approaches to professional 
knowledge.  
“I would say you cannot template. If you template with this in totality, the exact thing, 
the exact action, the exact moment that you template it into another area, another 
place, you will never be successful. You’ve got to reinvent things and what matters is 
that the learning process must [stick to] general principles. Once you master general 
principles, you have something to guide you” (Zakaria, 2011). 
 
So, rather than encouraging slavish adherence to procedure, the aim of military education is 
to produce officers who can adapt their professional knowledge to the exigencies of the 
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circumstances at hand. The ‘what’ of education here is commonly expressed as the need to 
develop ‘thinking’ skills.  
“The process of thinking develops as your experience grows…but if it happens to be 
that you do not have the opportunity to go through [active deployment]…then to 
become a high ranking officer… you must become an open minded person” (Zakaria, 
2011).  
 
This notion of open-mindedness takes us back to the ‘liberal arts’ model just mentioned. 
Through the conceptual framework I framed the idea of Critical Literacy as an important 
leadership attribute. My field research included engagement with the Universiti Pertahanan 
Nasional Malaysia (UPNM), a recent innovation from the previous British-influenced service 
college and senior staff college professional military education model, the ‘national defence 
university’ a milestone in the development of professional military education since the 
academic innovations in nineteenth-century Prussia. 
Their modus operandi is, within a standard undergraduate model, to blend credentialised 
academic study with basic cadet training, the resulting graduate earning an officer 
commission. This ‘liberal’ model would appear to encapsulate all of the education ‘whats’ so 
far mentioned. 
“There are pros and cons, it is currently trial and error…inside academia it is very 
liberal thinking. Inside the military [the thinking] is very illiberal…you must have 
discipline, military discipline” (Arafin, 2011).  
 
While this dichotomy seems rather archaic, the disciplinarian notion residing more 
comfortably in conscript or authoritarian military cultures rather than the professional 
volunteer culture predominant in the developed world, there does seem to be a tension 
between the military ethos and the principle of command on one hand, and the spirit of free 
inquiry on the other. 
“We have two cultures trying to work together…the military culture and civilian 
cultures. These are two almost conflicting cultures. Civilian academic culture is a 
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culture of inquiry, challenge, pushing the knowledge frontier. Nothing is absolute, 
nothing is fact. Whereas the military culture is…do what you are told, obey your 
superiors…how do you reconcile these cultures and which is the default culture?” 
(Ghazali, 2011).  
 
This question regarding mechanism through which to reconcile the tension articulated above 
may reside in Janowitz’ (1960) identification of an ‘elite nucleus’ within the military (ps.150-
172).52   
“You have got to look at the military as a profession and what their functions are. You 
cannot have too many people who are freethinkers. Then the system will not work. I 
think you have to balance those two. And that’s a big challenge” (Alagappa, 2010). 
 
As with Janowitz (1960), this suggests that the system can cope with, and thrives on, a certain 
‘healthy’ percentage of ‘mavericks’ and independent thinkers, but, above that ‘golden 
mean’53 there is chaos, below it, mediocrity.  
Colin Gray (2009) has argued that a key flaw in professional military education is that the 
strategic dimension of war is not formally taught until much later in an officer’s career, at 
which point it may be too late for the education to have any impact. I put this to the 
interviewees. 
“The problem is the habit of the mind has been formed by this stage…their thinking is 
formed by the tactical way of doing things. But it is a dilemma because your brain 
basically has its pattern of thinking by the time you are in your mid to late twenties 
and even early thirties. It is very hard to change your systems of thinking beyond that” 
(Jones, 2011).   
 
This lends weight to the potential of a professional reading programme to act as a ‘shadow 
curriculum’, providing exposure to strategic thinking well before the career stage it is usually 
formally introduced. 
“ What we are able to do now…is give [soldiers] a broad range of experiences, in the 
force itself, but also core time to attend graduate programmes, which I think are 
                                                 
52
 While Janowitz’ study was confined to the American military, a cross-cultural review of literature during this 
research suggests that many of his insights lend themselves to semi-universal application. 
53
 In Aristotle this is the desirable middle between two extremes. In the Eudemian Ethics he discusses the golden 
mean in relation to the military policy of Sparta (Aristotle, c.330 BCE/2011). 
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critical to really teach officers how to think, ask the right questions” (McMaster, 
2012). 
 
So, there would seem to be broad evidence that one of the prime ‘whats’ of military 
education is to develop thinking skills in the officer corps. However: 
“I think we are actually approaching this from the wrong angle. The objective is not 
necessarily to teach people to think. The objective is to teach people how to decide. 
Thinking is the enabler to decisions” (Jones, 2011).   
 
Differentiating as it does speculation from praxis, this distinction provides us with a lens 
through which to consider the differing conceptions of ‘intellectual’; the academic and the 
professional conceptions symbolised by the distinct forms of wisdom sophia and phronesis 
we encountered in Chapter Three. 
“[Military education] should be about reaching practical ends…but there’s no way to 
teach that. Clausewitz said about military theory that it is not to accompany you to the 
battlefield, but is really to help you think about the decisions you have to make and to 
help you think about the situation your forces are in relative to the enemy, the terrain. 
What some people lack is the ability to ask the right questions at the outset. ‘What is 
the nature of the conflict?’ To take that through is what I’ve seen missing in some of 
our recent experiences” (McMaster, 2012). 
 
So far in this chapter, I have considered the professional context and intellectual component 
of officership and military leadership. In this section, I used Livingstone’s (2006) learning 
framework to enquire into the military conception of education. I then asked what the 
purpose of military education was. To this we saw education as professional inculcation, 
development of life-long learners, individual career development, knowledge building, 
development of ‘thinkers’, and finally, development of ‘doers’. Now that I have asked what 
education is and what education does, in the final section of this chapter, I will ask ‘what is it 
to be educated?’ 
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What it is to be educated 
Earlier in this chapter we encountered credentialism, the self-perpetuating practice of 
requiring ever-higher formal qualifications for jobs that could be equally done through 
applying skills acquired through experience or self-directed learning. 
“One should never confuse "credentialisation" with education. One does not need a 
host of "letters" behind one's name…to achieve education or to be "educated." It is the 
process of education that is important - the deep professional reading, engaging in 
discourse and writing, with the subsequent criticism and debate that it entails that 
counts. In many ways, taking programs makes the process a bit easier since there are 
now benchmarks and exigencies that require an individual to undertake those 
activities. However, I know many a brilliant individual who do not have post-graduate 
degrees but achieved their brilliance through a sharp intellect and inquiring mind” 
(Horn, 2012).   
 
A reoccurring theme throughout our literature review and interviews was the debate about 
and tension between the use and understanding of the terms ‘intellectual’, ‘educated’ and 
‘credentialed’, particularly regarding the points where they overlap or intersect, and the 
points at which they differ. 
“In the military system, there is not much incentive to [reward self-directed learning]. 
So people have to be motivated by themselves. I think even now this opportunity to 
do Masters Degrees and so forth…is a good thing, but I think people do it just for the 
sake of doing it. It is not really education in the broad sense of the term”. (Alagappa, 
2010). 
 
This illustrates a dilemma in personal development in organisational contexts. Educational 
development needs to be both encouraged and measured (particularly where there are 
budgetary allocations). Self-directed learning is so incremental it is difficult to measure; 
formal and non-formal learning can be measured through the passing of papers or courses, or 
the attainment of qualifications. Does this indicate whether a person is educated? 
Earlier in this chapter I referred to Janowitz and his conception of the intellectual officer and 
the military intellectual. This typology was of particular interest in the literature review stage 
of my research. However, when I discussed this typology during the interviews, it did not 
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resonate with our audience. In contrast the term ‘warrior-scholar’ was both understood and 
embraced.  
“The warrior-scholar – marrying the two of those implies that there is a potential 
relationship between experience and study…I think that is more evident in the U.S. 
army than I think in the British army…to take two obvious examples are images of 
Generals Petraeus and Mattis.  They would both suggest here are people who see it 
important to continue reading while they are commanding…that it is a priority” 
(Strachan, 2009). 
 
In our conceptual framework, I characterised the ‘modern warrior’ as a fusion of caste and 
professionalism, continuity and change. The resonance of warrior scholar as a typology might 
be because military history provides rich and varied historical exemplars of the term. 
“You put Patton and Kippenberger in certain situations because they have studied 
military history in depth, they know the sorts of question to ask of the situation that is 
in front of them, and it’s sufficiently intuitive by then that they are also capable of 
doing that quickly without prevarication which would seem to be perhaps a classic 
symptom of the educated mind, you know, that you are still asking the questions 
rather than coming out with the answers” (Strachan, 2009). 
 
The ‘educated mind’ is here a synonym for ‘academic’. Thus, while ‘education’, may be 
understood in its formal, non-formal, informal and self-directed modes, in much of the 
discussions on what it meant to be truly educated in a useful military sense, the formal and 
non-formal, credentialed forms were repeatedly portrayed as the least beneficial in the 
military context. 
“That small ‘e’ education is a stepping stone to having the intellectual commander 
who can work through complexities. The best commanders throughout history have 
been able to handle complexity, understand what is the key thing to do, sort out the 
information they need, or the decisions they need to make or the guidance they need 
to [achieve their mission]” (Jones, 2011).   
 
But this aversion to the academically trained officer raises an issue for our warrior-scholar 
model. While the historical exemplars were, at least partially, autodidacts who pursued their 
scholarship independently through self-directed learning, in the contemporary context, the 
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term warrior-scholar is often used to refer to combat soldiers who have also engaged in post-
graduate academic research at doctoral level. 
“At the moment in the British Army there is a presumption that if you're studying for 
a PhD that means you can't be working hard enough on your day job. That is still the 
ethos, not the ethos that says it is a good thing to have done a PhD…as Petraeus or as 
some other senior American officers have done. The day when an officer who has 
done a further degree like that gets to the top of the [British] Army will be the day that 
the message really gets home” (Strachan, 2009). 
 
Despite the relative homogeneity of the books included in the global reading lists, there were 
variations in the underlying ethos of certain lists that could be interpreted in terms of cultural 
differences or preferences. Cultural differences even within the Anglo-Saxon world might be 
at play here too. However it may simply be a reflection of differing resource capacities. 
“This is not to say that the best officers cannot ride both horses, but there is a 
minimum of practical time required to make an officer suitable for higher 
command…and it is good fun anyway and what people generally joined for, however 
bright they are. That time certainly is generally such that it is not compatible with full 
alignment with the academic career path. If officers are to be sent to do PhDs, they 
need to do them in the minimum time and probably accept that it will be straight back 
to the operational ‘coalface’ as soon as they have finished” (Goldrick, 2013). 
 
Cultural differences and resource constraints aside, a discernible trend emerged throughout 
my conversations where, increasingly, soldiers pursue (or aspire to pursue) higher research 
degrees with the intention of staying in the core activities of the military. This is in sharp 
contrast to the more prevalent path in the past of officers pursuing higher education and then 
leaving their service. 
“I began my career as a regular commissioned officer…I did my officer training, a 
two-year program very similar to that at Sandhurst. And then I did 
telecommunications courses, and Staff College…and then I sort of transitioned to an 
academic career. While still in the [military] I did my Masters and my PhD…and then 
I left the armed forces to go into the academic world” (Alagappa, 2010). 
 
So far we have seen, on one hand, a lauding of officers who take the time and effort to 
develop themselves intellectually through rigorous academic study, and on the other an 
institutional antipathy towards purer academic pursuits by individual officers. We have 
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already seen the primacy of the intellectual component of command emphasised by senior 
practitioners. We are missing a key element or perception. 
“The reality is that the academic culture and outlook is one of contemplation and 
analysis without regard to time or circumstances, rather than analysis and decision in 
relation to sometimes complex and ambiguous problems within tight deadlines. Too 
great an immersion in the academic life can militate against being able to manage the 
host of big and small decisions that commanders are required to make – sometimes 
minute by minute” (Goldrick, 2013).  
 
Or, to put it more bluntly: 
“These military intellectuals are useful to the military but we cannot rely upon their 
leadership skill, their war-fighting skill” (Ghazali, 2011).  
 
Returning to Janowitz’ model, this is precisely the point he was making; that there was a 
perception that people who were inclined towards or attracted to academic pursuits had a 
natural tendency to have less facility in the skills vital for successful command – rapid 
decision making, seeing ‘the big picture’ etc.  
“My view is that [the army] do encourage people to [study]. They do encourage this 
idea of the military scholar, but there is a limit and there is a high reliance on 
practicality. Now, from the navy side…they actually definitely have had some very 
good scholars. But I think there’s a reluctance to actually put them into the senior 
positions, the most senior positions because they seem to be not practical. There’s a 
navy tradition which is it would rather have people who go to sea and live on a ship 
who understand the navy, the fleet, and the water rather than have someone who reads 
about it and who actually understands much more”(Gilbert, 2010). 54 
 
There is also the issue of the time needed to devote to academic pursuits and what that time is 
substituted for. 
“The problem with officers who devote too much time to academic development is 
that they can become ‘underdone’ in relation to the practical requirements of their 
profession. An ‘underdone’ captain at sea could make, even in peacetime, errors that 
result in death or injury to many” (Goldrick, 2013). 
 
So, there appears to be a seemingly unresolvable tension here. On the one hand intellectual 
development is seen as a necessary good and the engagement in credentialed academic 
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programmes is a known, respected and measurable way to do this. On the other hand, 
resourcing constraints, concern that time at study is time that could be better spent in 
experiential development, and a, perhaps irrational, fear that academic study fosters 
intellectual habits anathema to command, and a resistance to credentialism combine to create 
a climate that sees diligent independent study of the profession of arms, in combination with 
professional mentoring and experience, as the gold standard of command development. 
“I struggle all the time with this dilemma. Generals and Flag Officers raise this 
argument all the time. Moreover, they feel that once they reach the general or flag 
officer rank they automatically have achieved whatever education they require to do 
the job and feel they have earned a post-graduate degree experientially. Yet, if you 
asked them what was the last book they read; or the last conference where they 
undertook discourse or debate…and not on a policy issue…or wrote…not signed off 
with their name on a piece a subordinate wrote for them but actually put it together 
themselves…something intellectual or substantive, you'd find they would be blowing 
you goldfish bubbles” (Horn, 2012). 
 
Summary 
In this chapter my interviewees have provided viewpoints on the modern warrior-leader and 
professionalism and professional military education. This has provided perspectives on: 
• the professional context and intellectual component of officership and military 
leadership;  
• the military conception of education and its purpose 
• what it means to be educated in a military context, particularly as it related to 
differences in understanding of intellectual versus academic sensibilities. 
Having done this, the next chapter has the interviewees provide perspectives on the 
development of, and support for, the intellectual component of military leadership through 
professional reading, and the narrower question of canon. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONVERSATIONS ON PROFESSIONAL READING 
Promoting self-directed learning 
In Chapter Seven, I asked whether I could rely on the ‘espoused’ nature of the professional 
reading lists as indicated by the data, or whether I need to enquire more deeply into the 
‘theory in use’ of professional reading in the military. This required inquiring how the 
military conceived of, and thus put policies in place for, professional development, 
particularly as it related to professional mentoring and its role in professional reading. 
Related to this inquiry was a need to gain perspectives on the espoused notion of ‘self-
development’, and the degree to which it is in reality an autonomous activity or autodidactic 
activity or something dependent on interaction with others, the main question being whether 
the primary agent in the learning experience is the learner or the ‘teacher’.  
 “The commander who is making [professional development] decisions needs to 
actually spend time thinking about the subordinates…to think ‘what does that person 
need?’ [We need to] nurture our subordinates. For me that is one of the key things that 
I think is the [key] responsibility of all commanders”(Jones, 2011). 
 
The interviews presented a picture of self-development in the military that jarred with the 
educational models encountered in the literature. Rather than the picture gained from adult 
education theory where the learner is the more active and motivated party, I was presented 
with a more inverted picture. 
“I encourage that small ‘e’ education…encourage commanders at every level to coach 
and mentor their subordinates and say, okay, I’ve got…three platoon 
commanders…all different in terms of what professional development they need and 
how to do that.  This guy…might need to focus the leadership aspects…this other guy 
might need to focus a little bit more on tactical aspects and so how you focus that 
professional education and at the more senior level, how do you know, what the 
lieutenant colonels need or what the brigadiers need in order to broaden their 
education” (Jones).   
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On the surface we see here the ‘life-long’ aspect of professional development, with elder 
guidance and mentoring occurring at all stages of an officer’s career. The subtext however is 
of self-development as a highly directed, paternalistic activity where mentors are responsible 
for the development their subordinates, rather than this being the responsibility of the 
subordinates themselves. Though I am interested in professional reading it was important to 
locate it in the broader self-developmental context. 
“[Development is achieved] through practical experience, or some of it through 
education and reading, some of it through postings, or courses, or interaction with 
other people that they meet” (Jones, 2011). 
 
How does the mentor determine or gauge the impact of the informal learning activities on 
their charges?   
“It is very difficult to quantify. When I was commanding officer, we have this 
officer’s day. Every week I’ll have this officer [and] I will throw him a book on 
leadership. But the problem they would see is if they are at the younger stage they 
lack experience. They will be reading something but the problem that they face is how 
to apply the knowledge” (Alatiff, 2011).  
 
The sense here is that the success or impact of the informal learning activities depends greatly 
on the ‘raw material’ the mentor has to work with, i.e. learners with greater or lesser degrees 
of prior learning or experience. There is a flip-side to this, which would ask whether the 
superiors themselves were adequately prepared for their mentoring role.  
“Petraeus, I'm told, will deliberately carve out time. When he was in Baghdad he’d 
carve out time in the morning when he was not to be disturbed. He was reflecting. 
General Mattis came to me and asked, “How do I carve out time for my officers to 
reflect?” My response was if you set an example that says this is important then at 
least you've taken guys to the well, whether they drink from it is another matter” 
(Strachan, 2009). 
 
So, considering that the importance of self-directed learning has been long-stated in the 
professional literature, are the habits of life-long self-directed learning firmly established 
among senior command itself?  
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“It varies. It’s almost an individual basis. Self-development has been something that 
everyone says should be done. They’ve done that for 30-35 or more years. Unless the 
individual has actually set aside their time to do it themselves, there hasn’t been a 
formal acknowledgement that this has to be done as part of the process. Having said 
that, when they go into senior staff then obviously, they have to do it and they don’t 
recognize that you can’t actually get 20 years of reading done in one year”. (Gilbert, 
2010). 
 
This suggests that, even if a leader has been deficient regarding self-development earlier in 
their career, a corrective will kick in as they rise through the hierarchy and the ‘hands-on’ 
aspect diminishes in favour of the more intellectually demanding strategic requirements of 
organisational management and planning. 
“If you asked them what was the last book they read? The response, we're far too 
busy. That would be because they focus on the day-to-day, on in-baskets and insist on 
signing off on everything. They miss their role as strategic leaders who should be 
doing that deep professional reading and taking time to be introspective. But they are 
not. There are exceptions, but they are the few and far between. The military is still 
very experiential and to a degree anti-intellectual, although most are smart enough to 
know you no longer say that out loud. The mantra now is "education is good...but how 
much do we actually need?" (Horn, 2012). 
 
While my initial research question was inspired by the developmental activities of some 
exceptional leaders, the literature review introduced a significant corpus of work on 
ineffective, deficient, and even ‘bad’ and ‘toxic’, military leaders in history. I frequently 
encountered examples of what could be termed ‘elder dependency’, where the self-
development culture in a particular formation or unit waxes and wanes due to the particular 
disposition – good, bad, or indifferent - of its leader at any particular time. 
“We used to have a General who, through his own initiative, not [Army] policy, 
imposed us to read and write reviews and submit these to him…he enforced 
compulsory reading…but as he left it died off” (Idris et al., 2011). 
 
Thus, unlike training, experience or education, broadly termed, which will be guided and 
governed by high-level policy, in many cases, development through activities like 
professional reading is left to the personal initiative or inclination of individual commanders. 
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“What happens at the moment within the U.K. in terms of what I suppose you might 
call directed reading for officers is that it's almost entirely in the hands of the 
regimental commanding officer. So if you are serving as a lieutenant or a captain in 
the army you may well be encouraged to do some reading, think around a particular 
problem by a particularly zealous and enthusiastic commanding officer” (Strachan, 
2009).   
 
A key phrase to consider here is ‘directed reading’. The elephant in the room to this point is 
something that has been raised by peers, reviewers, and interviewees throughout my research. 
The original objective was to explore self-directed learning through professional reading. 
This approach became problematic. A lot of the professional reading activities I have 
encountered are mandated, either through superior-to-subordinate direction, or through 
professional reading programmes – the U.S. Marine Corps’ is a prime example – that have an 
engagement expectation built in. Without this benevolent coercion, how healthy is the self-
directed learning ethos among the officer corps? 
“There’s a long tradition of [self-development through reading in the military] and 
obviously there should not be the expectation that the institution is going to do 
everything for you…officers should take responsibility for their own education, their 
preparation for command” (McMaster, 2012). 
 
This is the ideal, the learner embracing the role of primary agent for their professional, and 
career, development. However: 
“No one publicly argues that education is bad. However, all will tell you they are so 
busy that there is little time on their own to do the reading, take courses, write, etc. 
Therefore, if it isn't provided as a formal military course or requirement for 
promotion, it's probably not going to happen. We espouse all of that rhetoric as well, 
and again, every general and flag officer I know will say ‘Absolutely, education is 
good; we need to be a learning organization; we should promote life-long learning 
and self-development, but, we're all just too busy’" (Horn, 2012).  
 
The tyranny of time, the pressure that operational tempo places on an officer’s ability, or 
perception of their ability, to engage with self-directed learning was raised as a significant 
factor for me to consider. 
“The time isn't there and in most officers the inclination isn't there either. You’ve 
talked about Patton and Kippenberger. Clearly there are officers in all armies today 
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who read independently and critically. But I think it has always been a minority”. 
(Strachan, 2009). 
 
This would suggest that the issue does not relate so much to the fact that much activity that is 
labelled self-directed is clearly not, rather that the military needs to mandate activities that, 
ideally, should naturally occur professionally. Should self-directed learning have the same 
degree of high-level policy support as training and formal education activities? 
“I think that is the way unfortunately. I think there’s room [for] some sort of doctrine 
at the army level on how to organise and conduct self-study…we could really benefit 
from something like that” (McMaster, 2012).  
 
Should such policy ensure that Masland and Radway’s (1957) ideal of formal education 
creating a culture of life-long learning is explicitly embedded into primary training and 
education programmes for young recruits and junior officers?  
“The problem with teaching soft skills related to self-development is students tend not 
to appreciate it there and then…maybe ten or twenty years down the line…you can’t 
really assess the impact of teaching [the skills and importance of] self-development, 
or how much is absorbed by the student” (Zaidi, 2011). 55 
 
Now that the promotion of self-directed learning institutionally and by mentors has been 
broadly considered, professional reading itself can be examined. The interviews will be used 
to reflect on the historical and contemporary phenomena of professional reading, its benefits 
to self and organisation, and some of the issues and barriers, over and above those we have 
already encountered, associated with its promotion. 
Professional reading 
During the literature review I encountered certain hagiographic biographies of historical 
military leaders like Washington and Napoleon which conveyed the impression that they 
sprang fully-formed onto the strategic stage, their inherent military genius the product of 
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nature, not nurture. I solicited professional opinion on the veracity of this ‘born leader’ 
model. 
“This is how military officers prepared themselves for duty during the eighteenth-
century. George Washington was basically self-educated as a military leader…he had 
practical experience in the French and Indian Wars, but he read every military text he 
could get his hands on…that’s how he prepared himself for command and military 
responsibilities” (McMaster, 2012).  
 
So, historically, was professional reading a substitute for a lack of a formal military 
education?  
“You know the Kippenberger [and] Patton analogy in part depends on the fact that 
there is a long period of peace when both those officers are thinking “I'm missing my 
profession”. Not much I can do. Patton's dealing with an army that's cut right back 
and [he] really has only a very limited experience of war anyway. So he's anxious to 
improve himself just as Kippenberger was in that same situation. It's a substitute and a 
conscious method of setting about the preparation for doing this business”. (Strachan, 
2009). 
 
How relevant are these historical examples to the contemporary environment? In 
Washington’s case, North America, both pre- and immediately post-Revolution,56 simply did 
not have a professional military education system of any sort. This is no longer the case in the 
vast majority of developed nations. While there may be contemporary parallels between the 
constrained economic conditions of today and those which impacted on military budgets, and 
therefore education, during the Great Depression, the exponential growth in educational 
opportunities over the past three decades would make it difficult to argue that officers today 
are as limited in their developmental opportunities as Kippenberger and, to a lesser degree, 
Patton. So what is the contemporary relevance of professional reading? 
“Professional reading opens up the mind. It provides factual knowledge that assists in 
planning and dealing with reality. It provides previous examples of what happened, 
what can happen, what worked, what didn't work - in essence, a vicarious experience. 
It can furnish alternate courses of action and /or solutions to problem sets. In the 
process it can help develop and hone your critical and creative thinking” (Horn, 
2012). 
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This notion of vicarious experience is interesting, introducing as it does a link between the 
tactile idea of experience and the contrasting self-absorbed activity of reading. 
“Very few get to experience combat or the infinite different situations that one may 
face in war and conflict. Operations, particularly mistakes therein, are unforgiving. As 
such, one must try to prepare oneself, especially senior commanders and leaders, as 
much as possible prior to being tested in the furnace of battle. Military history can 
assist with preparing individuals. It provides vicarious experience. It provides a 
preview of what can be expected and the types of problems a leader or commander 
may face. This assists with mental and physical preparation” (Horn, 2012).   
 
This suggests that, despite the emphasis on the primacy of experiential learning in the 
development of military leaders, the opportunity to gain the defining experience of military 
leadership – combat – is limited for most officers and so they must seek this experience 
through the experience of others. While this need for vicarious experience is unlikely to have 
been an issue in the U.S. services over the past decade, all-out war has been the exception 
rather than the rule for the standing armies of most developed nations since the end of WWII. 
This vicarious experience can also include lessons on dealing and working with other people; 
the sort of skills necessary in coalition warfare or strategic command. 
“Life-long professional reading can be a vital factor in the development of leaders, but 
it is also true that some do pretty well who never open a book in their lives; the people 
who I term ‘naturally wise’. Nevertheless, these officers tend to reach a ceiling at the 
equivalent of fleet command and are generally less comfortable in the higher staff and 
political environments. But it is the development of the sensibility which comes from 
systematic reading and continual reflection that really helps” (Goldrick, 2013).  
 
As was shown in the examination of the reading lists in Chapter Seven, biographies of 
individual leaders are a popular vehicle for the consideration of leadership and the military 
arts. However: 
“The danger of biographies is that you try and model yourself on another person. I 
think that is wrong because every individual is their own individual. And their own 
experiences, their own analysis, thinking things through, to come up with their own 
character and broaden their own professional competency”(Jones, 2011). 
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So rather than being imitative, engaging with the experience of others through military 
literature is almost an exercise of building other leaders’ skillsets into one’s own tactical, 
operational or strategic repertoire.  
“[Military literature] provides examples how others overcame problems, which 
provides a ‘data-bank’ of possible solutions that an individual can draw on when 
faced with a similar type of problem or issue. It is a critical tool for self-development 
that provides insight and knowledge into operations that clearing in-baskets and 
keeping up with the day-to-day bureaucracy in a headquarters can never accomplish” 
(Horn, 2012).  
 
So far I have primarily been concerned with the impact of professional reading at an 
individual level. Despite the popular trope of the ‘loneliness of command’, one that belongs 
before the telecommunications age and, more correctly, in the age when political and military 
command was unified in one person, decision-making in pluralist societies and their organs 
of state, is actually a collective activity. How important is a culture of organisational 
professional reading for operational and strategic planning? 
“It is absolutely critical. Very rarely are we faced with situations that are completely 
unprecedented. Afghanistan is a perfect example. All of the Coalition countries acted 
as if we encountered counter-insurgency and asymmetric tactics for the first time. Had 
people been better read they would have been far less surprised how things panned 
out” (Horn, 2012). 
 
This reference to counter-insurgency as a professional reading topic57 lines up with an 
observation made during my examination of some ‘historic’ – i.e. pre-1990s – reading lists I 
collected during the research. Examining their evolution over time highlights the shifting 
trends and ‘fashions’ in strategic studies and the fragility of the historical memory of 
institutions. 
The literature highlights that many of the military leader-readers I thought exemplary, were 
also notable authors in one form or another, usually in the context of their time as educators 
                                                 
57
 A key example is the work of French officer and theorist David Galula, briefly a ‘key author’ in the post-
colonial 1960s, largely forgotten by the 1980s and ‘90s, and again relevant in the 2000s; Galula (1964) and 
Marlowe (2010). 
219 
 
in professional military education institutions and commands. The post-facto authorship of 
publicly available memoirs and other, sometimes self-serving, products of retirement was not 
so much of interest. Rather, I was interested in the development of papers, manuals, and 
memos for an internal audience that showed thought leadership and critical literacy in situ.  
“The writing element is key, as it forces you to discipline your thoughts and sharpen 
your ability to make a compelling argument. When you publish, you surrender the 
ability to refute something you said or simply explain it away as a misunderstanding. 
It's in print, now you have to have the courage, intellect and ability to defend it. In 
total, these skills, as well as the vicarious experience and factual knowledge you build 
provides you with a great foundation when it comes to ‘tactical and strategic 
intellect’” (Horn, 2012).  
 
The possible link between active reading, ‘creative’ writing, and the development of tactical 
and strategic ‘intellect’ is worthy of further investigation.  
In the literature review, Van Creveld’s (1990) The Training of Officers provided an 
important, if somewhat cynical, perspective on professional military education. With the 
passing of two decades and on-going enhancements to the academic status of professional 
military education institutions, we asked the author whether he considered the academic 
quality of military education had improved generally or regionally, and whether this had had 
a positive or negative impact on the quality of command.  
“Hard to say. I argued [in The Training of Officers] that organisation is at least as 
important as content and the quality of the instruction. I have not checked out every 
college around the world. However, I have yet to hear of one that is really selective or 
that regards teaching at such a college as part of an officer's fast track” (Van Creveld, 
2012). 
 
This suggests that the historical experience encountered in the literature of officers ‘making 
their name’ through their stints as lecturers at staff colleges is not necessarily a career-
enhancing experience. Like the link between reading, writing and command intellect, this 
point will have to remain in reserve for further study. 
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The interviews have largely confirmed that professional reading is a fundamental constituent 
of professional development. This then suggests the not-so-mischievous question, ‘does the 
average officer know how to read?’ Is ‘how to read a book’ – on-line or traditionally – a key 
skill that needs to be taught and re-taught to professionals?  
“People do need to be taught how to read and, if the book is not in a narrative form, 
how to break it, how to get the content out of it quickly…read the whole book if 
you’re compelled by the material, but how to get value out of a book quickly is a 
valuable skill” (McMaster, 2012). 
 
I have highlighted the growing literature on the future of reading due to the changing format 
and physical nature of texts and the impact of this change on how we read and how our brain 
functions. 
“There has been some research on [the impact of the digital age on reading]…it 
doesn’t matter how much people force me to try and read electronic versions…if I 
really enjoy a book, I will sit down with a hardcopy. But people I know who are 20 
years younger don’t do that; they’re the opposite…they would rather try and find the 
electronic version than read the hardcopy. Now it shouldn’t be a problem if they 
actually know how to read, and do research, and understand what they’re looking at” 
(Gilbert, 2010). 
 
So, in theory, reading as a skilled activity should not be impacted by the format of the text 
being read. However, in reality, the Internet paradigm appears to be impacting the reading 
skills of military professionals.  
“The problem is the piecemeal information that’s online and the small penny packets 
of information as opposed to actually understanding the full depths of the subject.  
That’s one of the things we have all the time with [the] history questions that come 
through. People ask pretty basic questions and I think ‘why can’t they just look in the 
official history and get the statistics?’ The answer is because they’re not used to 
reading a book and they’ve looked online and it’s got four different answers. But the 
statistics depends on what website you go online; they’re all different. So then no one 
knows how to actually check a raw reference. It becomes too confusing for them and 
they come back to us and ask that question” (Gilbert, 2010). 
 
To this point, I have presented interview findings on the promotion of self-directed learning 
institutionally and by mentors, professional reading as a historical and contemporary 
phenomenon, its benefits to self and organisation, and some of the issues and barriers 
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associated with its promotion. It now remains to see how the interviews made sense of the 
reading lists themselves and the notion of canon in its military context. 
Reading lists 
In Chapter Seven I presented my findings from the quantitative analysis of the reading lists. 
While the lists are typically accompanied by glowing endorsements of the benefits and 
importance of professional reading, and the utility and pedagogical function of the lists 
themselves, these understandable reinforcements or justifications required further 
verification. I asked my interviewees about the prime utility of the lists.  
“Reading lists are of value as they provide the solution to the “you don’t know what 
you don’t know” piece. For those who are interested in learning more about the 
profession of arms or specific topics, the reading lists make it easy to find a starting 
point. This removes one potential barrier and makes it easier for people to spend their 
reading time in a worthwhile manner” (Horn, 2012). 
 
In the earlier part of this chapter I highlighted the impression that the formal professional 
military education curriculum was now too crowded to adequately cover all the topics 
essential to an education in “breadth and depth”. Were the reading lists acting as ‘shadow 
curricula’, assisting officers ‘round out’ their professional military education, particularly in 
subjects or topics that may not be currently in vogue?  
“Concur. It also allows us to explore venues that might not have been covered, 
whether geopolitically, politically, socially or historically. But again, it is dependent 
on individuals actually taking the time to do so” (Horn, 2012). 
 
If the reading lists can act as a shadow curriculum then how its construction, its pedagogical 
design, is approached should be an important consideration. 
“A reading list is a good idea, but needs to be very carefully constructed and 
continually revised. In particular, ‘vital’ texts need to be restricted as far as possible. 
A fundamental problem of many such efforts is that the lists are too long and give no 
idea of priority. Most people are quite slow readers and this needs to be recognised” 
(Goldrick, 2013). 
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So, ideally a list should be a ‘living document’ under constant revision and be designed with 
consideration of the audience’s aptitude and prior-reading. The sense that, if the lists are to be 
truly effective learning tools, they must be more than just a long list of worthy tomes came 
through as a strong theme. 
“You need context, purpose and then guidance on how to engage with the material, 
how to read purposefully, how to relate what you’re reading to your duties and 
responsibilities as an officer…That kind of explanation can be important and 
necessary for these [reading] programmes…Often [the lists are] not even annotated, 
just a list of books…That can be overwhelming. People aren’t sure how they actually 
engage the [books] first of all and then how do they apply it, why is it worthwhile to 
do this” (McMaster, 2012).  
 
In my initial collection and analysis of the lists, I encountered a number of lists that, rather 
than being a judicious selection of key and/or relevant texts, presented what could reasonably 
considered a whole life-time’s reading.  
“Keep it manageable… it's tempting to put several hundred books on the list but when 
your average person looks at that list and gets overwhelmed, they don't even know 
where to start” (Arvizo, 2010). 
 
The manageability factor was probably the most consistent theme regarding list design during 
the research. One renowned defence academic spoken to during the early stages of the data 
collection laughingly recalled engaging in an aborted exercise to develop a service reading 
list. Working with service seniors and academic colleagues to agree on a list of key works, 
the list grew to 300+ ‘indispensable’ texts before the enterprise ground to an unwieldy halt. 
Developing an effective, manageable reading list should therefore require the development of 
some basic guiding criteria for selection of the texts that eventually make the final list. My 
research has highlighted the influence the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) reading programme, in 
content if not entirely in conception, has had on the development of other lists. Their guiding 
criteria, when articulated, was succinct and reflected the amount of thought that had gone into 
being clear on the raison d’etre of their list.   
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“An emphasis on war-fighting, based in history, based on serious literature with 
permanence, but to be achievable, and have a broad context.  That's five or six, fairly 
wide brush standards for it” (Arvizo, 2010). 
 
As was noted in Chapter Seven, the U.S. Army’s 3rd Cavalry Regiment – the ‘Brave Rifles’ – 
is one of that nation’s most distinguished combat units. In my discussions with the USMC, I 
(and they) were unable to ascertain the effectiveness of their reading programme beyond any 
vague qualitative measure. The Brave Rifles Reading List, produced for a specific purpose – 
deployment to Western Iraq – however, it presented a more focused locus of inquiry. 
“[The reading list] wasn’t designed to give them the answer to particular tactical 
situations or problems. It was really to allow them to ask the right questions and to be 
able to learn effectively once they were in that environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
It did serve that purpose. It sensitised them to the fact that we were fighting to achieve 
political outcomes, and that the population was central to the effort…the basic 
observations you need soldiers to be able to make in those circumstances and to have 
that context. I think that’s what [the reading list] did for us” (McMaster, 2012). 
 
So far the utility and construction of the reading lists has been considered. But, outside an 
active deployment exercise like the Brave Rifles case where a niche, targeted programme of 
reading could be developed and monitored, the integration and use of generic reading lists in 
the everyday professional development of officers is still not clear.  
“I’ve been supportive of reading lists…but my preference is for someone to actually 
take that reading list and say, here’s the reading list. In your professional development 
for this year I think you need to read that one, that one, that one. And here are three 
other books that aren’t on there. Or I want you to read these two things here, but I’m 
also going to send you on that particular course or send you away on a two month 
posting to this organisation. Ideally it would be useful to tailor reading lists for 
individuals, which we can’t do in military organizations that are large” (Jones, 2011). 
 
With the general development, use and utility of the lists themselves considered, attention 
will now be turned to the component parts of the lists – individual books by individual 
authors – considering them through the varied lens of canon. 
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The canon 
Through my analysis of the professional reading lists, I sought to identify whether a canon of 
key military texts – some of them timeless classics that spoke to all ages, and that all officers 
regardless of rank should read and re-read – existed as a relevant, enduring concept for 
military professionals. I socialised this idea in my professional conversations using as 
prompts individual books and authors that lay claim to having made the greatest contribution 
to military knowledge over time –  Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Mahan, 
Corbett et al. 
“Clausewitz, and of course there are others that you might expect, like Sun Tzu and 
Gray’s ‘Modern Strategy’, Liddell Hart ‘Strategy’, Brody’s ‘War and Politics’…there 
are ones that recur, year after year, on reading lists, in our directives, in our 
syllabi…but then there are all the contemporary things too.  History is one of what we 
call the enduring themes of the War College, so we look for those classic old authors 
whose thoughts and words are still meaningful to today’s society” (Shope, 2011). 58 
 
In contrast to the more clean-cut inferences drawn from the analysis of the reading lists, 
which itself has revealed the absence of some of these classics from our lists, my  
conversations on canon generally elicited “Yes, but…” responses, particularly from the 
‘sharp end’ of the profession. These qualified reactions to this line of inquiry were from four 
perspectives: military history as the bedrock of a military reading programme; ‘mission 
relevance’ as a determiner of a key text; seniority of rank/function as a determiner of key 
text; and the ‘forgotten canon’ of works undervalued in a land warfare dominated joint 
educational environment. 
At the commencement of this research, my prior research, literature review, participation in 
programmes that had professional military education accreditation, and general engagement 
with the military history corpus had fixed an impression that military history – whether in 
tactical, operational, or strategic focus; ancient, medieval or modern – was the foundation 
                                                 
58
 Virginia Shope, Research, Instruction, and Access Services Chief, U.S. Army War College Library. 
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upon which an officer’s education would be built. The immutability of historical lessons for 
the modern professional had some support. 
“I believe if you’re going to [try to] learn from history, why would you only learn 
from the last 300 years?  Why wouldn’t you learn from 10,000 years?” (Gilbert, 
2010). 
 
The literature review conveyed a sense that military history in particular was the foundation 
that professional military education should be built upon because a study of it helps reveal the 
hidden constants in warfare. However, whether professional military education should be 
restricted to a study of military history was challenged. 
 “It needs to be much more than military history – it needs to be good economic, 
social, political and cultural history and it needs to be continually updated and revised 
as our understanding of the past evolves. Too many professional military education 
references are outdated historical works overtaken since by more comprehensive and 
systematic research and analysis” (Goldrick, 2013). 
 
Other conversations challenged even the need for a historical grounding to professional 
military education; sociology, anthropology, and psychology reoccurring as key disciplinary 
foundations for a programme of study (Chan, 2011).59 An important feedback on the idea of 
canon was ‘mission relevance’ as a determiner of a key text.  
“The classics by Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Huntington, etc. are all important.  They 
provide some insight into the enduring tenets of conflict and military civilian relations 
that assist in putting the complexities of the profession of arms in war and peace into 
context for all rank levels However, one must also target specific and contemporary 
works based on the type of conflict one is anticipating or involved in” (Horn, 2012).    
 
As Gray (2012, p.56) has pointed out, the primary value of a canonical work like On War to a 
military professional is not the intellectual challenge it presents in deciphering what 
Clausewitz meant in his own time, but rather how guidance can be drawn from the work to 
assist in conceptualising the problems of our own day.  
                                                 
59
 Lt-Colonel Kim-Yin Chan (retired), SAF-NTU Academy, Singapore. 
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“I think that the value of a good acquaintance with Sun Tzu and Clausewitz cannot be 
overrated. Perhaps one would like to add Thomas Schelling. However, this does not 
belong to the academy level but to the staff college level” (Van Creveld, 2012). 
 
Seniority, ideally, would imply that the rank had been gained through a variety of 
meritocratic measures including a degree of intellectual sophistication. However, the reality 
for many senior officers is that some of the ‘key’ works are difficult to grapple with. 
“There were certain books that have to be on the list even though a lot of people don’t 
read them.  People refer to them all the time.  Every time they do an essay on naval 
strategy, they refer to Mahan; but he’s a very difficult person to read” (Gilbert, 2010). 
 
Chapter Seven appeared to reveal a distinctive, if mutable, military canon. While my 
conversations have, to this point, endorsed the idea of canon, cross-referencing our tables 
from the analysis of the reading lists against the classics repeatedly cited in the interviews 
shows up a diverging opinion on the content of that canon. This prompts the question of what 
purpose does canon serve and is to merely state that something is a ‘classic’ enough to 
warrant its mandate as a ‘must-read’. 
“I am not comfortable that ‘canon’ is appropriately identified or explained. Many 
more caveats need to accompany the various works and much more time needs to be 
spent reading the works themselves as well as trying to understand the purposes for 
which they were written. Clausewitz is a particular victim of the selective quotation 
and out of context syndromes, as is Corbett in the maritime domain” (Goldrick, 2013). 
 
The dominance of the reading lists I have examined by land-warfare classics give the 
impression that the canon on and from the other services is slight and that, in comparison to 
land-based forces, naval professionals, for example, do not tend to commit their professional 
wisdom and experience to paper.  
“Oh yes? Sorry, don’t agree. I can provide a very long list of thoughtful memoirs and 
commentaries from the Royal and Australian Navies in WWII, for example…from 
very, very senior officers…[and] more junior professional commanders…I’d point the 
bone in a different direction – too many outside the naval service don’t make 
sufficient effort to look at what is available” (Goldrick, 2013). 
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Mirroring the ‘culture wars’ debate in literary studies discussed in Chapter Four, this 
prompts the idea of the military canon to be considered through its overt or orthodox form, 
and through its forgotten or ‘hidden’ form. 
The ‘hidden’ canon 
In Chapter Six, with Sun Tzu’s injunction to ‘know thy enemy’ in mind, I considered the 
importance of, and possible issues with, engaging with the literature from ‘the other side’. 
My analysis of the reading lists showed the predominance of literature from the Anglophone 
world on the reading lists we studied, even those from non-Anglophone countries.  
At the beginning of this research, spurred by engagement with a key text from the guerrilla 
warfare canon by Indonesian General Nasution (McElhatton, 2008a), one of the questions I 
was curious to address was whether there were ‘hidden’ veins of indigenous military canon 
that remained unknown or little known, to ‘Western’ scholars. My engagement with 
Malaysian officers allowed me to explore this question of a hidden canon. When the armed 
forces of the then newly emergent nations in S.E. Asia were educating their officers, was 
there an indigenous literature or more culturally compatible literature that supplanted the 
previous hegemonic literature of the colonising power? 
“We were only exposed to the American and British literature and literature from 
other sources only if it was translated” (Ghazali, 2011). 
 
After a half-century of independence would an indigenous literature have developed or be 
nascent? 
“Most of the reading material still comes from foreign sources.  I’m not sure if there 
are any indigenous books and materials except at the very tactical level” (Alagappa, 
2010). 
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Outside of the purely military, it might be expected that economic growth, the burgeoning 
university system in the region and a rapidly growing, educated middle class would see the 
development of an indigenous literature of relevance to professional military education. 
“Most books and theoretical models come from outside. Not much good management 
theory for example comes from [Malaysia]…Before you can have your theory 
accepted you must produce a book. Before you can teach something you need a book. 
So, for the theory component, it still comes from the U.S. or U.K.” (Arafin, 2011). 
 
My analysis of the reading lists across services and countries revealed the dominance by texts 
with an Anglo-Saxon provenance. As seen in Chapter Seven, An examination of the 
Canadian Forces (CF) reading lists provided an opportunity to test this, the CF being 
relatively unique in the West in having two national languages English and French, both with 
strong traditions of martial thought. From that perspective, I posed the idea that much 
important military theory, experience, and wisdom is closed off from the Anglophone world 
through Anglo-centricity and a consequent underfunding of translation activity. 
“Availability of material is always an issue, the biggest piece being you don’t know 
what you don’t know. Knowing what foreign works, particularly in French, are of 
value is probably the greatest impediment. CF senior officers are by decree required 
to be bilingual so the actual reading part is not a problem. Having said that, I would 
be happy if they simply actually read the English work available” (Horn, 2012). 
 
While some palpable sense emerged that the cultural dominance of the U.S. and the lack of 
funds for, or interest in, translation services have led to a disinterest or devaluing of the 
importance of ideas/texts from other cultures – including those within the West e.g. France – 
it was also hard to escape the reality of the linguistic dominance of English in military capital 
internationally. 
“Unfortunately there is no doubt about the dominance of English. We may not like it, 
but there you are. In today's world, an officer who does not know English well enough 
to read a book and write a review of it might as well be blind, deaf and dumb. Dumb 
above all, I suppose” (Van Creveld, 2012). 
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Could it be that English is the current military lingua franca and all writers of interest or 
worth must publish in English to gain both legitimacy and an audience for their ideas? 
Fiction 
During my initial encounters with the reading lists, I was interested in the inclusion of works 
of fiction in the lists. While fiction can easily be understood as an enabler or catalyst for 
further reading – e.g. reading military themed comic books when younger can be a precursor 
to a deep later engagement with military history (Zaidi, 2011) – the value of fiction in and of 
itself might not be so apparent, especially when precious time might be better spent engaging 
with more ‘serious’ texts? 
“Although totally dependent on the quality of the “fiction” it can help with creativity 
and arguably vicarious experience.  Also, it can assist with knowledge attainment - 
often novels will describe the functioning of certain technologies or equipment, as 
well as terrain and geopolitical realities.  It also helps with understanding human 
behaviour…to a degree” (Horn, 2012).   
 
Some of the works of fiction60 have been on lists like the U.S. Marine Corps’ for over a 
decade. Strongly encouraging consecutive cohorts of soldiers to engage with the same 
specific works might reasonably result in some cultural or psychological impact, some shift 
in thinking.  
“I think it's a very subtle influence.  I can't say that this book or that book's changed 
how the Marine Corps thinks overnight.  One of the books you'll hear staff NCOs 
refer to is A Message to Garcia…when telling a Marine to go get something 
done…Gates of Fire also has had a strong influence.  I noticed the Spartan concept 
has been adopted by several units to the point where even now one of them referred to 
the wives as the Spartan women.  That was a moment of pride for them…that [their 
wives were] their strength” (Arvizo, 2010). 
 
So, these cultural memes and emotive common reference points aside, is professional 
development through active engagement with works of fiction a common endeavour or one 
likely to develop? 
                                                 
60
 While Message to Garcia is not strictly a fiction title – it belongs more strictly to the ‘inspirational literature’ 
bucket – it has a fictive quality that leads the author to bracket it as fiction.  
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“We have a small collection and I would say we have the things that you might 
expect, like ‘Red Badge of Courage’, and we’ve got the Clancy novels…sometimes 
people will donate their fiction as they leave the barracks, so if I think it is appropriate 
I will put it in the collection.  There is a random volume of poetry or two here or 
there.  But that is very small.  We don’t necessarily list [works of fiction] in our 
bibliographies.  I wouldn’t expect to see fiction or a novel on one [the U.S. Army War 
College] reading lists…it is not that fiction isn’t used as a teaching tool but it is not 
something that is we would list. Occasionally [faculty] access [fiction] for academic 
work, but rarely” (Shope, 2011). 
 
Engagement with the same text by a large body of professionals might be expected to evince 
some form of collective cultural change over time, particularly if the text is written, like most 
good fiction is, with the aim of arousing emotions over and above the information-imparting 
role non-fiction might confine itself to. 
Coda 
Overall my conversations served to emphasise the importance of quality educational 
administration and learner-centric, pedagogically-sound instructional design in professional 
development policy and practice.  
“[The professional military education system] goes in cycles. It depends on the 
curriculum in the various schools at the time. There has been a tendency to 
overcrowd, but I’ve seen commandants, at Fort Leavenworth for example, reverse this 
and change the curriculum fundamentally so there is more time for reading, thinking, 
reflexion, and writing. It depends on the level of the school and on the leadership 
within the education system” (McMaster, 2012). 
 
While my initial approach to this research inquiry emphasised the autonomous conception of 
self-directed learning, the conversations presented a more symbiotic conception of learning, 
one more akin to that suggested by Livingstone, where the distinctions between one mode of 
learning or another were ‘fuzzy’; our conceptual models, in other words, begged scrutiny in 
terms of relevance and application.  
Despite the circumspection regarding professional development I have encountered, it is 
difficult to escape the sense that the Janowitzian notion of an elite within an elite, is a truism. 
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“I feel that they are sharing in the classrooms, books that they have read and they are 
recommending. Our [commandant] right now will identify books that he thinks that 
people should read. We have people who are sharing and it is just a real wonderful 
learning environment here. I think [the officers] are concerned about their 
professional development and this is their chance to really [grow intellectually] while 
they are out of the field and while they are here and in this studying environment. 
They really have a lot of reading to do. But that is really beneficial” (Shope, 2011). 
 
An ever-present concern during our inquiry was whether my research questions were ones 
which I could actually, and convincingly, answer. As highlighted from the beginning of this 
thesis, due to its incremental nature, self-development is something inherently difficult to 
measure.  
“I think [professional reading] is one of those things you’ll never have a quantitative 
answer to. It is something you could ask a broad range of officers with recent 
operational experience about…ask them how they draw on what they learned through 
self-study…through these sorts of reading programmes…that may be revealing to a 
certain extent” (McMaster, 2012).  
 
And then there is the question of the actual impact of much professional reading. 
“However much you produce reading lists the tendency in an unreflective mind is 
simply ‘so but I've read that – What's next?’ I've ticked the boxes.  I know it like a 
parrot. It doesn’t mean I know it to understand it or ask questions about it or to 
examine it critically” (Strachan, 2009). 
 
And what of the effectiveness or utility of the reading lists themselves? 
“You know, my worst fear is that we sit in an ivory tower and make these dictates, 
everyone on the fleet just pooh-poohs them and goes on with their lives” (Arvizo, 
2010). 
 
Despite the prevalence of reading lists, professional military education programmes, courses 
etc., the question of what it is to be educated returns. While ‘being educated’ or, more 
usefully, being ‘wise’ may be identifiable at an individual level, decisions like whether to go 
to war – and the ends, ways and means of such an endeavour – are taken in group or 
collective contexts. Does the mass, collective long-term study of subjects like military history 
have an impact on the conduct of war? 
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“It’s really frustrating, makes me sad. I was ranting before I left Afghanistan that we 
should just scrap every strategic studies programme or anything to do with military 
history because we just don’t pay attention to it” (McMaster, 2012).  
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CHAPTER TEN: DEVELOPING THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL  
Introduction 
In this first of two discussion chapters, I consider the findings in relation to the broad themes 
of my conceptual framework. These are leadership, professional wisdom and the modern 
warrior, the education of military leaders, and the acts and arts of reading and critical 
literacies. In Chapter Eleven I complete the discussion by considering my findings in relation 
to the more specific topics we have raised relating to professional military reading and the 
military reading lists.  
Leadership, professional wisdom and the modern warrior 
Ellyson et al. (2012) note that militaries are not only at the forefront of developing quality 
leaders, but they have also long been the testing ground for many different leadership theories 
(p.8). In the course of conducting this research I encountered a significant amount of 
literature on the military perspective of leadership. The professional military reading lists I 
have studied can themselves be interpreted as syllabi for the non-formal study of leadership. 
My research did not aim to investigate or propose a model of military leadership. That is a 
line of inquiry for further research. However, the question of leadership models does have 
some relevance to this research topic. 
In our research on Chinese leadership (McElhatton and Jackson, 2012), we used a conception 
of Barney and Zhang’s (2009) to distinguish between ‘a model of Chinese leadership’ or ‘a 
Chinese model of leadership’ (McElhatton and Jackson, 2012, p.444). The first approach 
focuses on applying and refining theories developed elsewhere in a Chinese context. This 
envisages researchers using modern business and political practices in China to test and 
refine general and universal theoretical models. The second approach focuses on creating 
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explanations for the existence of Chinese leadership phenomena that are uniquely Chinese. 
Barney and Zhang (2009) see this approach as a rejection of ‘a research agenda created by 
Western scholars in favour of a research agenda created by Chinese scholars’ [emphasis 
added] ( p.15). 
My review of the literature on military leadership, and the research interviews and analysis of 
the reading lists has highlighted a similar dichotomy. I have encountered, or had described to 
me, ‘models of military leadership’ where generic theories are applied in a military context, 
and ‘military models of leadership’ which seek to understand the phenomenon of military 
leadership from a uniquely martial perspective. That this distinction matters has come clearly 
through, particularly through its highlighting of two distinct approaches to officer education 
and professional reading.  
In the ‘models in military leadership’ approaches I have encountered, generic professional 
development opportunities – i.e. ‘mainstream’ university courses including MBA and Public 
Management – are encouraged and accepted as competency-enhancing career options, and 
readings from the business management literature, and the genre of popular non-fiction 
typified by writers like Malcolm Gladwell, are promoted as having ‘something to say’ to the 
profession of arms. 
In contrast, the ‘military models of leadership’ approaches encountered have little truck with 
this approach, their emphasis on the distinctions of the military profession manifesting as a 
belief in military professional development opportunities – i.e. traditional staff and command 
colleges – and readings from the syllabus genres directly applicable to the profession of arms. 
Even where there is some overlap between the two inclinations – i.e. in the increasing value 
placed on the engagement in post-graduate research – the inclinations are further 
distinguished by the focus of the research – i.e. pursuit of topics relevant to the military 
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profession broadly considered versus pursuit of topics directly related to war and warfare at 
the tactical, operational or politico-strategic level. 
This begins to highlight a flaw in my conceptual framework. Conceiving a model through 
which to examine professional reading in the military, I have framed military officers in a 
homogenous manner, and thus neglected to factor in that officers fill a variety of roles within 
contemporary militaries, the management of legalised violence being only one of them. Thus, 
combat proximity, either actual or through professional inclination, is an important 
differentiator to factor into my analysis.   
In his examination of the U.S. Army’s disastrous performance during the WWII Battle of 
Kasserine Pass, Alexander (2000) asserts that “leadership explains the differences in the 
performance of nearly all armies at all times”, arguing that the outcome of battles and 
campaigns is more dependent on the decisions of commanders, than on the attributes or 
supporting matériel of the soldiers (p.180). Emphasising as it does “great man” or trait-based 
models, from a theoretical perspective, this assertion appears rather antiquated, and certainly 
in contradiction to much contemporary leadership research on, and by, the military that 
emphasises transformational (Hardy et al., 2010), charismatic (Antonakis and House, 2013) 
and even spiritual leadership (Fry et al., 2011). 
I have encountered in the literature, and in interviews with some of the more ‘managerial’ 
inclined officers, something of a disjunct between the ideal and reality of military leadership. 
Piccolo (2010) notes an almost latent idealism in the leadership models presented in the 
academic literature. Noting that the vast majority of leadership studies have focused on 
positive aspects such as how leadership can contribute to organisational effectiveness, 
individual work satisfaction, etc., Larsson et al. (2012) have added to the growing academic 
literature on negative or destructive leadership through research in the context of military 
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leadership in the Swedish Armed Forces. While studies into destructive leadership might be 
relatively novel from the context of leadership or organisational studies, it can be argued that 
these are common in military history. For example, both Nye (1986, ps.99-107) and 
Alexander (2000, ps.181-7) have shown examples of the relative prevalence of career 
sabotage by peers in the military, that corroborate anecdotal accounts during the research. 
The literature review also highlighted self-aggrandisement, narcissism and other similar 
personality flaws in many of the notable leaders of our initial study period.  
This brief discussion inclines me to agree with Cowper (2000) that, rather than there being a 
single military leadership model, leadership in the military is a fluid and ever-evolving 
conception, the profession incorporating what has been proven over time to be effective into 
contemporary contexts and practices, modifying and building upon changeable ideas, and 
rejecting those that are becoming “antiquated and outdated” (ps.229 & 243). 
Professionalism 
In Chapter Five I consider the evolutionary and discriminatory aspects of the military 
profession. These are important, this inquiry, having, as I have emphasised, a practical and 
pragmatic concern in accord with the prevailing intellectual demeanour of the officer class 
(Klinger, 2004). However the findings have indicated that a more teleological perspective on 
professionalism is required to understand the phenomenon I have studied.   
In the literature review I made reference to Aristotle, particularly the conception of practical 
wisdom found in the Nichomachean Ethics. In the Ethics, Aristotle expounds his belief that 
everything in nature has a distinctive ‘end’ to achieve or function to fulfil (Stumpf, 1966, 
ps.105-6). An object, process or activity is teleological when it exists for the sake of an end, 
or telos. Aristotle distinguished between two major kinds of teloi; instrumental and intrinsic. 
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Instrumental ends are acts done as ‘means’ for other ends, intrinsic ends are acts done for 
their own sake (Stumpf, 1966, p.105).  
Instrumentally, each profession has an ultimate telos, the ends, and final ‘good’ of one 
profession differing from those of another (Aristotle, 330BCE/1906, p.11). Strategy has long 
been concerned with understanding the “dynamic relationship” between ends and means 
(Freedman, 2002, p.338). The telos of a profession provides insight into the theoretical 
construct that shapes and influences the practical application of its values by its members 
(Walter, 2007). The literature review considered Moskos’ (2000) typology of the dominant 
military officer roles in the modern, late-modern and post-modern eras, typified by the 
combat leader, manager/technician, and soldier-statesman/soldier-scholar types respectively 
in each period (ps.14-16).  
For Moskos (2000), the dominant professional teloi were: for the modern era combat leader, 
the defence of the homeland and defeat of enemy invasion; for the late-modern era 
manager/technician the support of alliances and the management of nuclear war; and, for the 
post-modern era soldier-statesman/soldier-scholar, the leadership of new mission roles such 
as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and the management of subnational or non-state 
political violence (p.15).  
The research data and literature has shown the impact of this teleological dominance on the 
design and focus of professional military education at any one point in time, this despite 
research like Downes’ (2000) pointing out that armed forces will represent a mixture of these 
role models, and that changing trends in the international operational environment, 
technological factors, and the prevailing strategic imperatives of individual countries and 
services will impact on the balance of roles in the military and the dominance of any one 
particular type (ps.191-2).  
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The complex array of intellectual skills my quantitative and qualitative findings have shown 
as being essential for military competence “matures in quality and grows…throughout a 
person’s lifetime through adulthood into old age” (Elliot Jacques quoted in Zais, 1985 pp.91-
2). In a military context this development has been studied by the U.S. Army Research 
Institute for Behavioral and Social Science which plotted the cognitive development of 
leaders across their careers and organisational context.  
Over the course of a full career, assuming steady promotion, the officer progresses from, at 
platoon command level, a cognitive state applied to hands-on direct work with objects and 
people in task execution, through to service level strategic command concerned with creating 
complex systems, organising strategic resources, and extrapolating system needs (Zais, 1985, 
p.93). In between these two career poles, the cognitive application develops from one wholly 
concerned with defining direct work and planning and controlling aggregates of tasks, to 
brigade leadership when a transition is made away from direct command to roles where the 
time-span of discretion moves from relatively short timespans, to multi-year and generational 
spans of projection (Zais, 1985, p.93). This would indicate that the teleology of the officer at 
a particular point in their career would correspond with the teleology of the professional 
military education and its institutions oriented towards that officer grade.  
However, the research interviews showed that the teleology of a particular rank (e.g. captain) 
requires an education that does not necessarily prepare one for the teleology of another role. 
This teleological consideration of professional military education has been shown to be 
important by my interviewees. As indicated in Chapter Eight, it was oft mooted that by the 
time officers get to strategic command and haven’t had necessary intellectual preparation for 
that level through appropriate professional reading; it is too late.  
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Intellectualism in the military 
In Chapter Five I introduced Janowitz’ (1960) typology of the Intellectual Officer and the 
Military Intellectual. For Janowitz the first was one who brought an intellectual dimension to 
their job, but where this intellectualism was held in check by the needs of the profession. In 
contrast the military intellectual was one whose attachments and identifications were 
primarily with intellectuals and intellectual activities. Janowitz thought the second were 
fundamentally unsuitable for higher command (pp.430-5). 
I ‘road-tested’ these two typologies and noted that they didn’t resonate with my interviewees. 
When used in the same context however, the term ‘warrior-scholar’, a term with more 
romantische than rational connotations, slid into conversation so fluidly that it seemed innate 
to the topic and context.  
Though somewhat akin to Janowitz’ construct of the Intellectual Officer, it is easier to 
understand why the idea of the ‘warrior-scholar’ has more resonance; it embraces the 
tradition, symbolism, and history of the military in a way that Janowitz’ construct – 
conceived when the Eisenhower-era nuclear doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ was pushing 
technocratic/managerial skills to the forefront of military priorities (McMaster, 1997, Payne 
and Walton, 2002) – does not. 
Both the documentary analysis and interviews reinforced the impression from the literature 
that the ideal of the warrior-scholar is a venerable one in the military (Petriburg, 1895, Clyde, 
1964, Dunne, 2003, p.260), the stylised Greek helmet61 I mentioned earlier having been 
appropriated by the U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps as “symbolic of the ancient 
civilizational concept of the warrior scholar” (ROTC, 1994). The term has enjoyed a 
                                                 
61
 I became consciously aware of Greek and Roman memes like the Greek helmet and the owl of Minerva when 
I started noticing their reoccurrence on book jackets, insignia, military art and multimedia. On one occasion, 
during an interview with a senior commander, the discussion on the intellectual dimension of command was 
given new meaning by the portentous presence of a large Greek helmet statue on a nearby shelf. 
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resurgence in usage in recent years within the land-forces (Moskos et al., 2000b, Reed and 
Efflandt, 2001, Horn, 2011) and in the media (e.g., Tisdall, 2007, Bohan and Stewart, 2011, 
Boteach, 2012). Used most prominently in the U.S. in relation to figures like Generals 
Petreus (Harris and Beaumont, 2007) and McChrystal (Beaumont, 2009), the depiction is 
used to suggest more than simply high qualities of command; it signifies that here is a 
‘thinking soldier’, one able to bring new ideas, innovations, and solutions to a conflict; one 
able to cut through ‘the fog of war’. 
 
Figure Twenty-three: The Greek helmet as meme for the military arts 
Despite the resonance of the term with my interviewees, its application in the literature is at 
odds with my findings. As Field (2013) notes, the typology has been used to magnify the 
contribution of a small group of figures to military change, those who were adept at high 
profile bureaucratic and political maneuvering, and thereby marginalising the contributions of 
the many others who implemented and adapted those new ideas and innovations in the field 
(p.129). This effect of emphasising “the thinkers” over “the doers” (Field, 2013, p.129) is at 
odds with the professional qualities and values expressed both in that same literature and by 
my research cohort. 
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Change and a ‘liberal education’ 
The term ‘liberal education’ frequently cropped up in the literature review and my data. The U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2010) have stated, “thinking about the future requires an understanding of 
both what is timeless and what will likely change” (p.4). In his commentary on the Spartan 
army, Ferrill (1985) highlights the display of most of the criteria of a professional standing 
army over 2,500 years ago (p.100). Complementary to this, writing on the most recent 
technological concern of strategists and policy makers, cyber power, Gray (2013) 
reemphasises the Clausewitzian lesson that, while the character of war does change, its nature 
is enduring.  
This tension between continuity and change, and the need of commanders to simultaneously 
grasp the enduring and the changing character of war, developed as a sub-textual research 
theme. However, while a historically and classically philosophical empathy presented in our 
dialogue within the combat-oriented data sets, it was not universally present or consistently 
articulated. This was reflected by the frequent, but inconsistent, use of the term ‘liberal 
education’ by my interviewees. 
I interpreted the advocates of a ‘liberal arts’ based education for modern officers as those 
who tended to consider humanities subjects and disciplines more conducive to the 
development of critical intellectual skills than the purer sciences or technical subjects. These 
advocates indicated that they considered that a professional military education focussed more 
on technological concerns was producing more narrow-minded officers. However, the liberal 
versus technological dichotomy was in marked conflict with the traditional definition of a 
liberal education. 
As Adler (1961) argued, a liberal education was not confined to particular academic subjects 
like those bracketed as the humanities or social sciences, but embraced any subject that could 
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develop the powers of “intelligence and imagination”, notably Mathematics and Physics 
(ps.105-6). Adler (1961) noted that, while liberal education did not aim to produce 
professional competence, a liberal education was indispensable for any intellectual profession 
(p.107). A point that can be derived from the data is that while the professional military 
education discourse frequently evokes the idioms of classical educational thought, it is 
actually still conceptually grounded in the disciplinarian divisions of the twentieth-century, 
what has been termed ‘Mode 1’62 thinking (Becher and Trowler, 2001, p.7). 
What the warrior-scholar typology also does not adequately reflect, something important for 
our consideration of professional reading, is what we can frame from an epistemological 
perspective. The epistemological perspectives we have interpreted from our data range from a 
humanistic, neo-Renaissance sensibility, to one more inclined to a neo-Enlightenment 
scientific rationalism. This distinction is completely absent from the warrior-scholar 
typology, and does not align with Janowitz’ typology. 
The humanistic sensibility I encountered in the course of the research has something of the 
Renaissance ideal of the Homo universalis to it; the ideal of an individual acquiring learning 
in a wide variety of subjects or fields to develop his or her potential, not only in all areas of 
knowledge but also in physical development, social accomplishments, and the arts (Watson, 
2006, ps.525-550). This ideal derived from the past and future facing characteristic of the 
period in which it developed. Humanism can be defined as a “system of thought or action 
which is concerned with merely human interests”, merely serving to explicitly exclude 
abstract concerns (Ayer, 1968). Typified in military thought by theorists such as Machiavelli, 
the humanistic focus is on the here and now, in the temporal, not the metaphysical, and 
                                                 
62
 In contrast to ‘Mode 2’ thinking which emphasises the importance of interdisciplinary approaches to inquiry 
(Becher and Trowler, 2001, ps.7-9). 
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advocates a close study of the ‘classical’ past to provide insights towards the challenges of 
the present. 
In contrast, the neo-Enlightenment scientific rationalism I have observed has a much more 
contemporary purview. From this perspective, science and technology combined with rational 
thought and the power of the individual provide limitless possibilities for humanity going 
forward (Frampton, 2008). From this perspective, while ‘the past’ has relevance, it is only the 
near-past from which we can draw insightful lessons. That this was the perspective of 
Clausewitz (Bragg et al., 2012) gives an interesting twist to the consideration of relevance. As 
Bragg et al. (2012) note, despite the exhortation of his key referent Napoleon to learn from all the 
great captains of history, Clausewitz drew his understanding of war from a near exclusive 
consideration of the immediate past. Apart from the obvious question that poses for the continued 
relevance of the author’s own work, the example of Clausewitz illustrates the historiographical 
dimension to the depiction of the intellectual typologies and the consideration of the utility of 
history in professional reading.  
Practical wisdom 
The characteristics of phronesis as articulated by the ancients that we saw in Chapter Three 
have stood up to scrutiny during the research as the very modern traits, skills and 
characteristics commonly articulated as those necessary for leadership in complex 
organisations and environments like the military. The embeddedness of the concept of 
wisdom in the military ethos revealed itself in many fashions, the related concept to 
phronesis, noesis or ‘nous’ being a term that cropped up in the literature, interviews and 
analysis of the lists. 
The importance of the notion of wisdom in war comes through strongly throughout the text of 
Ricks’ (2006) Fiasco, an important primer on the planning and execution of the 2003 
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invasion and occupation of Iraq.63 In an important passage regarding the failure of the 
strategic political leadership to consult with or listen to the practitioners, an interviewee 
observes that, “these are educated men, they are smart men. But they are not wise men” 
(Ricks, 2006, p.99).  
While the notion of wisdom as a tangible and, importantly, an attainable and not 
exceptionally singular phenomenon was clearly articulated in the literature and interviews, 
there was little precision or clarity about what ‘it’ actually was, and how ‘it’ was developed 
or attained. The need for clarity – the perennial endeavour to ‘define wisdom’ (Trowbridge, 
2005) – may therefore be important for this inquiry because, as my findings have indicated, 
the teleology of professional military education could be described as developing wise 
commanders.  
If this is the case, the cognitive end point – i.e. practical or professional wisdom – needs to be 
comprehended so educational design can then determine how it is best reached. In this sense 
then the professional development of a modern warrior could be considered in terms of an 
apprenticeship not an education. This would firmly align my conception of wisdom in the 
practical, locating our teleology of the intellectual development process as a means toward 
practical application, in this case decision making, rather than as speculative or contemplative 
aptitudes for their own right. While this corresponds with the phronetic over the sophistic 
approach I aligned this inquiry to in Chapter Three, it raises some further conceptual 
problems both in general and specifically for our consideration of professional reading.  
I have framed the wisdom debate as one between the idea that wisdom is identified with 
abstract contemplation and one in which practical application to good ends is its truest, and 
                                                 
63
 Ricks’ analysis presents a damning picture of the strategic-level political and military leadership of the period. 
Of the operational leaders examined, Ricks cites as highly effective and successful USMC General Mattis, and 
US Army’s General Petraeus and (the then) Colonel McMaster. Mattis and Petraeus were both frequently cited 
by interviewees as exemplars of warrior scholars.  
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most attainable, manifestation. Dumain (2003) identifies the fundamental logical problem of 
this discussion as the mix-up of unity and distinction, in which unities are assumed where 
distinctions need to be made, and distinctions are assumed where generalisations ought to be 
made.  
Dumain (2003) identifies a variety of positions adopted in the consideration of wisdom, 
individually or in combination. They are that: wisdom and abstract thought are inseparable; 
wisdom and abstract thought are two different things; theory and practice are inseparable; 
theory and practice are separable; theory is legitimate without regard to practice; practice is 
legitimate (wise) without regard to theory; theory is only legitimate with regard to practice; 
and practice is only wise with regard to theory.  
Dumain (2003) asserts that while the question of theory and practice is not identical to that of 
abstract thought and wisdom, it raises the same issues. Wisdom may refer to knowledge, 
understanding or judgment alone, or in connection with action/practice. While the conflation 
of the abstract thought/wisdom question with the theory/practice question obscures the 
question of possible roles for non-theoretical intellectual judgment – e.g. informal reasoning 
and intuition – he reasons that as humans are not automatons, we cannot engage in any 
practice without some kind of thinking (Dumain, 2003). 
While these are, on the surface, somewhat abstract considerations, they capture the plurality 
of attitudes towards, and conceptions of, professional development generally, and 
professional reading particularly I encountered in this research. This can be seen in the 
differing considerations we experienced of what constituted ‘experience’ i.e. something 
conceptually restricted to active participation as against the broader acceptance of vicarious 
experience. We will pick this thread up again presently. For the moment however, this leaves 
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our consideration of professional wisdom in some ontological limbo. Maxwell (2013) 
provides an out. 
Criticising the academic focus on defining the term, Maxwell (2013) refutes the assumption 
that wisdom has some kind of “essential nature” that is capable of being captured through 
‘correctly’ defining ‘wisdom’ (p.94).  He asserts that the search for “what is wisdom?”, is 
some academic wild goose chase, the ‘what’ of wisdom in all probability being something 
dependent on context and purpose. It is, he asserts, up to the individual or group to decide 
what, precisely, they choose to mean by wisdom, depending on what the particular purpose is 
at hand (Maxwell, 2013, ps.94-5). Provocatively, Maxwell (2013) states that what needs to be 
appreciated is that there can be no such thing as the correct definition of wisdom: the search 
for it is the search for something that does not exist (ps.94-5). Qualifying this, he asserts that 
wisdom is merely a technical term; shorthand for ‘good’ or effective thought and deed.  
Considering the discussion to this point, we begin to encounter what Argyris and Schön 
(1976) identified as a critical issue in organisational learning; the clash between espoused 
theory – what we say we are doing – and ‘theory in use’ – what we actually do. Rogers 
(2004) argues that, for a variety of reasons both benign and vested, in education, what 
educationalists and institutions do may on occasion contradict with what they say, or even 
what they believe they are doing (p.6).  
My research findings to this point highlight a tension between the military’s interest in the 
academic soundness of its approach to intellectual development, ‘the ways and means’, on 
one hand, and the utterly pragmatic focus on practical outcomes, or ‘the ends’, on the other. I 
will further consider this emerging theme by discussing the divide the findings have 
highlighted between academic and professional military models of educational development. 
247 
 
Educating military leaders 
I have stated that my interest in the differing conceptions of ‘education’ developed as a 
fundamental component of my investigation in the role of professional reading in the 
development of military leaders and leadership and that these conceptions guided, though did 
not explicitly form, the direction of my questioning. Broadly framed, counterpointed were the 
questions ‘what education is’ versus ‘what education does’. Related to the second was the 
question ‘what it is to be educated’.  
These questions underpin much of the long philosophical discourse regarding the theory and 
praxis of education (Schofield, 1972, ps.30-5). Pring (2000) considers that the key 
consideration in any education-related research is to first clarify the general usage of the term 
and second, the different ways in which the term is applied, especially in its evaluative sense 
(p.12). For Pring, ‘education’ is a contestable notion. This is because, while the concept is 
value-laden, those values differ across individuals, groups and societies (p.11). Both the 
qualitative and the quantitative findings, overtly and obliquely, highlight the contestability of 
education generally, and specifically in the context of professional military education.  
Schofield’s (1972) account of the contested etymology of the term education – whether the 
term comes from the Latin educere, ‘to lead or bring out’, or from educare, ‘to form or train’ 
-  is illustrative of the issue (ps.32-3). My examination of the reading lists revealed differing 
conscious or unconscious motivators for each list’s construction. At least one list, comprising 
a number of contemporary titles from one ideological perspective and source, could be 
interpreted as having an indoctrinarian pedagogical approach. Exposure to only such limited 
range of sources would have a reinforcing effect on weltanschauung at the very least.   
While being ‘educated’ surely implies more than being a repository of ‘facts’, a correlation 
might be drawn between being educated and being ‘knowledgeable’, knowledge assumed to 
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be something more than an accumulated set of individual pieces of information. For Wilson 
(2010) knowledge is about “concepts as the elements of understanding”, these elements 
combining into theories regarding aspects of the presenting world. For Wilson, these theories 
in turn can develop into models “that constitute operational representations of our 
understanding” and, in turn, combine to produce “intelligence, capabilities and critical 
thinking” (p.3).  
Like much debate in education, Wilson’s conception is itself contestable. What it does point 
to, the purpose of his argument, is the need for professionals to have a breadth of 
understanding – interdisciplinarity – and a depth of understanding – deep rooted ability to 
confront problems, recognise them for what they actually are, and “select the appropriate 
elements from our conceptual toolkit” to address them (Wilson, 2010, p.4). This emphasis on 
the importance of developing knowledge or being educated in breadth and depth was 
endorsed by our findings, and is echoed by Sir Michael Howard (1961/1993) in his celebrated 
essay on “The Uses and Abuses of Military History”, Sir Isaiah Berlin (1953/1977) in his 
evocation of ‘the hedgehog and the fox’, and Zaccaro et al. (1992, p.326) in their 
investigation on the social intelligence of leaders.  
Rogers (2004) highlights the difference between the ‘exchange value’ and the ‘use value’ of 
education, a related issue to the above, and one that resonated in my research conversations. 
At an individual level, the former is a form of schooling that is primarily aimed at 
qualifications. Knowledge is sought to pass an exam, learning is pursued to get a job. At an 
organisational level, the exchange value is where an institution exists to provide instruction. 
In contrast, the use value perspective focusses on education to do a job. Here the learner 
pursues knowledge for its own sake, enjoyment and utility and institutions exist to produce 
learning (p.56)  
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The ambivalent relationship of credentialisation to professional development was a strong 
theme of this research. The pros of credentials are that, for the employee, they add an extra 
incentive – the attainment of formal qualifications - to engage in professional development 
(Hayden, 2007), and for the employer they provide a benchmarkable measurement for the 
employee’s professional development progress. On the contra, by becoming an end in itself, 
the pursuit of credentials obscures the purpose of education and, as Barone and Ortiz (2010) 
note, credential inflation creates employment conditions where tertiary degrees may be 
requested for some occupations, even though they are not really needed to perform the 
corresponding job tasks, with accompanying negative impacts on productivity and job 
satisfaction (ps. 3 & 14).  
So, is this drive to study part of a ‘virtuous’ cycle of learning and credentialisation – one 
driven by a sense that it actually makes a difference to one’s ability to command – or is it, as 
it is perceived to be in the civilian world (Zumeta, 2008), just another set of boxes to tick to 
get ahead in one’s career? As has been mentioned, militaries have long been pioneers in 
education (Masland and Radway, 1957, Barnett, 1967, Shelton, 2001, Hirai and Summers, 
2005) and with so much time and capital invested in it, it is not surprising that participation in 
formal military education is linked to career progression. 
The relevancy of the credentialisation debate is summed up by Dore’s (1976) comment that 
“not all schooling is education; much of it is mere qualification-earning” (p.ix). A pernicious 
effect of education inflation is where the relative ‘value’ to an individual of particular levels 
of qualifications declines, making it necessary for individuals to gain ever higher levels of 
qualifications simply to attain the same levels of professional reward (Rogers, 2004, p.47). 
Ironically, Richardson (2004) found that workers with higher qualifications were those also 
most likely to engage in formal and non-formal education and training (p.17). There may be a 
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link between this and the paradoxical notion that a trait of the truly educated is that they 
never see themselves as truly educated and so are constantly engaging in self-developmental 
activities. This has parallels to Socrates’ (Plato, 399 BCE/1984) realisation that the Oracle 
thought him wise because he knew that he did not know (ps.69-73). 
This takes us closer to the central focus of this research which will be addressed in the next 
two sections of this chapter. I have framed my focus narrowly as the role professional reading 
plays in the development of military officers. Returning to the conceptual framework, this 
can also be expressed more broadly as the role self-development and non-formal education 
plays in the enhancement of the critical literacies necessary for command. I will first discuss 
critical literacies before concluding this chapter with a discussion of my findings regarding 
self-development and non-formal education. 
Critical literacies 
This thesis has set out to explore the role professional reading plays in shaping and 
developing a military officer’s ability to make effective decisions for command. In a general 
sense then, it is fundamentally a question about learning, or more specifically, how does one 
learn to command for, and in, conditions of war. Thus framed, this question seems fully 
formed. Not so, for, while the constituent parts of the process I was considering were clear, 
the point of the process was temporarily and unconsciously eluding me.  
To elaborate, my early focus was on the cognitive dimension of military leadership, the 
thinking bit. Previously, research on the notion of strategic thinking in a military context had 
led me to explore the role professional reading played in the purely cognitive development of 
officers. For the initial part of the research the lens of inquiry was thus metacognitively, or, 
more correctly, meta-strategically (Zohar and Ben David, 2009) focussed; I have been 
‘thinking about thinking’, assuming that superior modes of thought in and of themselves were 
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what separated the leadership ‘wheat’ from the leadership ‘chaff’. This focus on the 
‘thinking’ component is a Clausewitzian approach to the study of military leadership, one that 
has as its keystone skill ‘strategic thinking’, pre-eminently an activity of the mind (Kennedy, 
2010, p.16).  
However, as the research developed, both the literature review and data collection revealed 
the stark differences in approach from the purer academic appreciation of speculation as an 
end in itself, and the professional consideration of thinking as merely a means to an end, that 
being the making of good decisions. Critical literacies are thus inherently bound to the 
practical, or phronetic, form of wisdom. Two primary critical literacy related questions were 
posed to me during the research interviews. The first asked, somewhat rhetorically, whether 
there was a tension between the need for critical thinkers in the military and the need to 
maintain authority and discipline in such an authoritarian environment popularly conceived. 
The second asked, if this paradox can be resolved, how does one actually go about 
developing these skills? 
Researchers from within the military, like Thomas (2006) in Australia and Simons (2009) in 
New Zealand, have highlighted the tension that exists in formal military education 
programmes that, on the one hand, espouse the values that underpin the principles of classical 
liberal education (i.e. debate, free inquiry, Socratic dialectic, challenging ‘all-comers’) yet, in 
practice, often default to more top-down or ‘instructive’ pedagogies. 
Added to this is the seemingly paradoxical demand for officers who are simultaneously 
critical thinkers and obedient to the chain of command. The interviews revealed some 
bemusement almost at the juxtaposition of liberal educational ideals with military education 
imperatives and academic enquiry with organisational discipline. However, the substance of 
this juxtaposition might be superficial and/or situational, and is certainly not a new concern. 
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The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century views were that an educated, thinking soldier was a 
danger to military discipline, itself based on conformity and blind obedience (Durflinger, 
2005). The question of whether higher education is a threat to military skills was much 
debated in the Cold War era (Jordan, 1971, p.240), a debate that remains current in some 
countries and cultures into the present era. This debate is fuelled by a perceived scepticism 
within military culture toward an ‘intellectual community’ with its characteristic anti-military 
values (Lindemann, 2006). Much of the overt discourse within the military also accentuates 
the perceived dichotomy between ‘thinkers’ and ‘doers’, articulated as a tension between the 
academician’s “why?” and the commander’s need to make, or commonly, act on, decisions.  
However nicely this may play to popular stereotypes, and, within British military culture 
historically there has been a tendency to play up to this stereotype by a certain breed of 
officer, this line of thought has little substance to it. For one, as I have shown in the literature 
review, warfighting as a primarily intellectual activity has been fundamental to the 
prosecution of command since ancient times. Secondly, this understanding has 
simultaneously driven and demonstrated the rich tradition of literature, theory and intellectual 
debate within the broader military community. 
Interpreting the data, I have inferred that the real concern about the threat of higher education 
within military circles is political; military professionals, particularly in ‘the West’, are 
sceptical about a politicised higher education sector where hostility to the military as an 
institution is commonly held, and military approaches as legitimate responses to certain 
problems are commonly derided (Downs and Murtazashvili, 2012). While this may be an 
oversimplification of the issue, it is not a fallacious one.  
So, taken that the development of critical literacies are important, how does one actually set 
about doing this? A message consistently articulated in the professional literature, the reading 
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lists, and the qualitative interviews was the importance of fostering higher order generic 
attributes like critical thinking and problem solving in officers. While generic attributes have 
long been considered integral with the development of content knowledge in many 
disciplines, the last two decades has seen the development of these generic attributes in and 
of themselves identified as an explicit pursuit of higher education (Jones, 2009). The research 
confirms Jenkins’ (2012) summary of the research on educating for critical thinking. Though 
higher education emphasises skills like critical thinking across disciplines, many students 
cannot effectively utilise this skill and that while critical thinking exists in the curricula of 
institutions, there is disconnect between what is taught and what is practiced (p.95). 
Despite the importance given to the development of generic attributes in higher education 
policy, Jones (2009) found that they often existed as espoused theory, rather than as clearly 
articulated teaching practice, their degree of being embedded in a programme of learning 
varying according to the disciplinary culture in which they are taught (p.176). As we have 
seen, this difference between espoused theory – what we say we are doing – and ‘theory in 
use’ – what we actually do – was identified by Argyris and Schön (1976) as a critical issue in 
organisational learning. Rogers (2004) argues that, for a variety of reasons both benign and 
vested, in education, what educationalists and institutions do may on occasion contradict 
what they say, or even what they believe they are doing (p.6). The findings validate these 
points. 
For one, the tension within professional military education between the espoused aim of 
fostering generic attributes and teaching disciplinary content was highlighted. Added to this 
are the quality pressures that come from the quantity of content the typical military syllabus 
is required to cover. However, as Jones (2009) points out, the reasons underlying the barriers 
to teaching generic attributes are many and reflect the practical constraints on teaching in 
contemporary higher education and on the complexity of generic attributes (ps.188-9).  
254 
 
While the practical constraints are significant, underpinning this is the fundamental nature of 
attributes such as critical thinking and problem solving as integral to disciplinary thinking. As 
Willingham (2007) shows, the nature of critical thinking explains why it is hard to do and 
teach, recent cognitive research suggesting that skills like critical thinking cannot be taught, 
the process of thinking being intertwined with the content of thought. Willingham asserts 
that, in fact, critical thinking is not a set of skills that can be deployed at any time, in any 
context and is dependent on domain knowledge and practice. Because of their fundamentally 
contextual nature, critical literacies are part of the discourse of disciplinary knowledge. 
Considering generic attributes as separate from disciplinary knowledge, and hence, in 
competition with it rather than integral to it, is at the heart of the problem (Jones, 2009, 
ps.188-9). 
If this is the case, it brings us once more to our reoccurring question of the importance of the 
past. A once dominant view, but one we have experienced to be increasingly under attack, 
held that the study of military science combined with a study of the military arts in the form 
of quality military history sits at the heart of an officer’s intellectual development. We can 
conclude that this view seems supported by the argument that the development of generic 
attributes like critical literacies are inseparable from the development of domain knowledge 
and practice. My interviews revealed something of a wooliness regarding the conception of 
critical literacies when discussed in the abstract. When discussed in the military context of 
historically referenced or experiential practice, the conceptions solidified into something 
articulable and achievable.  
Self-development 
I introduced my topic by recounting how my interest in self-development, non-formal 
education and professional reading grew from a study of senior commanders of the WWII-
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era, particularly Generals Kippenberger and Patton and how they developed their command 
skills in the experiential vacuum that was the inter-war period. 
While their focus was on formal military schooling, the pioneers of the sociological study of 
the U.S. military, Masland and Radway (1957), concluded that a major focus of formal 
military education was to “push that particular button” within each officer that enabled them 
to continue their education under their “own steam”; formal education served the military by 
stimulating the habits of mind, attitudes and intellectual curiosity that would determine 
whether a “genuine interest in continued self-education” was acquired (Masland and Radway, 
1957, pp.509-10).  
My concept of self-development has been challenged throughout the research process. The 
research topic evolved from an encounter with the autodidactic habits of a New Zealand 
officer, to a consideration of the developmental reading habits of a range of martial and 
political figures like Patton (Dietrich, 1989), Montgomery (Hamilton, 2001), Jefferson 
(Lehmann, 1947), and Hitler (Ryback, 2010), before encountering the artefact of the 
professional military reading list and the ‘Great Books’ programme of Hutchins and Adler. 
The early working title for our thesis was, “Autonomous, self-directed reading and the 
education of military officers”; but this became problematic the further the research 
progressed.  
In his examination of Epicurus and the Epicurean tradition, Erler (2011) has highlighted the 
long-argued paradoxes in the relationship of self-education and external instruction and the 
proper relationship between innovation and the commitment to authority. Similar questions 
arose in the lead up to, and during, my full proposal presentation. Essentially, the question 
was how to reconcile the idea of autonomy within the framework of a formal, career-driven 
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professional education system and the notion of self-directed within the context of an 
institutionally developed and approved book list.  
As Erler (2011) points out however, there may not actually be a diametrical issue here. For 
the Greeks, there was no conflict between the idea of self-development and the presence of 
outside instruction. Adler’s (1940) reference to books as ‘dead teachers’ complements this. 
Fisher and Fisher’s (2007) consideration of the phenomenon of the autodidact is interesting 
for this discussion for a number of reasons. Firstly, in their definition, “an autodidact may 
well access some formally taught learning, but that this would be an adjunct to a largely self-
driven and highly accelerated learning process” (p.516). This conforms to my initial 
conception of self-development.  
Secondly, their study provides useful insights into “accelerated critical learning” (p.156) as 
well as into ways in which learning as a social process has changed over time. Thirdly, their 
two study loci – 1930s British Communist Party activists and a group of contemporary cyber-
learner/activists – provide interesting parallels to two focal points we have earlier considered; 
the education of ‘non-professionals’ we considered and the future of reading in a digital era 
our interviewees have raised. 
Finally, through both their definition, and their acknowledgement that the concept of 
autodidacticism is “deeply problematic”, Fisher and Fisher (2007) show us that any study of 
the effect of self-development through professional reading is extremely difficult where the 
research subjects are also developing through formal and experiential learning processes. 
This is the case with the overwhelming majority of our military professionals today (p.515).  
An old dilemma in vocational training discussed with many employers over the years is 
whether to ‘spend time and money training employees and then they leave, or not train them 
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and they stay.’64 Goldrick (2013) has noted that, while the ‘Generation Y’ of service 
personnel have “a thirst for self-improvement and for gaining qualifications”, this can often 
be with an eye to careers outside the service. The trick, he notes, is to encourage study 
programs that meet both the individual and the service need. This can only be done within a 
mentoring culture that individualises officer career streams and educational pathways and 
encourages “an interior intellectual life”.   
During my initial reading a figure relatively unknown today kept appearing as a pivotal figure 
in the personal and professional development of Generals Patton, Marshall and Eisenhower. 
U.S. Army General Fox Conner recognised and recruited talented subordinates, and 
encouraged and challenged those protégés to develop their strengths and overcome their 
weaknesses (Cox, 2010). The literature frames him as a mentor par excellence.  
The importance of mentor-teachers like Fox Conner to organisational learning in the military 
has cropped up throughout the research (Alatiff, 2011, Jones, 2011, Zakaria, 2011). 
Throughout our literature review and qualitative analysis we were presented with the belief 
that when a leader embraces the mentor role, a virtuous cycle of learning develops and that 
mentoring is the crucial factor that transforms an initiative like a reading programme from a 
professional development token to an effective tool for organisational learning. Lloyd (1950) 
notes that under the British regimental system, the responsibility for education lay in the 
hands of the unit commander, usually a Lt-Colonel. This, and the differing needs of each 
regiment, meant that British army education was varied (p.54). The glaring lack of a British 
Army reading list that fulfilled the pan-institutional function of the U.S., Australian or New 
Zealand versions reflects this tradition. 
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One final point regarding self-development – its relationship to ‘experience’ – should be 
mentioned. This point takes us back to the taxonomies of education I considered in Chapter 
Five. It will be recalled that the model most commonly encountered in our interaction with 
the military was the ‘professional development model’ which broke professional military 
education into the four distinct conceptual strands training, experience, education, and self-
development.  
As noted, while the model presented a conceptually neat typographical representation of 
professional military education, it neither captured the complexity of the learning process nor 
did it adequately reflect the ‘whats’ and ‘wheres’ of education. Moreover, for our study, 
professional reading, particularly when driven by a reading list, did not neatly fit into the 
schema. 
The priority that should be given to experiential learning and, more fundamentally, what 
constituted ‘experience’, were two common points of debate during this research. The more 
polarised line on this held to the simplistic idea that experience is to education as practice is 
to theory, there being an innate dualistic line that divided human phenomena into separate 
speculative and active, or cerebral and physical, domains. This presented a hermeneutic 
challenge, the overt language or cultural text of our cultural members needing ongoing 
interpretation, reflexion and reformulation of understanding to elicit a sense of the actual 
relationship our subjects understood between these stark concepts experience, training, 
education, and self-development. Gadamer provided guidance: 
“The whole concept of practice has been distorted by the modern concept of 
theory…as an instrument for explaining reality. But theory is an attitude of human 
beings, an attitude which demands a great deal of self-control and 
discipline…Theory…is a form of human practice; practice is not to be seen as the 
application of theory”. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer (Boyne, 1988, p.29). 
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Despite the frequent inference within single interviews that dualistic norms were rejected in 
favour of an appreciation of the ‘fuzziness’ of the human condition, it became apparent that 
the older, simpler typologies from models like the professional development framework were 
so ingrained in professional discourse that the tropes surrounding their application to 
education and training slipped easily and unconsciously into dialogue, thus shaping the 
debate; a case of the trope wagging the debate, so to speak. 
Beneath this surface dialogue, I interpreted the thrust of the military conviction that it was not 
experience per se, but an admixture of simulated and vicarious experience that was the surest 
teacher of the military arts. This line of reasoning is supported by the classic literature on the 
theory of war. The later Marshal Foch (1903/1918) was critical of the school of military 
thought that saw experience as the surest teacher of the military arts. For one, he noted that 
war – the only context that could truly be deemed ‘experience’ – was a school that “can 
neither be opened at will, nor kept going for the benefit of our learning” (p.5).  
Secondly, he posited that the actual conditions of war preclude learning ‘on-the-job’. In the 
presence of an enemy, and the turmoil produced by that enemy’s blows, “one does there 
simply what one can in order to apply what one knows…in order to do even a little, one has 
already to know  a great deal and to know it well” [italics as the original] (Foch, 1903/1918, 
pp.5-6). Noting the quip on Marshal de Saxe’s mule,65 Foch stated that war should not be 
embarked on without first having rigorously studied it through critical reflection (p.5). It is 
instructive that the ancient Chinese philosophers believed that wisdom was learned by three 
methods; while reflection was the hardest, and imitation the easiest, experience was 
considered the costliest.  
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 “A mule” said Marshal de Saxe, “that made twenty campaigns under Caesar would still be but a mule”. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: PROFESSIONAL MILITARY READING 
Introduction 
In this chapter I complete the discussion by considering my findings in relation to the more 
specific topics I have raised relating to professional military reading and the military reading 
lists.  
Reading for leadership 
Our appreciation of what constitutes a ‘leadership text’ is challenged by the books we 
identified in the analysis presented in Tables Four, Five and Six in Chapter Seven. On face-
value, Keegan’s The Face of Battle for example, ubiquitous to the studied lists, presents itself 
primarily as a history text, albeit one with a particular focus on the physical and 
psychological dimensions of war. However, on re-reading this work, it quickly became 
apparent to me, as clearly apparent as it is to the lists’ compilers, that Keegan’s opus is, at 
essence, a work on leading and being led in the most extreme of human contexts. Whether 
overtly or covertly, this essence of leading and the led pervades the books the military has 
acknowledged authority in through their inclusion on the reading lists.  
The reading lists provide us with an interesting counterpoint to the broader public debates to 
where leadership resides in an organisation. The popular/populist leadership literature comes 
in a variety of genres, autobiographies (e.g. Giuliani’s Leadership) or ‘lessons from great 
figures’ (e.g. Axelrod’s Elizabeth I CEO) being some of the more common. The popularity of 
these tomes and their focus on CEOs, top athletes, Prime Ministers etc. suggest that 
leadership as popularly understood resides at either the strategic level of organisations or at 
the ‘fame’ or ‘big money’ segment of society. In contrast, the core or exemplary military 
readings on leadership the lists recommend focus on or exemplify the “sharp end” of military 
leadership (Hackett, 1983, pp.215-228), located at the tactical or small unit level. 
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The contemporary public notion of leadership itself is challenged too by the books’ 
contextual focus. The lists are strong on tactical or small-team leadership, the realm of the 
Corporal and the Major.  While leadership consumers from outside the military show no 
inclination to discard their biographies of cultural icons or Fortune 500 CEOs, the 
hierarchical balance presented by the military lists could only be mirrored if civilians were to 
equally value the leadership lessons of the mailroom and maintenance shop as they do the 
boardroom and executive office.   
Howard’s (1997) definition of ‘leadership’ may be the key here to understanding the 
difference between military and civilian conceptions of leadership. For Howard (1997) 
leadership is most essential “at the lower levels of command where danger and hardships are 
greatest”, the role of the upper hierarchies – command – being something more detached, less 
personal, more managerial (p.117). The reading lists confirm this view. Related to the locus 
of leadership is what the lists can tell us about authorial authority. 
A finding of interest to leadership educators is the varying degree to which books on 
management, leadership and their directly related domains from outside the military 
environment are valued as core developmental texts by the reading lists. As illustrated in 
Figure Twenty-one (Chapter Seven), my analysis of author provenance overwhelmingly 
points to one conclusion – authority in matters pertaining to military leadership, broadly 
defined, is invested in those authors, serving, retired, or civilian, who are members of the 
military ‘inside’.  
As Costley, Elliot and Gibbs (2010) have highlighted, learners in a particular vocational or 
workplace culture often approach their proposed educators having internalised questions like 
“who speaks and why?” and “who speaks for whom?” (p.39). The mistrust, albeit possibly 
unconscious, of the military profession’s confidence in ‘outsiders’ ability to educate them on 
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leadership is palpable.  It is evidenced that authority, when it comes to leadership education, 
is invested in serving and retired professionals, and those rare civilian scholars who, like 
Keegan, have so long nested in the branches of the old oak, that they have become more 
military minded than the military themselves.  
This said, the reading lists give us a window into the evolving and contentious question of the 
military’s conception of itself and its function. This is illustrated by the emerging focus in the 
lists on the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency constabulary functions that Kitson 
(1971) dubbed ‘low intensity operations’. As the military role changes, new conceptions of 
authority may emerge, and arguably did in the 2000s when the elevated importance of the 
cultural dimension of war gave the work of anthropologists and scholars of religion new 
cache among practitioners (McFate, 2005, Lucas, 2009), and led to debates about the 
“weaponisation” of disciplinary knowledge (Price, 2011). 
The language of books 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) noted that the strong linguistic and ideological connections 
between Anglophone countries enables the rapid transmission and adoption of ideas among 
institutions in those countries. The common reference framework of military knowledge that 
the professional reading lists help distribute exemplify this. 
A significant finding from the reading list analysis was the relative homogeneity of the purely 
military works recommended across service, national and linguistic boundaries. While the 
most commonly recommended contemporary (i.e. post-WWII) leadership text across the 
lists,66 John Keegan’s The Face of Battle (1976), is a work primarily about the English 
experience of war, the work has transcended the national and is seen to speak to the common 
human experience of war. While the transnational military endorsement of the value in the 
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 Twenty-two of the sixty-eight lists cite it, putting it just behind the most cited text, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, 
with twenty-three citations.  
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study of the publishing phenomenon that is Sun Tzu’s Art of War is harder to explain and 
requires further future research, it indicates that the speculative or philosophical approaches 
to the study of war are considered important. Thus far, the findings on the homogeneity of the 
lists indicate that a common ‘core canon’ of globally acknowledged authoritative military 
texts may be discernible.  
Significantly, the contemporary portion of this emerging canon has Anglophone origins and 
spreads to the non-Anglophone militaries through translations and their members’ facility 
with the English language. Prior to this cultural shift, which began sometime prior to WWII, 
the predominant body of modern military literature from Machiavelli and De Saxe, through 
Jomini and Clausewitz, to Foch and Von Der Goltz, sprang from outside the English speaking 
world (Howard, 1965, Luvaas, 1965) and entered the Anglophone body of knowledge 
through the translations of British and American scholars and the officer corps’ natural 
faculty with European languages.  
The research has indicated a worrying trend towards further entrenchment of Anglo-origin 
dominance of the professional military literature. From the Anglophone ‘side’, the end of the 
Cold War spelled a dramatic reduction in funding for translations into English (Shope, 2011); 
from non-Anglophone cultures, particularly Asian, there appears to exist a degree of bias 
against the value of their indigenous literature (Zaidi, 2011) or the development of their own 
indigenous methods of, and perspectives on, inquiry (McElhatton and Jackson, 2011a).   
The reading lists do reflect individual cultural nuances in other ways, however. The mingling 
of works on philosophy and high literature (e.g. Kant and Goethe) with the more mainstream 
military fare on the Bundeswehr list reflects broader German educational values that 
emphasise creativity, close reading of texts, a broad education, critical thinking and the 
German tradition of Bildung, or ‘self-cultivation’, which emphasises the overall formation of 
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the individual and includes development of attitudes, views and values (Reichelt, 2009); the 
French military’s unique obliviousness to Anglo-American business management literature in 
their list tells us something about that nation’s public sector values and national psyche 
(Amis, 2009, Kodeih, 2013); while the ambition inherent in the Singapore Armed Forces’ list 
seems an extension of their national ‘study and succeed’ ethic (Leong et al., 2013). 
The British colonial origin of a number of the national defence forces has left a ‘residue’ on a 
number of reading lists. Some indigenous works on the Indo-Pak Wars aside, the Indian lists 
that were studied have a WWII-era Commonwealth forces campaigns focus. Considering the 
concentration of the Indians on the possible eventuation of a major conflict with its Western 
neighbour, the campaigns of the North African theatre may still have some practical 
relevance. Given Ireland’s long-standing policy of neutrality, that this could also be the case 
operationally for the Irish Army is moot. It is only by considering the roots of the Irish Army 
in the old Irish regiments of its British parent, and the historical tradition of Irish soldiery in 
the armies of Europe and the new world, that the intellectual gravitation becomes 
understandable.  
A final cultural twist to the intellectual influence of the British was revealed through my 
engagement with the military in Malaysia. During a week-long study tour to the National 
Defence University and the Royal Military College, Malaysia, and primed with a prior 
interview with Malaysian defence academic Muthiah Alagappa (2010), my general research 
focus was supplemented by a side-bar question; was there an indigenous Malay67 body of 
literature comparable to the Chinese and Indian strategy classics that was an influence on 
modern Malaysian strategic culture? With great honesty and stoic pragmatism, the answer 
delivered was “no”. My research conversations emphasised the bedrock that British military 
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 The term Malay, rather than Malaysian, is used here both to acknowledge that the ethnic Chinese and Indian 
denizens of the region have a prominent body of martial literature to reference, and to highlight my interest in 
the impact of  traditional literature on the strategic thinking and culture of a country. 
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literature, particularly that of the WWII struggles with Japan and the post-war counter-
insurgency campaigns of ‘the Emergency’, played and plays in the education of Malaysian 
officers. The influence of the counter-insurgency literature was particularly pronounced, the 
ethos and language of the ‘hearts and minds’ strategy being revealed as the assimilated 
strategic culture of the modern Malaysian military. 
Ultimately however, the contemporary cultural distinctions across modern militaries globally 
are minor in contrast to the homogeneity of approach to professional reading influenced by 
what could be termed the intellectual hegemony of the United States military. My research 
has shown that the contemporary artefact of the professional military reading list is an 
American progeny, the contents of individual reading lists to a greater or lesser extent 
influenced by both local drivers and the universalising cachet and ubiquity given to particular 
texts by their inclusion in the ‘mother-lists’; the reading lists, notably those of the U.S. Army 
and Marine Corps, that set reading trends in other services and other nations. 
I arrived at this conclusion in two ways. First, individual list compilers over the course of our 
research told us so. Secondly, from my initial encounter with the New Zealand Army’s 
Professional Reading Programme in 2007, through my consideration of lists in Australia, 
Asia, Europe and North America, I have traced a process of development, implementation 
and revision of individual lists that follows trends led from institutions in the United States. 
That the U.S. is intellectually dominant in contemporary military thought and education 
should be of little surprise. That a staple of the U.S. compulsory education system - the state 
education board-mandated reading list - has, through its adoption and export by the military 
products of that system, become a common feature of professional military education around 
the world is certainly a quirk of cultural diffusion. 
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An Inclusive Canon? 
In the discussion on canon, I note that canon can serve to reinforce the existing 
weltanschauung of its compilers and consumers. Outside some of the reading lists I have 
examined where reinforcement, if not indoctrination, seem the conscious objective of the 
author, the literature has led me to conclude that translation (or, more correctly, lack of) is the 
chief obstacle to the engagement of militaries with works outside of their particular cultural 
purview. The apparent lack of cultural bias (in a nationalistic sense) among students of 
military affairs is apparent when we consider that, in the field of strategy, the widely 
acknowledged masterworks are from China, Greece, Italy and Prussia (Gray, 2009). The 
popular four-volume Roots of Strategy (Phillips, 1985, Anon., 1987, Anon., 1991, Jablonsky, 
1999) series reproduces the translated works of authors from what we know today as China 
(1), France (3), Germany (6), Italy (2), as well as Britain (1) and the United States (2).   
While some of the authors in the Roots of Strategy series are somewhat obscure today – Book 
Three’s (1991) German trio of Generals von Leeb, von Freytag-Loringhoven, and Erfurth for 
example are infrequently cited in contemporary literature –the majority continue to proffer 
much food for thought for students today.68  A question raises itself: is the continuing impact 
and relevance of these, and other, works of non-Anglophone provenance solely due to their 
intrinsic quality, or has their translation into English, and the corresponding non-translation 
of other works of possibly intrinsically equal power, facilitated their canonical status, 
particularly today in the Anglo-dominated sphere of information provision and 
dissemination?  
I am challenged to consider this question by leading Brezhnev-era theorist/practitioner 
Savkin (1972) in his review of influential Russian military literature. Tracking the 
development of pre-Soviet Russian military thought from the late seventeenth-century, 
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Savkin précises the theories of Rumyantsev, Suvarov, Kutuzov,Khatov, Medem, Astaf’yev 
and Leyer to cite a few (pp.11-39).   
Despite Savkin’s compelling arguments for the importance of these theorists, and in some 
cases their foreshadowing of the theories of the better known Clausewitz and Moltke (p.13 & 
p.28), ‘Western’ authorities on the history of military thought like Van Creveld (2000), Gat 
(1989), and Handel69 (2001) make no reference to them. While the Soviet-era military 
theorists, including Frunze, Tukhachevsky, Shaposhnikov, Yegorov, Kork, and Uborevich, 
that Savkin (pp.39-46) précises get somewhat better attention in generalist (as opposed to 
Soviet-focused) histories of military thought, the active engagement with their works are 
minor and, like their pre-Soviet antecedents, there appears no great desire among Western 
students of military thought to raise the works of these Russian authors to canonical status 
(Blank and Weitz, 2010). 
To return to the question I have just posed, is there something intrinsically inferior about the 
works and authors that Savkin cites, or are there other factors at play? Regarding the pre-
Soviet authors, it may be that the prevailing unfamiliarity of non-specialists in the ‘West’ 
with the theatres they operated in – the Western, Southern, and Eastern borders of the 
expanding Russian Empire – and the campaigns they fought – against the Ottomans and 
Caucasians for example – (Davies, 1997, pp.653-4, 739, 869-70, & 1277) renders the context 
of their thought less accessible, and therefore relevant, to students of military affairs brought 
up to glow at the mention of the campaigns and battles of, say, Marlborough, Frederick, or 
Napoleon. More importantly perhaps is the lack of access to their works in translation.  
The omission of Soviet-era authors from the Western military reading lists is, however, on 
any analysis astounding. As Blank and Weitz (2010) argue, the “most profound”  military 
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 Admittedly Handel is quite explicit in his intent to focus predominantly on the writings of Sun Tzu and 
Clausewitz. 
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thinkers of the 1920s and 1930s, and the 1970s and 1980s were the Soviets thinker-
practitioners (pp.1-3). They pinpoint the reason for this omission, wearily noting that, due to 
falling post-Cold War interest, the funding is simply not available for the translation and 
study of ‘irrelevant’ theorists (Blank and Weitz, 2010, p.2). My research interviews confirm 
this (Shope, 2011). A corpus of potentially universally relevant theory is therefore being 
neglected because of the currently perceived strategic irrelevance of its Motherland. Applying 
the same logic across the canon would surely lead us to question why print works of French, 
or Italian provenance, and British if its tongue wasn’t the lingua franca of strategic 
conversation. 
The points I have made in this section lead to the question of whether there exists a common 
canon of key texts vital to the intellectual development of military professionals. 
A common canon? 
My initial considerations of a military canon were influenced by Gray’s (2009, 2010a) 
assertion that a strategist’s judgement can be greatly improved by an intense study of a 
handful of key texts. On initial analysis, my examination of the professional military reading 
lists has seemingly revealed the existence of a dominant suite of texts that, individually, 
services and national defence forces considered important enough to recommend or mandate 
as key texts for an individual’s professional reading and development and value as 
‘professionally canonical’. However, the validity of the notion of canon in our professional 
context became apparent as I explored the idea across temporal, geographic, cultural, service 
and professional contexts through the interviews and analysis of the professional reading 
lists. 
My discussions on ‘canon’ have elicited a nuanced variance in attitudes towards the idea of 
key texts. Academics in the defence space were more inclined to endorse the notion of 
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‘canon’ and see ‘authority’ as a permanent state. Practitioners, however, were more utilitarian 
in their reading and attachment to particular works, authors or ‘classic texts’. The only 
authority they perceived as being relevant was that to their proximate needs and context. 
Textual ‘authority’ was expressed as having a transient quality. Furthermore, as the defence 
community collectively confronts the rapidly changing character, if not the nature, of war in the 
twenty-first-century many military theorists and practitioners are questioning the continued 
relevance of classical military theorists such as Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu, and others 
(Andersen, 2012). Ironically, and further underscoring his enduring vitality, the questioning of 
the relevance of the far past and its chroniclers was a fundamental position of Clausewitz himself 
(Bragg et al., 2012). 
One of the core problems associated with a military canon from a professional perspective is 
utility through accessibility. While largely supportive of the aim of professional reading lists 
in the military, many interviewees were critical of their application. Many noted that, in their 
experience, the issue was not caused by the failure of officers to attempt to read some of the 
more challenging texts mandated in the lists, but a combination of a lack of guidance the 
officers receive about what is key in those books, and the sheer difficulty of reading many of 
the texts themselves, their intellectual provenance residing in a milieu distant and foreign to 
the average junior officer. A common refrain was that it was one thing to tell an officer to 
read a book, but quite another thing for that officer, in most cases a company grade officer of 
limited practical experience, to grasp some of the important concepts of those books and be 
able to determine what is in them that is relevant and applicable to their own immediate 
challenges. 
This emphasis on the utilitarian function of the lists as professional development tools is 
reflected in the process of compromise used to develop the lists I have instructional design 
data on. The effective lists – effective as in their ability to engage a range of professional 
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readers – could be described as inhabiting a ‘zone of compromise’ between an ideal and 
reality. The ideal conceives professional reading in the military as a quest to get to the heart 
of the complex phenomena of war; it is the pursuit of wisdom. The real however recognises 
that wisdom is arduous and its pursuit is stalled by poverty of time, attention deficit, and the 
average intellect and pre-education of the average officer. Designing an effective list is, 
therefore, an exercise in ensuring a sufficient spread of texts across the reading challenge 
spectrum, from conceptually orientated to more narratively framed works. 
A further challenge to the notion of a professional canon came from within the canon itself.  
As Rahe (2006) and Waldman (2012) emphasise, both Thucydides and Clausewitz are less 
interested in telling their readers what to think than in teaching them how to think (p.99 and 
p.358). A consideration of the differing intellectual, social and technological contexts in 
which both theorists developed challenges us to consider if ‘how to think’ may no longer be 
the exclusive domain of the non-fiction book. 
Complementary to many professional reading lists are recommendations regarding audio-
visual material relevant to the professional study and understanding of war. For example, The 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Crane, 2007) highly recommends the 1966 film Battle of 
Algiers as a “troubling and instructive” (p.391) guide to the application of French 
counterinsurgency doctrine in the Algerian war. Watching this movie recently for the 
umpteenth time, I have been prompted to ask myself if a book could provide better 
instruction. Having a personal interest in the history and development of firearms, my own 
knowledge of the topic has rapidly deepened by watching YouTube clips of modern 
enthusiasts demonstrating the use and effect of historical pieces. Now that media content70 is 
                                                 
70
 The availability of films, documentaries etc. aside, for professional development, the access online to leading 
institutional and conference presentations that previously were limited to attendees is an important advance. 
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exponentially more available, the reliance on older mediums for the prompting of 
professional debate is lessening rapidly. 
I noted the recommendation by the lists of works of fiction, notably science or speculative 
fiction, as key. For this research I read Card’s Ender’s Game (1977/1991), and re-read 
Heinlein’s Starship Troopers (1959) as recommended by reading lists in the U.S. and 
Australia. Approached for professional instruction, rather than pleasure, both works prompted 
critical reflection. Considering the abridged history of professional reading earlier presented, 
it can be argued that an important part of professional understanding is a reader grounded in 
the ‘stories’ of their profession. Like early warriors versed in the oral epics and sagas, and 
later readers grounded in the great novels and heroic adventures, modern genres, both textual 
and visual are the mediums for an enduring path to understanding. 
Noting historian Tom Holland’s (2013) view on the political and strategic lessons to be 
gleaned from the Game of Thrones series of books and TV dramas, a claim can be made for 
an ever-broadening range of ‘texts’ for our professional instruction. To dub these as ‘new’ or 
‘emerging’ canons would put paid to the notion of canon itself; to deny them the ‘accolade’ 
would make the notion of canon as something relevant, well, irrelevant. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE: ARE LEADERS READERS? CONCLUSION  
“Not all readers are leaders, but all leaders are readers”, Harry S. Truman (Gillen, 
2004, p.2). 
Introduction  
Following the presentation and discussion of my research findings, in this final chapter I 
conclude my research odyssey by presenting my key conclusions on the conceptual 
framework, highlighting the original contribution of this research, and considering the 
implications and limitations of the research as well as areas for further research I have 
identified.  
Key conclusions 
I set out to address three main research questions:  
1. What is the influence of professional reading-based self-development and non-formal 
education on the development of leadership skills in the military? 
2. Why and how are professional military reading lists developed, and what are their use 
and utility among their audience(s)?  
3. Is there an identifiable canon of key texts the military deem important to critically 
read for the development of leadership and command skills? 
As previously mentioned, to address these required my constructing and applying a 
conceptual framework to the topic. While I have already commented on the use of such a tool 
from the perspective of method, when addressing the research questions I need to make 
comment on the constituent parts of the framework, particularly where they have illuminated 
or clouded the analysis and findings. I summarise my conclusions by question order. 
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The influence of professional reading 
Although the research did not seek to prove the link between reading and the development of 
military leaders, such an approach being inconsistent with the methodological lens adopted, 
the research does however indicate, the many contingent variables at work considered, that 
professional reading in breadth and depth is as important a component in the development of 
military wisdom as is training, experience, and formal education. This conclusion is 
particularly supported through my exploration of the critical literacies and wisdom 
components of the conceptual framework. This conclusion can be worked towards from its 
expressed end state, the attainment of professional or practical wisdom. Thus: 
• the attainment of professional or practical wisdom by the individual officer is the goal 
of professional military education in all its formal, informal and non-formal modes 
• this form of wisdom can be described as the ability of the commander to make deeply 
informed decisions as presenting circumstances require 
• effective decision making is dependent on the development of critical patterns and 
habits of thought 
• this is dependent on a broad and deep knowledge of the ‘content’ of the profession 
• as we grow intellectually, we expand our horizon, through application or praxis, the 
practical decision making that puts knowledge to work  
• career-long professional reading, by supplying content in breadth and depth, clearly 
offers an important supplement to the professional content gained through formal 
education, training and experience. 
Central to the development of this conclusion is the hermeneutic notion of horizon, the range 
of ‘vision’ that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. For 
Gadamer (1960/1996), human inquiry is embedded in horizon, the limited perspective of the 
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individual’s history, language, or in our case, professional knowledge. An individual’s 
horizon shifts over time through the inter-related and inter-dependent processes of 
understanding, interpretation and application.  
In the ‘experiential vacuum’ much of the preparation for war is conducted in, training, 
experience, and education requires supplementation through critical engagement with war 
vicariously experienced through “the repositories of knowledge captured in past and present 
literary works” (Hirai and Summers, 2005, p.90). This horizon expansion or personal 
intellectual growth occurs during the development of an individual’s career. The horizon of 
individuals is constantly expanding through the dynamic informational interaction of groups 
and subgroups involved in professional dialogue. This dialogue is conducted between the 
broadly designated groups of serving officers, retired officers, civilian defence officials, and 
academics. Knowledge transfers from organisation to organisation through either the conduits 
of common language or translation.  
In their most developed form, professional reading lists present a curriculum for non-formal 
learning that, it being explored more gradually and incrementally than in the ‘crowded 
curriculum’ of formal programmes (Strachan, 2009), present a broader and deeper learning 
opportunity for the engaged learner. However, as illustrated by the U.S. Marine Corps 
programme, actually monitoring and measuring the impact of the programmes is tricky 
(Arvizo, 2010). 
Humankind has long understood that books, particularly when they concern such a 
fundamental subject as war, can be powerful things, especially in the right (or wrong) hands. 
At various points in history classic tactical and strategic works have been treated as powerful 
texts, access to them restricted to an elite few (Gat, 1989, p.23, Sawyer, 2004, p.17). While 
technologies come and go, there is something fundamentally unchanging in the human 
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dimension of warfare. To this point in history at least, the book has helped guide (parts of) 
humanity through both continuity and change. 
The nature of reading 
While Bloom (1994) and Manguel (1997), perhaps reflecting their personal characteristics 
and preferences, portray reading as a solitary activity, Hartley (2001) emphasises the long-
standing history of, and benefit from, reading as a group activity (ps.1-2). Hartley’s research 
into the phenomenon of the ‘reading group’ in the UK resonates for my research. While her 
focus is on group reading in a social/personal context, rather than one with a 
work/professional orientation, her findings highlight the role peers have in stimulating the 
reading habit or urge, and, importantly, the role group discussion on a particular text plays in 
discussion members’ ability to critically engage with a text and with other discussants’ 
conception of a text – the growth of their critical literacy skills in other words. Importantly, a 
reading list, developed by/for the group through a range of processes located at all points on 
the democratic/autocratic spectrum, is the lynchpin of most of the reading groups’ activities 
(Hartley, 2001). 
Hartley’s research (2001) serves to reinforce a key conclusion of this research: that rather 
than the autonomous, self-contained and self-directed activity I conceived at the beginning of 
this inquiry, reading in a professional context is, on average, an activity that is stimulated and 
enhanced through its incorporation in daily professional discourse. This research indicates 
that military reading lists and programmes that encourage and support group discussion, 
and/or insinuate themselves into the professional mentoring relationships between leader and 
successor, are those that will stimulate an enduring form of organisational learning 
independent of the presence of academically inclined or intellectually oriented individuals. 
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The development and utility of military reading lists 
Development 
I have examined the construction and implementation of the reading lists. Unsurprisingly, my 
findings revealed that the lists have been developed using a varied mix of structural, 
androgogical, and disciplinarian approaches.  
Structurally the lists vary from simple lists of books to sophisticated reading programmes 
supported by instructionally designed reading resources and digital enhancements. While a 
minority of the lists are on the ‘minimalist’ end of the structural spectrum, an even smaller 
minority are fully supported, the majority inhabiting a middle ground where the list is 
structured by topic and/or rank and annotations accompanies each reading recommendation. 
While the structure of each list is influenced by the organisational resources allocated to 
develop and maintain it, there are clear androgogical influences at work. The first, and most 
important of these, is the relative importance the particular organisation or sponsor gives to 
self-development and non-formal education. While the relative importance of self-
development through professional reading may be espoused, its relative resourcing in 
comparison to formal education programmes is indicative of the actual importance given to it 
in use. 
A second androgogical influence is the weighting given to the degree of challenge or 
accessibility that should be built into the particular books chosen for recommendation. There 
are both cultural and ideological dimensions to this. Culturally, the lists are reflective of each 
military’s wider societal values and norms regarding educational attainment and 
achievement. This can be thought of as the difference between believing one should push 
learners or coax them. Ideologically, the lists’ construction reflect varying degrees of 
278 
 
idealism regarding the need to pursue professional wisdom, and the reality that many officers 
have neither the inclination nor ability to pursue wisdom with the rigour it requires. 
The disciplinary influence on construction will most obviously be influenced by the 
disciplinary background of the individual or institutional list compilers – i.e. a list on 
leadership compiled by a military history institute will favour traditional military texts. 
However there is also an indication that the relative organisational encouragement or support 
given to the officer corps to engage in the academic study of non-traditional military 
disciplines – e.g. anthropology – has an influence on the considered relevance, and thus 
inclusion of, a broader range of texts. 
A final point regarding development relates to the method employed to select or reject 
individual texts. In many cases, it would appear that there is no method to speak of employed. 
Texts are recommended based on the individual compilers’ familiarities and preferences and 
group consensus is deployed to arrive at a final, manageable list. This approach seems 
susceptible to the ‘cachet effect’, where texts are included because of their perceived prestige 
and because ‘they always have been’. 
This approach is in contrast to the principles-based approach evident in the method used in 
the design and construction of many lists, from the deceptively simple ones, to those I have 
described as sophisticated. It is hoped that the ‘twenty principles for the development of 
reading lists’ this research has arrived at can be used to inform and improve the construction 
of lists globally, thus making them more effective developmental tools. 
Utility 
The primary utility of the reading list approach is as a means of promoting professional 
reading, particularly to assist officers: 
• prepare for a posting or campaign 
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• prepare for formal professional military education courses 
• aid developmental activities towards promotion 
• broaden general knowledge, and 
• cultivate professional military knowledge in breadth and depth. 
I have concluded that reading lists function as ‘shadow’ syllabi for the non-formal mode of 
professional military education, particularly to supplement the study, in breadth and depth, of 
military history, strategy and doctrine, the art of war, and leadership in command. This 
function is particularly important because of the ongoing impact on formal military education 
from financial constraints and the habit of diluting the formal programme content through the 
inclusion of additional ‘must have’ topics. On a positive note, the shadow function is 
increasingly important because digital technologies have made it possible to create rich and 
sophisticated reading programmes that can be accessed anytime or anywhere. 
A military canon? 
The question of whether there is an identifiable canon of key military texts has been the 
earliest and most enduring component of this research topic. The idea of canon has long 
intrigued me and, under the influence of a number of thinkers from both the politically realist 
and the educational perennialist perspectives, I incline towards the value and actuality of the 
concept. This acknowledged position or bias has made it particularly important for me to 
ensure objectivity and contingency were present as I laid out my final conclusions on this part 
of the topic. 
So, to the question, “is there an identifiable canon of key texts the military deem important to 
critically read for the development of leadership and command skills?” the conclusion is 
“yes, but...” I have arrived at this contingent position because, while the findings indicate 
there exists an identifiable set of key military texts, I now think that it is incorrect to label this 
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body of knowledge ‘a canon’. This is because of four interrelated points that I will elaborate 
on.  
• immutability of the key texts 
• the characteristics and utility of the military body of knowledge 
• a fault with the concept of canon. 
Immutability 
I came to the notion of canon via the perennialists Hutchings (1952) and Adler (1940, 1959) 
and their ideological kinfolks Downs (1983), Allan Bloom (1987) and Harold Bloom (1994), 
and O’Hear (2008). The influence of the idea of canon on the initial approach to this research 
topic is illustrated by the annotation scribbled on the frontispiece of the copy of O’Hear’s 
(2008) The Great Books in my library: 
Thesis – there is something in well written, human focussed, time & context 
transcending books that provide an intellectually active, motivated professional with 
tools/scenarios/lines of inquiry/diagnostic equipment/reference points etc. that 
facilitate decision making in complex contexts and environments. This provision is an 
important component of tactical and strategic wisdom. 
 
Written by me sometime in late 2009 or early 2010, it is revealing that this proto-abstract is 
written in a book that examines O’Hear’s pick of classical literature including Homer, Virgil, 
Dante, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Milton and Goethe.  
The idea of a military canon seemed to be supported by the writings of Colin Gray (1999, 
2009, 2010a) who suggested that there existed a “classical canon of strategic texts” (2009, 
p.48) invested with such intrinsic and timeless power, and fundamental and enduring 
messages to impart, that they could, and should, function as the core professional readings for 
officers and others with a professional or personal interest in understanding strategy and the 
phenomenon of war. Gray identified this strategy canon as the key work each of Sun Tzu, 
Thucydides and Clausewitz. Conceptually, I was using the ideas of classical realists like Gray 
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to apply the ideas of the literary canon onto the notional idea of a professional canon. This 
became problematic. 
Gray’s context was the education of strategists, a select set of uniformed and civilian 
positions within any national military. He was not claiming that there existed a tactical, 
operational or logistical canon, the realms in which the majority of military leaders would 
function in and be educated for. The notion of canon is traditionally applied to substantial 
bodies of time-tested literature. In relation to the notional military canon, beyond the realms 
of strategy, I could find little evidence to support the idea that there was a substantive set of 
immutable texts that spoke from the distant past to the tactical, operational or logistical 
realms of today. The majority of ‘key’ texts I identified were written in the twentieth- and 
twenty-first-centuries. 
The ‘yes, but…’ factor is that, yes, there exists a ‘canon’ of key time-tested works, but it is so 
small as to make it difficult to sustain the argument that it is a ‘canon’. To Gray’s Sun Tzu 
and Thucydides, can be added Caesar (c.50 BCE/2008), Machiavelli (1532/1999), De Saxe 
(1732/1985) and Frederick (1747/1985) and few others of more than purely historical interest 
before we enter the military literature of the Modern Era. 
Characteristics and utility of the military body of knowledge 
A further problem with the term canon came from its normal application to substantial works 
– treatises, novels, plays, epic poems, single author collections, etc. When I began this 
research, under the influence of Adler’s ‘Great Books’ ideals, I imposed a limit on the 
boundary of canon to books in their properly understood sense. Excluded from this were 
reference works and textbooks, essential as they are. Significantly, I also excluded journal 
articles, lecture notes, and other ‘texts’. This has proven problematic in three ways.  
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First, as my research journey has progressed, it has become increasingly apparent that one 
cannot meaningfully conceive of a ‘canonical’ body of military knowledge without referring 
to the rich lode of articles from venerable journals like Parameters, RUSI, or Military 
Review, or monographs and papers from research institutes like the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, the Strategic Studies Institute or RAND. 
Secondly, it has become apparent that, in contrast to the ‘great conversation’ of human ideas 
described by Adler (1940) and Hutchins (1952), ‘canonical ideas’, in a military context, do 
not solely disseminate via key text, but also, perhaps predominantly, through the interpreters 
and popularisers of these canonical ideas. The preeminent example of this is Clausewitz. I 
would argue that the overwhelming majority of interested readers approach, and begin an 
appreciation of, On War through secondary sources like those of Aron (1976/1983), Paret 
(1985), Bassford (1994), or Strachan (2007). Even a direct engagement with On War is today 
predominantly in the Anglophone world through the accessible Howard and Paret ‘Princeton’ 
translation, and its accompanying translators’ essays and the indispensable Guide to reading 
On War by Bernard Brodie. This edition provides the busy reader with a concise overview of 
Clausewitz’ thought without having to actually read the whole of the main text.   
Thirdly, despite these previous caveats, by expanding the boundaries of canon to include all 
texts of influence, one encounters a vista so vast as to be beyond the boundaries of easy 
codification. This point is illustrated by the lists I have studied that, by trying to be 
comprehensive, have become incomprehensible.  
A point should also be made regarding the inapplicability of the notion of canon to a 
professional context. Canon, particularly as envisaged by Bloom (1994) has at its heart the 
idea that certain texts are superlative in and of themselves – they have an intrinsic aesthetic 
value and their teleology is contemplative. In contrast, the professional audience I have 
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studied are more concerned with the utilitarian value of a text. Works may have an intrinsic 
aesthetic value, but their teleology must be both contemplative and for application. 
A fault with the concept of canon 
A final point, one that recalls my previous comment about the Princeton edition of On War, 
relates to the role of the translator in the transmission of canon. Adler particularly frames the 
‘Great Books’ canon as the works of their original or primary authors. This is fine while the 
book was authored in the reading language of the reader, and in an idiom that the reader is 
comfortable and familiar with, but becomes problematic when the written language is in a 
form of English for example that is alien to our reading ear. 
If we do not read ancient Greek or Enlightenment High German, we are dependent on the 
provision of translations. Thucydides is accessed for example through Rex Warner’s fine 
1954 translation or the older 1874 version by Richard Crawley. However, while the Penguin 
Classics edition lets Warner down by the provision of poor maps (essential for following the 
text) and a rudimentary index, Crawley enunciates on the stage provided by Strassler’s (1996) 
edition and its clear maps and extensive supporting essays by an array of contemporary 
experts. 
Thinking of The Iliad of Homer, my childhood introduction to the work was through Pope’s 
1715 translation, one that is as much Pope as it was Homer. Since then, of the many different 
Iliads on my shelves, I find that Homer speaks to me best through Fagles (1990), rather than 
say Rieu (1950) or Lattimore (1951). Going back to Clausewitz, the transmission of On War 
succeeded despite rather than because of the 1908 Maude and Graham translation. 
Thus, rather than being fixed, immutable things, as time passes classic become products of 
the original author and the editors and/or translators who re-render them accessible to the 
modern reader. The ‘hidden canon’ of key Russian texts I highlighted in Chapter Nine 
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illustrates this point. While their intrinsic value is lauded by Russian specialists, because 
many of them have not been translated into English or made widely available, they don’t 
feature on the ‘must-read’ lists that a canon represents. 
A farewell to canon 
Canon has been a useful concept through which to explore the ‘key texts’ component of my 
research topic. It allowed me to explore ideas like the longevity and reach of theory and the 
development and transmission of, and critical engagement with, the body of knowledge that 
the military arts and sciences are based on. Canon works as an idea in literature, especially in 
its broader humanistic conception, and is a particularly valuable concept where one is seeking 
to explore, and inquire on, the human condition.  
However, canon, in the limited sense that I have been exploring the term, while interesting 
from an academic perspective, does not fit the professional context under consideration. 
While there is a body of key texts that can currently be identified as being valuable for the 
mastery of war and the development of professional wisdom, this corpus is constantly 
changing and evolving, only a select few texts so far demonstrating the endurance to become, 
to use Thucydides’ (BCE 395/1972) idea, “a possession for all time”. 
Rather than through the lens of canon, I now believe that the idea of syllabus is the more 
appropriate concept to frame professional reading. The reading lists I have collected and 
studied, with their varied approach to challenging their consumers, laying out their cut on the 
military body of knowledge, and deciding and revising the texts to include as key readings, 
act like shadow syllabi complementing the formal military education programme. Scown 
(1998) notes that “the nature of a professional syllabus is that it should be constantly under 
review” (p.5). This is antithetical to the concept of canon. 
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Original contribution 
This research makes an original contribution to the literature and to professional practice 
through: 
• conducting the first qualitative review of professional military reading lists across 
national and service boundaries 
• updating the literature on the influence of professional reading on military leadership 
development through an interdisciplinary literature review as well as a qualitative 
interview engagement with military leaders and academics 
• applying the hermeneutic method to a military leadership context 
• and, forming, propagating, and validating principles for the development of 
professional reading lists. 
Implications for theory 
Implications for leadership theory 
I have attempted to approach the subject of military leadership through Keegan’s (1987) 
‘post-heroic’ lens. This has not been easy for, more so than any other leadership context, the 
library of military leadership is ablaze with the distracting flashes and smoke of the plumes, 
medals, gold lace, great deeds and heroism (Keegan and Wheatcroft, 1996, pp.vii-ix) that 
attires much popular, and some professional, military history and science.  
The conflation of the concepts of ‘hero’ and ‘genius’ particularly confound the study of 
military leadership. Clausewitz (1832/1976) devotes much thought to the idea of military 
genius and the conditions for its development. This is unsurprising considering the 
Napoleonic shadow his magnum opus was conceived in. He considered genius in quantitative 
and qualitative terms. For Clausewitz, the “condition of a society” was the relevant 
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determinant of the distribution or quantity of military genius within that society (1832/1976, 
p.100).  
According to Clausewitz (1832/1976), in modern or post-modern societies where there are a 
large range of social activities, military genius will be rare. In more ‘primitive’ societies (i.e. 
those where the social activities are more warlike) then, following Clausewitz, military 
genius will be much more numerous (1832/1976, p.100). An illustration of this idea can be 
seen in the panoply of military talent on display in the Iliad’s famous ‘ship scene’ where a 
roll-call of the warrior elite of the Greek world is given, none less than Odysseus, 
“mastermind like Zeus” (Homer, c.800 BCE/1997, pp.115-124).  
In contrast to the frequency of military genius, Clausewitz asserts that the quality of military 
genius depends on the “general intellectual development” of a given society. For Clausewitz, 
the most highly developed societies produce the most brilliant soldiers (1832/1976, p.100). 
The subtlety of the notion of “highly developed” is interesting and does not necessarily 
equate to most technologically developed. To a man like Clausewitz, highly developed would 
most likely relate to the prevailing intellectual environment of the society.  
How does this relate to my study? First it frames military leadership as a product of the 
dialect between the variables ‘individual’ and ‘social condition’. That the second of these 
variables is correct is argued convincingly by Keegan (1987, p.1) who sees military 
leadership as “stubbornly local and particular”, something shifting and changing from one 
age and place to another. The first of Clausewitz’ variables is altogether more problematic, 
maintaining as it does the primacy of the individual in the human endeavour. For Clausewitz 
seemingly, the march of history is one in which military genius concentrates into fewer and 
fewer leaders as society and social roles evolve and develop. It is pyramidal leadership 
(Greenleaf, 1977, p.74-5); top-down and singular. This presents challenges on many levels. 
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One implication of this is that leadership in the military, affected as it is by the conflicting 
and complementary forces of caste and professionalism, and continuity and change, does not 
lend itself well to examination and extrapolation using leadership models deriving from 
‘civilian’ life or from idealistic or teleologically intrinsic conceptions of leadership. This 
endorses Jackson and Parry’s (2008) caution about the need to conduct research that takes 
both emic and etic approaches: that is, studies conducted within as well as from outside the 
host culture (p.79), in this case military culture. 
Related to this is, when considering the military, the need to clearly distinguish between 
leadership education and the education of leaders. Hayes (2008) distinguishes between the 
former – instruction in leadership theory, concepts, and models of action – and the latter – the 
professional knowledge a leader needs to do their job (p.87). Rost (1993) differentiates these 
as the process of leadership and the content of leadership, with a mastery of professional 
content as the “stuff that separates the real people from the quiche makers” (p.4). The 
implication of this is that, like the critical thinking skills considered earlier, if a separate 
learning strand for the academic teaching of leadership is created away from the professional 
context it occurs in, something develops that is both potentially irrelevant and a further 
burden on the formal learning curriculum.  
Implications for methodology 
The research experience validates hermeneutics as a methodological perspective for research 
of this nature. This was illustrated by the need to be consciously aware of researcher 
prejudice and horizon in the interaction as an outsider with the cultural members of a research 
locus so notably ‘guarded’ as the armed forces.  
Prasad (2002) has examined the application of the hermeneutic method to organisational 
studies and concluded that, as an epistemology and philosophy of interpretation, 
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contemporary hermeneutics has expanded the scope of the term text to include not only 
documents in the conventional sense but also organisational practices and structures, social 
and economic activities and cultural artefacts. In methodological terms, he infers that scholars 
may legitimately adopt hermeneutics as a research approach not only for interpreting 
corporate documents but for investigating a whole host of micro-level and macro-level 
organisational phenomena such as leadership, motivation, empowerment, corporate strategy, 
and technological change, (p.19). 
Prasad (2002) observes that methodologically, hermeneutics as an approach for research 
requires the investigator to pay great attention to the context and history of the organisational 
phenomenon being studied, and hermeneutics as a methodology makes important demands on 
the organizational researcher’s capability for self-reflection and self-critique (p.19). Citing 
Gadamer’s guidance, Prasad (2002) highlights the necessity in hermeneutics to be conscious 
of one’s prejudices and allow them to be confronted by “texts whose meaning challenges the 
truth of our prejudices” (p.19). 
This has been an important grounding for my approach to this topic, my status as an 
‘outsider’ an ever-present consideration during our dialogue with this notoriously closed 
community. While comforted by Brodie’s (1973) assertion that outside observers are best 
able to judge clearly and objectively a particular culture (p.479), this was tested by off-hand 
comments from some senior officers questioning the credibility of this research project due to 
my lack of military service. I consider that the primary strength of the methodology is that it 
provides the researcher with an intellectual framework and method in which to derive 
objective, and thus verifiable, findings from a subjective approach (i.e. a single individual’s 
interpretation). The reliance on interpretation stems from the need to consider quantitative 
and qualitative data-sets that could, from a purely empirical perspective, be seen to contradict 
or nullify each other. 
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Implications for method 
Using a conceptual framework 
On initially exploring my research topic, it became clear that rather than there being a 
discrete ‘whole’ to investigate, the phenomenon I wished to consider was the sum of a 
number of key constituent parts. Some of these were less discernibly relevant to the topic 
than others, but felt important to explore nonetheless. Adding to the fog was my personal 
distance from the topic. Having never served in the military my approach to the topic was as 
an outsider, albeit a very well-read one. 
To allow me to conceive the topic in a conceptually manageable fashion, I decided to relate 
the constituent parts that were emerging – i.e. reading, professionalism, military leadership, 
intellectual development – to a framework that could be used to aid the data analysis, and 
then relate it back towards the key focus. With Miles and Huberman’s (1994) guidance in 
mind, this conceptual framework would enable me to label, arrange and define the 
interrelationships between the discrete concepts, factors or variables I was being confronted 
with (p.18). 
Nersessian (2008) discusses how concepts provide a means through which we can make 
sense of the world. By categorising experiences, phenomena can be sorted, relationships 
noted, and differences and interconnections identified and analysed. A conceptual framework 
is thus a way of systematising, or putting concepts in relation to one another in a coherent 
manner (p.391-2).  
As a caveat though, Nersessian (2008) also points out that conceptual structures are complex 
and intricate and, because of the difficulties inherent in examining the enormity of their 
whole all at once, trying to understand how a concept relates to others can reveal previously 
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unnoticed limitations and problems in the representational capabilities of the conceptual 
structures and can reveal inconsistencies with other parts of the structure (pp.391-2).  
In approaching the artefact of professional reading lists and the development of military 
leaders, I formulated, tested and retested the conceptual structure to satisfy myself that the 
framework was assisting, rather than shaping, the topic evaluation. Doing this required 
ongoing recourse to the visual depiction of hermeneutic circle supplied by Michrina and 
Richards (1996). Armed and aware of my particular prejudices and limited horizon, I 
engaged with the cultural text of the military through the constantly cycling stages of data-
gathering, interpretation, description, challenge, self-analysis, reformulation and back to data-
gathering, interpretation, and description. 
The implication of this is that the use of a conceptual framework requires an awareness of the 
strengths and weaknesses inherent in its construction and application, and that these 
weaknesses are hammered out through ongoing critical methodological examination. My 
consideration of the strengths of the conceptual framework is summed up in the saying “a 
picture paints a thousand words”. Understanding a complex phenomenon is facilitated, for me 
at least, by the visualisation of its components through the development of relational 
diagrams. Embodied in this strength is the prime weakness in my eyes. This is that the results 
of the application are dependent on the rigour of the initial construction of the framework. 
Being both constructor and applicator, the researcher must consider a self-developed 
conceptual framework more critically than one adopted from another tested source. 
Data analysis 
The use of data analysis software during this research was considered during the data 
collection period, when I was introduced to, and given the opportunity to use, prominent 
analytical software, particularly NVivo. While engagement with this software package 
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confirmed the potency of this tool, it raised questions regarding the compatibility of the use 
of such a tool with the philosophical inclinations of my chosen methodological approach. 
After some deliberation, a conscious decision was made to preserve the epistemological 
purity of my approach by relying on the long-standing analytical methods of the pre-digital 
age.  
This decision has been reinforced by Goble et al. (2012) who found that the introduction of 
software like NVivo into a project “invariably brings with it new practices, both extending 
and restricting human possibilities”. While the programmes expanded the scope and potential 
of projects, they stymied phenomenological analysis by creating practical conditions that are 
markedly unphenomenological [ital. in the original]” (p.46). They concluded that “while we 
as qualitative researchers may believe we are actively shaping the use of this software, we 
ignore at our peril how this software also shapes our research practices, our relationship to 
research, and ourselves as researchers” (Goble et al., 2012, p.46). 
While this is an argument this researcher endorses, it raises the spectre of the perennial debate 
regarding the authenticity of research (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982, Bryman, 2012) read as 
managing the balance between validity – the idea that a researcher’s observations or 
deductions are an accurate reflection of reality – and reliability – the extent to which the 
research methods, findings and interpretation can be repeated, yielding consistent outcomes 
(Kayrooz and Trevitt, 2005, ps.339 & 342). 
Mikhaylov et al. (2012) highlight how the debate over machine versus human coded content 
analysis largely revolves around this trade-off between reliability and validity. They point out 
that while proponents of computerised schemes of content analysis cite perfect reliability in 
their favour, they struggle to demonstrate validity. In contrast, they note that hand-coded 
schemes claim validity as a central advantage but then devote huge resources to attempts to 
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enhance reliability. While Laver and Garry (2000) convincingly present the case in favour of 
computer-based documentary analysis for teasing out meaning from data sets involving 
multiple texts and individual actors, Grimmer and Stewart (2013), though excited by the 
potential of digital methods, warn that, for now, they are no substitute for careful thought and 
close reading and require extensive and problem-specific validation.  
Having vexed great minds throughout the modern era, this is clearly an epistemological and 
ontological conundrum that will continue to be debated generally, and in the minds of 
individual researchers and their peer-reviewing or examining audiences.  
Implications for practice 
While the heels of this research may hover with Hermes, my methodological patron, the balls 
of our feet must remain planted firmly on terra firma; our research lives and dies in the arena 
of practical application. To this end, I have developed Twenty Principles (see Table Seven) 
for leaders with organisational learning and personnel development responsibility to consider 
and apply when developing and implementing the tool now familiar as a professional reading 
list. These principles have formed, re-formed and solidified throughout the research process, 
and have been shared with, and validated by, practitioners in the field (e.g. McMaster, 2012).  
These principles represent the sharp, applicable end of this research. Supported with further 
research and development on syllabus/curriculum, learning support, and, crucially, 
programme effectiveness measures, these principles might provide a foundation for the 
development and implementation of economical, forward and backward-facing, innovative, 
responsive and accessible organisational learning programmes. While the principles are 
oriented to professional military education, it is hoped that, backed by further research, they 
have application beyond the immediate context to other professions and contexts. 
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Table Seven: Twenty Principles 
Twenty Principles for the development of reading lists 
Pre-Development Principles 
1. Have a ‘sponsor’ for the reading list. They should believe it is an important resource, 
will support its development and implementation, and will be its ambassador in 
communiques, talks, and orders. 
2. Be clear on who exactly is the intended audience for the reading list as this will 
influence your list structure. All ranks? Officers only? Does ‘officer’ include NCOs?  
3. Be clear on the intended purpose of the reading list as this will influence your content. 
Is it to prepare your audience for a particular tour of duty or theatre? Is it to inform, 
motivate, indoctrinate, or challenge the intended audience? Is it part of a longer term 
professional military education initiative designed to promote and foster sustainable 
self-development among the audience? 
Structural Principles 
4. Decide on a structure (or whether to have a structure) to ‘grade’ the texts on the list i.e. 
by (a) level of perceived difficulty or by (b) recommendations by service rank. Beware! 
Option (b) is fraught with potential ‘alienation dilemmas’. 
5. Decide on a structure (or whether to have a structure) to theme or categorise the texts on 
the reading list. Develop a matrix of ‘topics’ the reading list will cover. These topics 
should ideally cover the main knowledge domains in the military profession’s body of 
knowledge. 
6. Ruthlessly limit the number of books on the list to the absolute essentials – less is more. 
Only select texts that suit your purpose and are the finest ‘teachers’. Resist selecting 
texts to flatter colleagues or self. Resist inclusion by default; a ‘classic’text should be on 
your list because of its utility not its intellectual cachet. 
Content Principles 
7. Your pre-development considerations will have established your audience and purpose. 
Decide on the academic disciplines, professional bodies of knowledge, or genres your 
audience could benefit from being exposed to. Reserve final judgement on the breadth 
and depth of this until all other content related questions are adequately resolved in your 
mind. 
8. Decide whether good military history should be the foundation of your list. 
9. Don’t underestimate the educational and engagement power of good fiction and poetry.  
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10. If your purpose is long-term, default to including texts with a proven providence i.e. 
those that have been tested by time and will endure. Resist ‘fad’ or ‘slogan’ works.  
11. If your purpose is short-term, then also default to including texts with a proven 
providence regarding a particular theatre, culture, aspect of human behaviour etc. 
12. Unless the purpose of the reading list is to indoctrinate, then seek to educate by 
including texts that challenge the mind and the mind-set/worldview of the audience. 
Particularly look for good translations of texts from outside the Anglophone world. 
Never underestimate the power of non-Anglophone authors (in translation) to 
challenge! 
13. Have a small selection of up-front ‘must reads’ to create a common referential text for 
all your audience. Is there a key service, campaign, or motivational/leadership work(s) 
that can ‘anchor’ the list? 
14. Create a ‘space’ around the reading list for discussion, debate, and information sharing 
to occur. Would a simple online forum or wiki enhance the reading list and the 
audience’s ownership of it through making it more inter-active? 
Accessibility Principles 
15. Review your content selections with intellectual accessibility for your particular 
audience and purpose in mind. A concise derivative summary of a classic work may be 
of more value to your purpose than the original work itself. 
16. Review your content selections with physical accessibility for your particular audience 
and purpose in mind. Are texts readily available to your audience and in quantity? Are 
they purchasable at a reasonable price? Are they available for free as e-book 
downloads? 
17. Ensure your list is balanced with shorter and longer works. Consider for some texts 
recommending what your audience can skip and what is essential reading. 
18. Support the key readings with links or references to other sources e.g. further readings, 
key journal papers, reference texts, films, online media including webcasts etc. 
Implementation Principles 
19. If the list has sponsorship at the highest level and if professional reading is important to 
your particular organisation, then build an interaction with the reading list into your 
mentoring and professional review processes. 
20. Be patient – reading lists produce slow and incremental results! 
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Limitations of the research 
I have identified three limitations of this research. These are the two related questions 
concerning the breadth of my international enquiry and my consideration of data from all 
military services, and the question of reinforcement bias in the data sample. 
During the initial data-gathering exercise, I was cautioned by one defence academic to limit 
my study to professional reading in the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New 
Zealand Armies’ (ABCA) programme, both to keep the focus manageable and ensure 
accessibility to data and literature in a language I could readily understand. While this advice 
was, and is, sound, an interest in the strategic culture and literature of non-Western countries 
from previous research (McElhatton, 2008a) compelled my data gathering focus to remain as 
global as language and other literature permitted. 
I stand by this decision, giving me, as it has, an insight into the professional reading of 
militaries in continental Europe, Asia, and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. However, my 
picture is a fragmentary one. Despite extensive efforts, I was unable to gather data from 
continental Africa and the Middle East, as well as many important military institutions in 
Asia and Latin America as well as the former Soviet Union/eastern bloc of Europe. 
Related to this was my decision to consider professional reading from a trans-service 
perspective. This was more an iterative rather than a conscious decision, and primarily 
stemmed from the ‘neither fish nor fowl’ character of the U.S. Marine Corps whose 
professional reading programme I became quickly acquainted with in the initial research 
phase. While the popular imagination associates the U.S. Marine Corps with land campaigns 
in WWII in the Pacific and the Vietnam War, its operational focus is power projection from 
the sea and has, since its inception, come under the oversight of the U.S. Department of Navy 
(Krulak, 1996b).  
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My interest in this navy that is an army, and immersion in the joint services doctrine and 
education at strategic levels, opened my interest in professional reading lists from other 
maritime and aerial services. While the analysis of this data, and the insights provided by 
non-Army service personnel, enriched our research, my aim to arrive at some ‘universal’ 
insights into military leadership development might be undermined by the low proportion of 
data from the other services I gathered and analysed in comparison to that from armies, and 
the very real differences in professional practices and leadership, perceived and actual, 
between these services. 
In considering my third limitation, I refer to Kayrooz and Trevitt’s (2005) meditation on the 
objective consideration of phenomena through the limited perceptions of participants and the 
impact of contextual change on those perceptions. They demonstrate that research in 
organisational settings is complex because it is tempered by people’s limited, and/or varied, 
perceptions (p.9).  
When discussing the qualitative component of my research – the research interviews – with 
peers, particularly those with both an academic and service background, I was repeatedly 
challenged with three related questions:  
1. Has reinforcement bias come into play through your targeting of particular individuals 
for interview who showed a positive inclination towards your research questions? 
2. Has their actual participation reinforced this inclination? 
3. Will your subjects – military professionals – for a variety of reasons, monetary and 
professional pride, actually be truthful about the academic inclinations and activities 
of self and service? 
While the first two points are moot, the extracts given in Chapters Eight and Nine are candid 
about the reality of professional reading in the military. Yes, my engagement with individual 
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officers was facilitated by their interest in, and promotion of, my research focus. However 
their input into the research was forthright and far from dewy-eyed regarding the limitations 
of their profession. 
Finally, during previous presentations of this research, comment has been made on the 
apparently innate male gender-centricity of the work. While there is some truth to this 
criticism, it needs pointing out that this does not reflect any calculated design, merely the 
historical dominance, still largely prevailing, of the military profession by males. 
Areas for further research 
An aspect of the professional military reading lists worthy of further consideration is their use 
of Science Fiction and Historical Fiction works to promote models and ideals of leadership. 
The spectre of Prudentia rears again because, while the works by Heinlein and Card are set in 
a possible future, they depict a futurised past – in the case of Starship Troopers, a 
modernised, but clearly identifiable Sparta. The depiction of leadership in these works would 
trouble those who embrace ideals of transformative or servant leadership. That they are 
considered by the highest military authorities to have valuable lessons to impart is worthy of 
further inquiry. 
I have collected a significant number of reading lists from the late nineteenth-century through 
to the mid-1990s period where my main focus of enquiry begins. While I have made some 
brief analysis and commentary on these, the opportunity to engage in a fuller consideration of 
the evolution of professional military reading trends over time presents itself. Until we see 
the full digitisation of relevant archives, this topic would require a significant amount of 
archival research in the great collections in the U.K., U.S. and Europe. 
Also collected were reading lists issued by war, defence, and strategic studies departments 
from universities and research institutes with a predominantly ‘civilian’ (i.e. non-uniformed) 
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purview and target audience. These lists were not included in my analysis because their 
primary consumers were not military officers. A future comparative analysis of the texts they 
recommend and the texts the professional military reading lists recommend would provide an 
interesting insight into the differing worldviews and approaches to development through 
reading by each group. 
I have considered the means militaries use to develop their learning capabilities or 
‘organisational wisdom’ through self-development, and examined two ‘sub-questions’ that I 
have had to ‘converse’ and interact with towards our interpretive inquiry: the means and ends 
of professional military education and the nature of military wisdom. A by-product of this 
inquiry has been a consideration of how modern militaries function as ‘holding environments 
for knowledge’, particularly with regard to the learning relationship between the minds of 
their leaders and the textual sources of military knowledge. This is an area for further 
research. 
Closing thoughts 
In the introduction, examples were shown of two commanders who had so closely studied 
history that they could see enough analogy in the events of the past to give them guidance to 
their endeavours in their present. General Patton’s ardent study of military history gave him 
flashes of strategic insight so intense that he felt it akin at times to some effect of 
reincarnation (Duggan, 2005). Nearer to home, our prior immersion in Major-General Sir 
Howard Kippenberger’s autodidactic approach to mastering the military arts (McElhatton, 
2008b) led to my research topic on the influence of professional reading on the development 
of military leadership. 
However, as political and economic changes continue to shape and re-shape professional 
education, particularly within public sector professions like the armed services, situational 
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forms of learning like self-directed and collective informal learning is gaining more attention 
from educators and, importantly, those with responsibility for setting organisational education 
policy and procurement (Simpson et al., 2004). I have previously argued that directed and 
concentrated professional reading is intellectual self-development in its purest and most 
immutable form (McElhatton and Jackson, 2011a). There have long existed exemplars of the 
military reader-leader, but the model conveyed by Dietrich (1989) of the still-to-develop 
George S. Patton is illuminating; his “professional reading was only one of several pillars of 
his intellectual development as a soldier, but it may have been the most important one 
overall”. Compiling a reading list is a key step in creating any programme of professional 
development (Stohry, 1993).   
In principle the ideal of the warrior scholar is a noble one to pursue. Like all ideals however, 
reality has a disturbing habit of intruding, or to paraphrase Moltke the Elder, no ideal 
survives contact with reality. The professional soldier must balance reading obligations with 
the demands of occupational and personal life. Work schedules, demanding fitness regimes, 
ongoing technical training requirements, and, for many, the responsibilities and distractions 
of family life and multi-media entertainment, squeezes the time left available for engagement 
with texts, even engagement with texts on a reading list.  
D.H.M. Henry acknowledges that even for a ‘Leatherneck’ these conflicting demands make 
“allocating sufficient time to the US Marine Corps Professional Reading Program at the end 
of everyone's ‘to do’ list. Unfortunately, for most military personnel, they have to spend their 
reading time for other things” (Henry, 2006). Plato, through the medium of Socrates, while 
acknowledging that these conflicting demands exist, has no tolerance for the professional 
soldier who allows one professional military education demand to trump another.  
They need intellectual eagerness, and must learn easily. For the mind shirks mental 
hardship more than physical…anyone who takes it up must have no…inhibitions 
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about hard work. He mustn’t be only half inclined to work, and half not –for instance 
a man who is very fond of hunting and athletics…but has no inclination to learn, 
listen and inquire (Plato, c. 360 BCE/1955). 
 
The complex nature of reading makes it something that, evidence from a neuro-science 
perspective aside, is inherently difficult to study and reach empirically based conclusions. Its 
effects are incremental and not isolatable from other environmental factors; e.g. Eugene was 
an avid reader but circumstance, temperament, heritage (his mother) etc. were so vitally 
important to his psychological make-up, and therefore his generalship (Bevan, 1975, pp.198-
9), that it would only be self-serving to isolate one of these factors and say ‘there is the key 
factor’. Adrian Liddell-Hart (1976), despite his father’s long assertions, doubted whether a 
direct correlation could be determined between the influence of writers and theorists and the 
actual conduct of war (p.5).71 Winton (2011) argues that military theory can be quite useful in 
the maturation of military commanders, but it is not always necessary and by no means 
perfect, and thus should be studied assiduously but used with caution. 
In Chapter Three I note Socrates’ antipathy to the medium of written knowledge. Socrates 
concerns were, that in transforming from an oral/memory culture where knowledge was 
stored in the mind and transmitted through social conversation, to a written culture where the 
guardianship of knowledge was entrusted to the page and transmitted through textual 
engagement, the very act of thinking, the process of human inquiry, would irrevocably 
change. He was right. 
As Barber (1964) noted, before writing, all cultural traditions had to be memorised and, while 
the human memory is capable of storing much more than our twenty-first-century under-
exercised mind might appreciate, there are still limits to what memory alone can store, and 
                                                 
71
 A soldier, adventurer, businessman and journalist, Liddell-Hart junior had a distinguished and varied military 
career including service in the British Army, Royal Navy and the French Foreign Legion (Danchev, 1998). 
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thus, the permanent expansion of human knowledge has been dependent on its collection and 
codification in written form (p.50). 
Neuroscience-based research like that of Wolf (2007) and Dehaene (2009) show the impact 
that the act of reading in all its variety and complexity has had, and continues to have, on the 
structure and activity of the human brain. We see this developmentally by observing the life-
cycle of human growth and the anomalies of conditions like dyslexia. We see this culturally 
as we observe the differences today in the brain activities of alphabetic, ideographic, or non-
literate cultures, and those that read left-to-right, right-to-left, top-to-bottom or not at all. And 
finally, we see this historically, as humans have moved from oral to written, to mass-print, 
and now to digital, cultures. As Wolf (2007)  points out, humans are not born to read, and 
humanity was never destined to read. Writing and reading is singularly humanities’ greatest 
invention and agent for intellectual change. 
Arguably, the changes in the way we read in the digital age are the fourth major milestone in 
the ongoing evolution of the impact of reading on brain structure and activity. As in Socrates’ 
day, this will have an impact on the very act of thinking, on the process of human inquiry, on 
the intellectual development of our species. And as in Socrates’ day, this will be both to our 
benefit and to our detriment, though proportionately in what order we cannot yet know, and 
when we can, it will be too late to change. 
Wolf’s (2007) erudite work was named Proust and the Squid. Hitchens (2008) draws from 
Proust that, “the past is never really over” (p.143). My research journey has revealed patterns 
and connections, a sense that many things do in fact connect each other, that the logos 
concept is something real, maybe a grand map of the human experiment. Lifelong reading 
helps illuminate the connections that little bit more. We have seen that experience alone is a 
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difficult teacher; learning from others’ mistakes is a much more profitable and less costly 
exercise.  
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ANNEX THREE: RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM 
Research Information Sheet 
Emmet McElhatton, PhD candidate, School of Government, Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand. http://www.victoria.ac.nz/  
Researcher email: emmet.mcelhatton@xtra.co.nz  
Supervisors’ emails: lance.beath@vuw.ac.nz   b.jackson@auckland.ac.nz  
 
Research Topic: Professional Reading in the Education of Leaders 
 
 
This research seeks to explore the role of reading in the education of, particularly military, 
leaders. The research explores the phenomenon of the 'professional reading list' and its 
impact and the place of 'classic' texts in modern military education. 
 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as part of this research. The interview will consist 
of open-ended questions which you are free to answer in any manner you see fit. You may 
refuse to answer any question. You may terminate the interview at any point during the 
interview. This interview will be recorded a using digital recording device. Access to the 
'raw' interview audio will be limited to the researcher and his supervisors. All audio will be 
stored in a secure, password protected location. All audio will be destroyed five years after 
the completion of the thesis. 
 
You can choose to indicate to the interviewer either before or after the interview whether you 
wish your comments to be either fully or partially attributable or wholly confidential. If 
during the course of the interview you wish to make some comment non-attributable or 
confidential please indicate so during or immediately after the interview. You will be asked 
to sign a consent form before the interview commences. This consent form can be reviewed 
after the interview is completed if you wish to make any changes to the attribution status of 
all or some of your comments.  
 
The interview should take no more than 30 minutes to complete. Your time is valuable so 
your participation is highly valued. 
 
The researcher will seek to publish the whole or part of his thesis in book or journal formats. 
 
This survey has received ethical approval from a Victoria University of Wellington Human 
Ethics Committee 
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Consent for Interview  
 
Emmet McElhatton, PhD candidate, School of Government, Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand. http://www.victoria.ac.nz/  
Researcher email: emmet.mcelhatton@xtra.co.nz       
Supervisors’ emails: lance.beath@vuw.ac.nz   b.jackson@auckland.ac.nz 
 
Research Topic: Professional Reading in the Education of Leaders 
 
 
 I have been provided with adequate information relating to the nature and  objectives 
of this research project, I have understood that information and have been given the 
opportunity to seek further clarification or explanations. 
 
 I understand that I may withdraw from this research at any time before the  final 
analysis of data without providing reasons.    
 
 I understand that if I withdraw from the project, any audio commentary and 
 subsequent communications I have provided will be destroyed. 
 
 I understand that the information I have provided will be used only for this 
 research project and that any further use will require my written consent. 
 
 I understand that five years after this research is completed the audio recording will
 be destroyed. 
 
Attribution of Comments 
 
 I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept 
 confidential and reported only in an aggregated/non-attributable form or 
 
 I consent to information or opinions expressed in this interview and subsequent 
communications being attributed to me or 
 
 I consent to information or opinions expressed in this interview and subsequent 
communications being only partially attributable to me as indicated during the course 
of the interview. 
 
Interviewee name: 
 
 
Interviewee signature:  
 
 
Date: 
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